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3ABSTRACT
This thesis contains three essays on the impact evaluation of social programs and
public sector reforms.
Chapter 2 investigates whether the effects of a cash transfer program persist or wear
off in the long-run. I study the first two phases of Bono de Desarrollo Humano
(BDH) in Ecuador, each of which lasted about five years. My identification strategy
uses a regression discontinuity design and relies on the fact that at the threshold
of eligibility, the second assignment to treatment (in 2008/9) was independent of
the first assignment (in 2003). This allows me to disentangle the impact of a
short exposure to the program (treatment during one phase) from a long exposure
(treatment during two phases). Most of the gains in enrollment and schooling were
achieved in the short-run among children that started treatment when they were
about to start elementary school, eleventh grade or Baccalaureate. However, an
extended exposure to BDH was not enough to keep raising children’s education.
Regarding labor market outcomes, BDH had a negative (not statistically significant)
impact on the probability of working among young children but did not increase job
opportunities among young adults in the long-run.
Chapter 3 evaluates the impact on in-hospital mortality of a reform that made
all health professionals working part-time switch to full-time contracts at public
hospitals in Ecuador. I take advantage of the staggered adoption of the reform and
hospital panel data to implement an event study to evaluate the impact of the reform.
The results for the sample of admissions to the emergency department show that
mortality in public hospitals decreased by 0.1% on the adoption year and by 0.2%
one year later. Results were robust to several alternative specifications and to the
inclusion of pre-reform characteristics that could have been used by policymakers
4to decide the order of implementation. More importantly, I show that the effects
reported in this paper cannot be attributed to changes in other quality indicators at
the hospital level like the length of stay or by changes in the patient mix.
Chapter 4 studies the impact of increased liability risk facing physicians on the use of
c-sections and on indicators of maternal and infant health. I take advantage of a legal
reform that led to the hardening of sentences for cases of professional malpractice
in Ecuador. I use a difference-in-difference strategy that compares the outcomes of
two neighboring countries, Ecuador and Colombia, before and after the introduction
of the reform and perform several parallel trend tests on the outcomes of interest and
test for the stability of the demographic composition of both countries to support my
identification strategy. During the five quarters following the reform, Ecuadorian
doctors reduced the c-section rate by 1.1% among women aged 15 to 24 years, and
by 0.9% among women aged 25 to 34 years. The c-section rate remained unaffected
for women aged 35 to 44 years, possibly because doctors have less discretion over
riskier births. Interestingly, the observed reduction in the c-section rate did not
affect the health outcomes of mothers or newborns.
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C h a p t e r 1
INTRODUCTION
In developing countries, where social insurance covers a small fraction of the pop-
ulation, labor market regulations are thin and poorly enforced, and the incidence
of poverty is high, the focus of social protection systems is on social assistance
programs like non-contributory pensions and cash transfer programs (Barrientos,
2011). Latin American countries are at the forefront of developing countries’ efforts
to build stronger social protection systems (Naranjo, 2014). These countries not
only are pioneers in the use of cash transfer programs, with the first conditional cash
transfer programs being implemented in Mexico and Brazil by the end of the 90s.
They have also been very active with the implementation of other initiatives includ-
ing subsidized social security pensions for retired workers (where the government
contributes with part of the cost and the other part is paid by the employee) and in
the expansion of health protection (Naranjo, 2014).
Cash transfer programs are one of the most powerful tools in the fight against
poverty and inequality in Latin America. By 2011 these programs had already
spread across 18 countries in the region, covering close to 129 million beneficiaries
(Stampini and Tornarolli, 2012). Many of the conditional cash transfer programs
in the region have pursued an integrated approach to poverty reduction, balancing
goals of social assistance and human capital formation. For this, they target women
with children and condition the receipt of benefits to school enrollment and regular
health checkups. Some examples include the conditional cash transfer programs in
Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Panama (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
Cash transfer programs vary widely in terms of the overall objectives they pursue
and in terms of coverage. In Latin America, some programs put more emphasis on
17
human capital formation while others focus more on income redistribution. There
are also programs like Chile Solidario, were families commit to household-specific
action plans as a precondition for receiving the benefits. In other regions of the
globe these programs have been used to reduce gender disparities in education or to
help alleviate the consequences of epidemics and natural dissasters. In general, the
versatility of these programs explains why they have become so popular worldwide
and why the interest in conditional cash transfers has spread from developing to
developed countries—most recently to programs inNewYorkCity andWashington,
DC. (Fiszbein et al., 2009).
In terms of coverage, most Latin American programs, like Mexico’s Oportunidades
and Chile Solidario, target only households living in extreme poverty, while other
countries like Ecuador have a more inclusive approach, targeting a broader share
of the population. More precisely, relative coverage ranges from approximately
40 percent of the population in Ecuador to about 20 percent in Brazil and Mexico
and 5 percent in Chile (Fiszbein et al., 2009). The economic importance of these
programs is such that in 13 countries of the region, by 2010, they represented over
20% of poor beneficiaries’ incomes and studies suggest that the poverty headcount
index in those countries would have been on average 13% higher, had conditional
cash transfers not been implemented (Stampini and Tornarolli, 2012).
Cash transfers have become central to social protection systems by helping vulner-
able households weather shocks while incentivizing human capital accumulation
since the early stages of child development. A long literature reports that cash trans-
fers have been effective in increasing enrollment and cognitive development among
treated children; and in reducing child labor (Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Schady
et al., 2008; Behrman, Parker, et al., 2011; Behrman, Sengupta, et al., 2005; Kugler
and Rojas, 2018). The success of the basic model is prompting countries to address
second and third rounds of challenges with complementary actions to ensure that
18
conditional cash transfers have a greater impact. Some of them include expanding
access to health care and education and exploring possible ways to make benefits
conditional on performance and not conditional on mere service use (Fiszbein et al.,
2009).
In the last two decades, cash transfers have become one of the main tools against
poverty. However, inequality of income and opportunities remain high, in particular
with regards to access to public services like health care and education (OECD,
2017).1 Health systems in Latin America remain highly fragmented and unable to
cover the most vulnerable population. There is also a high portion of the middle-
class that does not have access to contributory social insurance programs (44%
and 34% of those in the third and fourth quintile, respectively). It is precisely the
low rates of social insurance coverage and the difficulty to reach out to informal
workers, that led to the expansion of non-contributory programs (cash transfers)
and the development of health-assistance programs for those excluded from the
contributory systems (OECD, 2017).
Health systems in Latin America were inspired by the Beveridge-type model of a
National Health Service based on universal access and funded from tax revenues,
yet, it was never fully implemented (Giovanella et al., 2012). The ‘debt crisis’
during the 80s and 90s, intensified the problems. The structural adjustment policies
imposed by international financial institutions prompted cuts in public spending and
led some countries to set up partial health insurances with minimum services to
cover only specific groups such as pregnant women, infants, and the extremely poor
(Giovanella et al., 2012). As a result of these and some more recent reforms, the
health systems in Latin America consist of a private sector block and two separate
public sector blocks: a well resourced social security health system for salaried
1The average Gini coefficient went from 0.51 in the early 1990s to 0.42 in 2015 but relative
poverty (i.e., households with incomes less than half of the median) decreased by only 4 percentage
points between 2000 and 2014.
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workers and their families and a Ministry of Health serving poor and vulnerable
people with low quality standards (Cotlear et al., 2015).
During the 2000’s or the so called period of economic prosperity in Latin Amer-
ica, several countries implemented health reforms focused on improving access and
quality of health services in the public sector. For some countries of the region this
also meant dealing with old problems related to the difficulties to attract health pro-
fessionals, insufficient training, and a tendency to specialization among physcians
at the expense of the large number of professionals required in the first level of care,
all of which constitute major constraints to achieving the goal of universal health
coverage (Maeda et al., 2014). Some of the reforms implemented in this regard
include training programs for community doctors in Argentina and Venezuela, the
creation of a specific secretariat responsible for the human resources management
and training in Brazil (Giovanella et al., 2012), and a reform in Ecuador that made all
health professionals working part-time switch to full-time contracts at public hos-
pitals in Ecuador, which aimed to increase the available doctor-hours at emergency
departments.
In this thesis, I study three different government interventions that took place in
Ecuador in the era of economic recovery that followed the dollarization in January
2000. Ecuador is the eight largest economy in Latin America2 with a developing
economy that is highly dependent on commodities like petroleum and agricultural
products. After the dollarization of the economy, in January 2000, Ecuador ex-
perienced inclusive growth fueled by a favorable external environment and by the
increase in oil prices (Rubalcaba et al., 2017). Studying Ecuador during the era of
economic recovery is interesting for several reasons. First, Ecuador is one of the
ten countries in Latin America that between 2004 and 2009 underwent a profound
transformation with left and center-left presidential candidates winning electoral
2Source: CIA World Factbook
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contests (Pribble, 2013).3 With some variations, these governments introduced
several universalistic social policies aimed at guaranteeing coverage for a set of
essential social services and ensuring a basic minimum income for all its citizens
(Pribble, 2013).4
By 2011, Ecuador was the only country in the region that assigned more than 1%
of its GDP to cash transfers, while other countries like Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay only assigned between 0.09% and 0.35% of
their GDP (Amarante and Brun, 2016). Stampini and Tornarolli (2012) compare
the performance on poverty reduction of several cash transfers programs in various
Latin American countries over the period 2004-2010. They found that Ecuador
experienced the largest reduction in the poverty headcount index in absolute terms – a
reduction of 3.3 percentage points –, followed by Brazil andMexico with a reduction
of 1.7 percentage points respectively, while in Chile, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Panama,
and Paraguay, cash transfers reduced poverty by less than one percentage point.
Amarante and Brun (2016) reached similar conclusions for the period between 2011
to 2013, when Ecuador exhibited the highest decrease in the incidence of poverty
as a consequence of transfers – 2.4 percentage points –, followed by Uruguay with
1 percentage point.
As a result of a favorable external environment, Ecuador’s gross national income-
per-capita rose from 1,540 dollars in 2000 to 6,130 dollars in 2014;5 and, the
poverty rate decreased significantly between 2000 and 2014 from 64.4% to 21.7%
in 2014.6. However, income inequality remained high. Even though the Gini index
3Argentina (2003, 2007, and 2011), Brazil (2002, 2006, and 2010), Bolivia (2005 and 2009),
Chile (2000 and 2006), Ecuador (2006 and 2009), El Salvador (2009), Nicaragua (2006),Paraguay
(2008), Uruguay (2004 and 2010), and Venezuela (1998, 2000, 2006, and 2012)
4Universalistic policies provide income transfers and public services of a similar size and quality
for all citizens. Importantly, access to programs must be transparent, making sure that benefits are
allocated on the basis of legal criteria (Pribble, 2013)
5Source: World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files. The
figures are in current US dollars.
6Source: World Bank Indicators. Poverty is measured as the headcount ratio at the national
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decreased from 56.4 in 2000 to 45 in 20147, by 2012, more than 50% of total income
was concentrated by households in the richest quintile, while 26% was distributed
among the 60%poorest households and 22% among households in the fourth income
quintile (Naranjo, 2014). Inequality in access to public services is also a big concern
in Ecuador. By 2004, almost a third of Ecuador’s population lacked regular access to
health services, while more than two-thirds had no health insurance and insufficient
resources to pay for health care services (López-Cevallos and Chi, 2010). Whereas
regarding access to education, children in the top income quintile achieve around 6
more years of education when compared to children of the same age in the lowest
quintile (Cruces et al., 2014).
Economic prosperity paved the way for several reforms to the health sector and
to the existing legislation seeking to expand access to public services. In 2008,
Ecuador reformed its constitution and included access to health care as a right of
all citizens and a responsibility of the state (Giovanella et al., 2012).8 The new
constitution also declared that public education should be free from the first year of
basic education up to the undergraduate level. What followed was a marked increase
in public spending during the 2000’s. The budget for education grew significantly
in the 2000-2012 period, from 3.4% of GDP in 2000 to 4.8% of GDP in 2012.
Similarly, the health care budget increased from 0.8% of GDP in 2000 to 2.1% of
GDP in 2012 (Naranjo, 2014). This growth in spending has been accompanied by
an important improvement in some education and health indicators. For instance,
the net enrollment rate for baccalaureate grew from 42.1% in 2003 to 65.1% in
2014, while the maternal mortality ratio decreased from 65.45 per one thousand
inhabitants in 2000 to 49.16 per one thousand inhabitants in 2014; and, the infant
poverty line of 1.90 dollars
7Source: World Bank Indicators
8However, despite these reforms, according to specialists in the healthcare sector, Ecuador
has never undergone a real reform process involving a deep and sustained change in the sector’s
fragmented structure (Naranjo, 2014).
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mortality rate decreased from 15.46% in 2000 to 8.35% in 2014.9 Yet, there is no
rigorous evidence suggesting that the increase in spending generated commensurate
improvements in health and education.
This thesis is composed of three independent papers (chapters 2, 3 and 4); each paper
draws onmethods in economics to evaluate three different interventions/reforms that
happened during the period of economic prosperity in Ecuador. In each paper, I use
quasi-experimental methods where institutions generate situations close to random
assignment, to recover the causal effects of interest (Angrist and Krueger, 1999).
In Chapter 2, I investigate the short- and long-term effects of Bono de Desarrollo
Humano (BDH) on young people’s education and labor market outcomes. BDH is
the main cash transfer program in Ecuador. It was initially advertised as a condi-
tional cash transfer program requiring mothers to take children to health checkups
and to enroll them at school. However, soon after its implementation, it became
an unconditional transfer due to lack of administrative capacity to monitor the con-
ditions. Several short-term evaluations show that BDH has had positive effects in
enrollment and cognitive and socio-emotional development among treated children;
as well as negative effects on child work (Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Schady et al.,
2008). However, until recently there were no studies on the long-term effects of this
program and much less evidence on the persistence of its short-term effects in the
long-run.
By 2014, the program had two phases, each lasting 5 years. Hence, people who were
eligible during the two phases of the program received the transfer for a maximum of
10 years. Unlike the previous literature that looks at how well the original treatment
and control groups performed after several years of a program’s implementation, the
main question I address is whether children who were treated for a longer period of
time continued achieving better outcomes compared to similar children who were
9Source: Compendio Estadístico del 2014, INEC.
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treated for a shorter period of time. In other words, I study whether treatment
continued being effective after several years of targeting the same population.
I build a unique data set that uses Ecuadorian Social Registry micro-data linked
to BDH payments data that allows me to track the treatment status of children
and their academic and labor market trajectories.10 The main challenge was to
construct a panel at the individual-level linking the three waves of the Ecuadorian
Social Registry using probabilistic record linkage. I describe the main details of
the process in the corresponding data section in Chapter 2, however, more details
regarding attrition and sample balancing can be found in Appendix A.
My identification strategy relies on the fact that at the threshold of eligibility, the
second assignment to treatment (in 2008/9) was independent of the first assignment
(in 2003). This allows me to disentangle the impact of a long exposure to BDH
(treatment during phases one and two) versus a short exposure (treatment during
phase one only) by comparing the outcomes observed at the end of phase two
of children who were treated during phase one and were also marginally treated
(or not) during phase two. The results show that most of the gains in enrollment
and schooling were achieved by children that were treated during one phase of the
program and started treatment at juncture ages (5, 12 and 15 years). However, an
extended exposure to BDH was not enough to keep raising children’s education.
Apart from being one of the first studies to investigate the persistence of the effects
of cash transfers in the long-run, the methodology proposed in this paper consti-
tutes a tool that other countries could use to evaluate programs that have similar
characteristics to BDH. In particular, programs that use Social Registry data and a
secret targeting rule to select beneficiaries, which changes from time to time when
10Social Registries are information systems that support registration, and determination of poten-
tial eligibility for social programs (Leite et al., 2017). In their comparative study, Leite et al. (2017)
analyze a sample of 32 countries that use social registries to illustrate their extensive use in social
policy
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governments update the information from the Social Registry or decide to change
the targeting rule. This would help to create accountability and to avoid having
ineffective and expensive cash transfer programs that are not reformed for political
reasons.
Chapter 3 moves to the analysis of health care reforms in Ecuador. Several studies
in developed countries suggest that there is a trend of declining working hours
of doctors (Swami et al., 2017; Broadway et al., 2017).11 In response to this
phenomenon and a growing demand for healthcare services, several countries have
implemented policies that operate in the intensive margin to increase the working
hours of doctors and consequently expand health coverage (Dolton and Pathania,
2016; Swami et al., 2017). However, evidence from stated preference studies
suggests that if doctors are given a choice, they would not choose to work more
hours (Broadway et al., 2017). This paper studies for the first time a reform that
replaced all part-time contracts in public health establishments and banned the
creation of new part-time and occasional contracts, forcing doctors to work at least
8 hours a day or 40 hours per week. The reform – that started in 2009–, increased the
number of doctor-hours at public hospitals. Hence the question I address is whether
it had a positive effect on hospitals’ quality as measured by in-hospital mortality.
I use information from hospital resources data, patient discharges and budget data
to build a balanced panel of public hospitals from 2004 until 2014. I use the infor-
mation on the number of health professionals with part-time contracts from hospital
resources data and information from a series of resolutions issued by the Ministry
of Labor that established particular adoption dates for each of the different groups
of public hospitals, to identify the year of adoption for every hospital in the panel.
For this, I identified the year of an unusually large reduction in part-time contracts
11Some of the reasons for this decline are a greater preference for working predictable and fewer
hours and increased participation of women in the medical workforce
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within the period of adoption signaled in the resolutions.12 The staggered adoption
of the reform across public hospitals allowed me to implement an event study to
evaluate the impact of the reform on in-hospital mortality. Importantly, I show that
once hospital and year fixed effects are controlled for in the model, the timing of
adoption was exogenous to several measures of in-hospital mortality. Not only hos-
pitals did not get to choose their adoption dates; but also, there is no evidence that
the government decided the implementation schedule based on hospitals’ observable
characteristics. Proof of this is that the results of the econometric models remain
robust to the inclusion of pre-reform characteristics that could be considered by the
authorities that designed the implementation schedule. With this in mind, I argue
that any change in hospital mortality observed after the adoption of the reform can
be interpreted as the causal effect of the reform.
The labor reform analyzed in this chapter is of interest to other countries in the region
that are trying to expand health coverage. Ecuador is to the best of my knowledge the
only country in the region that has adopted such a drastic reform with the intention
of homogenizing the working conditions of professionals in the public sector and
expanding health coverage. I find that the reform was successful in reducing in-
hospital mortality, especially mortality within the first 48 hours of admission. This
was true for the complete sample of admissions as well as for admissions to the
emergency department. Importantly, I show that the effects reported in this paper
cannot be attributed to changes in other quality indicators at the hospital level like
the length of stay or by changes in the patient mix.
Chapter 4 studies whether changes to malpractice pressure facing physicians have
effects on the use of c-sections and on measures of infant health and maternal
12Instead of this data-driven approach, I plan to use the complete implementation schedule as
soon as I get access to it, but I do not expect to see significant changes in the results, considering that
the main adoption dates are established in the resolutions of the Ministry of Labor and that for the
event study I do not require the exact date of adoption, just the year.
26
mortality. A large literature has found that the liability system is an important de-
terminant of health care provision (Baicker et al., 2006; Frakes, 2013; Kerschbamer
and Sutter, 2017; Kessler and McClellan, 1996). I evaluate the effects of a reform
to the malpractice legislation in Ecuador that took place in August 2014 and led to
the hardening of sentences for cases of professional malpractice. I focus on the field
of obstetrics because this is an area where doctors are very prone to malpractice
suits, as have been documented by the literature on this topic in developed countries
(Dubay et al., 1999; Currie and MacLeod, 2008).
To investigate whether doctors in Ecuador reacted to the malpractice reform, I use a
difference-in-difference strategy that compares the outcomes of interest in Ecuador
and Colombia before and after the reform. The results of several parallel trend
tests on the outcomes of interest and tests for the stability of the demographic
composition of both countries support my identification strategy. Previous studies
for Ecuador warn about the excessive use of unnecessary c-sections in the period
prior to the malpractice reform. The reform provides a unique opportunity to
asses whether these excess c-sections were socially wasteful or not. For this, I test
whether the reduction in c-sections that was triggered by the malpractice reform was
accompanied by an improvement in infant or maternal health indicators (or remained
unaffected), in which case the extra c-sections are deemed socially wasteful (Kessler
and McClellan, 2002; Dubay et al., 2001).
This paper contributes to the literature on over-provision of health services, one of
the major drivers of health care costs and a source of concern throughout the world
(Cohen et al., 2015). The case of c-sections deserves special attention in Latin
America, especially because of the high c-section rates in some countries that are
close to 50%, which has led many organizations to suggest mechanisms to reduce
the c-section rates (Guzman et al., 2015).
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For the different analysis, I use vital statistics and death certificates micro-data from
Ecuador and Colombia. Even though I show that Colombia is the best control group
for Ecuador, several problems related to data quality and difficulties in accessing
data from other countries hindered the comparisons that could have been made with
other countries of the region in a timely manner.13 This highlights the heterogeneity
in the level of development of the countries of the region in the management of
public data and to some extent the lack of homogeneity in the handling of data
(OECD, 2014). The results of this study show that malpractice laws can reduce
the excessive use of unnecessary procedures in low-risk patients without affecting
patients’ health. This conclusion is of great interest not only for the countries of
the region but for other countries facing increasing health care costs linked to the
over-provision of health care services.
Chapter 5 presents themain conclusions of this thesis. Furthermore, it discusses how
each identification strategy was chosen carefully to prevent the effects of a certain
policy from contaminating the effects of another policy. One possible concern
could be that the labor reform started in 2009, but some hospitals were assigned to
adopt the reform as late as 2014, the year of the passing of the new Penal Code. I
argue that because by 2013, 82% of public hospitals had already adopted the labor
reform, it is unlikely that the effects of the labor reform could affect the estimates
of the impact of the malpractice reform that happened in August 2014. However, to
remove any doubt, I perform robustness checks which include setting aside hospitals
that adopted the labor reform in 2013 or later, to make sure that the effects of the
malpractice reform on the c-the section rate, maternal mortality, and infant health
were not affected by the passing of the labor reform. It was reassuring to see that
the results were robust to the exclusion of said hospitals.
13With the exception of Colombia, Mexico, and Uruguay, it was not possible to access the micro-
data on vital statistics or death certificates of other countries of the region without having to make
an official request to the statistical office of each country.
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Chapter 5 also discusses the limitations and policy implications of each of the papers
and suggest avenues for future research. More often than not, the limitations found
in each paper have to do with data availability and data quality in Ecuador and
other countries of the region. Hence, apart from the policy implications that are
derived from the analysis in each paper. I suggest several ways how Ecuador and the
countries of the region can improve the quality of administrative records and health
statistics, to facilitate public scrutiny of governments and facilitate the creation of
comparative studies across the countries of the region.
Finally, Appendix A contains an additional paper where I contrast the performance
of probabilistic record linkage versus phonetic encoding when linking individuals
across several waves of Social Registry data. This document was conceived as
an independent paper but at this stage, it has been included in the Appendix. Its
objective is to document the procedure used to generate the database that I use in
Chapter 2. The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, is one of the very few
papers that document the best practices for conducting probabilistic record linkage
using big administrative datasets recorded in Spanish. Second, this paper addresses
the issues related to attrition and differential link rates that arise when linking
individuals across time and proposes some alternatives to limit those problems
including the use of an algorithm to follow individuals that leave their original
household and sample-balancing to correct for differential link rates.
All in all, this thesis addresses questions that have not been discussed enough in
the literature on cash transfers, like the persistence of the short-term effects of cash
transfers in the long-run. It also provides first-hand evidence on the effects of labor
market regulations on hospital quality in a developing country context and adds to
the literature that looks at possible solutions to mitigate the problem of rising health
care costs in developing countries, by studying the role of malpractice reforms.
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C h a p t e r 2
THE SHORT AND LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF CASH
TRANSFERS ON EDUCATION AND LABOR MARKET
OUTCOMES
Abstract
This paper investigates whether the effects of a cash transfer program persist or wear
off in the long-run. I study the first two phases of Bono de Desarrollo Humano
(BDH) in Ecuador, each of which lasted about five years. My identification strategy
uses a regression discontinuity design and relies on the fact that at the threshold
of eligibility, the second assignment to treatment (in 2008/9) was independent of
the first assignment (in 2003). This allows me to disentangle the impact of a
long exposure to the program (treatment during two phases) from a short exposure
(treatment during one phase). Most of the gains in enrollment and schooling
were achieved in the short-run among children that started treatment when they
were about to start elementary school, high school or baccalaureate. However, an
extended exposure to BDH was not enough to keep raising children’s education.
Regarding labor market outcomes, BDH had a negative (not statistically significant)
impact on the probability of working among young children but did not increase job
opportunities among young adults in the long-run.
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2.1 Introduction and literature review
It has been widely accepted in the literature that factors operating during early
childhood play a more important role than tuition, school reforms, job training or
family credit constraints in explaining gaps in socioeconomic attainment (Carneiro
et al., 2002; Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010; Heckman, 2000). The reason is
that human capital investment exhibits both self-productivity and complementarity.
Self-productivity has to do with the fact that skill attainment at one stage of the
life cycle raises skill attainment at later stages of the life cycle. On the other hand,
complementarity reflects the fact that early investments are more productive if they
are followed by later investments. This explains why late investments that attempt
to compensate for the lack of adequate early investments are very costly (Cunha,
Heckman, Lochner, et al., 2006).
Cash transfers targeted to the poor have become the most popular tool in developing
countries to encourage investment in the health and education of young children.
These programs range from pure unconditional cash transfers to fully monitored
and enforced conditional cash transfers (CCTs) that link the receipt of benefits to
conditions such as school enrollment and regular health checkups (Baird et al.,
2014). This paper studies the effects on young people’s education and labor market
outcomes of a continuous exposure to Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH), the
main unconditional cash transfer program in Ecuador. While the previous literature
on the long-term effects of cash transfers study how well the original treatment
and control groups perform on several dimensions of interest after several years of
a program’s implementation, the question I address in this paper is whether cash
transfers continue to be effective after several years targeting the same population.
Janvry et al. (2006) describe a basic model of school enrollment and work decisions.
In said model, a CCT reduces the net cost of school. When the transfer is lower
than the opportunity cost of schooling, it brings to school children with school cost
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above the reservation cost by less than the transfer. However, if the transfer is larger
than the opportunity cost of schooling, it becomes a net payment for going to school
and it brings to school any child with a positive utility for school. On the other
hand, the transfer induces an income effect that causes an overall decrease in work
participation (Janvry et al., 2006). In this line, several empirical studies have shown
that CCTs are effective in increasing enrollment rates among beneficiary children in
the short-run (see Fiszbein et al., 2009 for a review and Saavedra and Garcia, 2012
for a meta-analysis). Large gains on school participation have also been reported
as a result of unconditional cash transfer programs labeled as education support
programs like in the paper by Benhassine et al. (2015).
In general, the impact of CCTs is overall much stronger on schooling than it is
on child work. One possible explanation is that in most CCTs the conditionality
applies to school and not to work, then a CCT is not expected to have a big effect
in preventing parents from increasing child work in response to an adverse income
shock, considering that school and work are not incompatible (Janvry et al., 2006).
There is mixed evidence regarding the impacts of CCTs on child work, with some
studies finding significant reductions on child work among children most vulnerable
to transitioning from schooling to work (Edmonds and Schady, 2012; Schady et al.,
2008; Skoufias and Parker, 2001; Baird et al., 2014) and others finding no effects
(Janvry et al., 2006).
While there is sufficient evidence of the impact of cash transfers in the short-run,
evidence about their impacts in the long-run is sparse. In a recent study, Aizer et al.
(2016) analyzed the long-term impact of the Mothers’ Pension program in the US
on educational attainment, income in adulthood and other health-related outcomes.
The study found that boys of mothers whose application to the programwas accepted
accumulated one thirdmore years of schooling and had a higher income in adulthood.
Also for the US, Hoynes et al. (2016) found that access to food stamps in utero and in
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early childhood leads to significant increases in educational attainment and earnings.
In developing countries, the few existing papers that examine long-term effects focus
mainly on Latin America. Since most of these programs are relatively young (the
oldest CCT program, PROGRESA/Oportunidades, started in 1997), the analysis
has focused on the study of outcomes measured at the end of high school or during
early adulthood. Most of the evidence comes from PROGRESA /Oportunidades
(Behrman, Parker, et al., 2011; Behrman, Sengupta, et al., 2005; Kugler and Rojas,
2018), and Nicaragua’s CCT program Red de Protección Social (Barham et al.,
2013a; Barham et al., 2013b).1 For both countries, there is consistent evidence
of impacts on schooling as well as some evidence for Nicaragua of impacts on
learning, off-farm employment, and income. Other studies have also used short-
term estimates to extrapolate to long-run program impacts (Behrman, Sengupta,
et al., 2005; Todd and Wolpin, 2006; Attanasio et al., 2012).2
In addition to these studies, a contemporaneous paper by Araujo et al. (2016) studies
the impact of Ecuador’s Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH) after 10 years of its
implementation. The authors use data from a randomized evaluation in 2003 and
survey data collected in 2014 to test the impacts of BDH on various cognitive tests.
Furthermore, they use Social Registry data and a RD design to evaluate the effects of
BDH on school attainment and employment status of young adults, aged 19-25 years
old in 2013/14. The results suggest a modest impact on high school completion,
between 1 and 2 percentage points among 19-25 year olds and no effects on cognitive
tests.
Unlike the previous literature that studies howwell the original treatment and control
1Also Baez and Camacho (2011) found that children who benefited from the CCT Familias en
Acción in Colombia were on average between 4 and 8 percentage points more likely to graduate from
high school but no significant effects were found on cognitive tests.
2There are some concerns about the results that stem from extrapolations; one is that short-term
evaluations may reveal only temporary improvements in the outcomes of interest, which may vanish
as time goes by. Another concern is that they may fail to detect any impact because the time span
between the treatment and follow-up may be too short (King and Behrman, 2009)
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groups perform after several years of a program’s implementation, the question I
address in this paper is whether children who are treated for a longer period of time
continue achieving better outcomes compared to similar children who were treated
for a shorter period of time. In other words, I study whether treatment continues
being effective in the long-run. My identification strategy relies on the fact that there
was a change to the targeting rule five years after the implementation of BDH and,
at the threshold of eligibility, the second assignment to treatment (in 2008/9) was
independent of the first assignment (in 2003). This allows me to estimate the short
term effects of BDH and the differential effect of a short exposure to the program
(treatment during phase one) versus a long exposure (treatment during phases one
and two).
I build a unique dataset that follows individuals (not households) through the three
waves of the Registro Social (RS), which allows me to control for transitions in and
out of the program and account for family dynamics that may also introduce bias
to the estimates. More importantly, I assigned the eligibility status to households
according to the Selben score that was in effect in each phase of the program and
assigned the ‘treated’ status to children living with women who actually claimed
the transfer each year. This generates the variation in lengths of exposure to the
program that I exploit in this paper.
The results show that treated children experienced important short-term gains in
enrollment and high school graduation by the end of phase one. Most of the gains
in enrollment and schooling were achieved among children that started treatment
when they were about to start elementary school, high school or baccalaureate.
However, an extended exposure to BDH was not enough to keep raising children’s
education. This explains why 18-year-olds that were treated during the two phases
of the program were not more likely to finish high school when compared to similar
children that were only treated during the first phase of the program. The only
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group that experienced positive differential effects in years of education after being
exposed during the two phases of the program were children aged 0 when BDH
began in 2003. Regarding labor market outcomes, BDH had a negative yet not
statistically significant impact on the probability of working among young children
and did not increase job opportunities among young adults in the long-run.
This paper contributes to fill the gap in the literature about the long-term effects of
cash transfers with emphasis on long duration programs and investigates whether
these programs lose their effectiveness after several years targeting the same pop-
ulation. It also contributes to the literature on the complementarities of human
development investments, and highlights the use of individual panel data to produce
reliable quasi-experimental evidence of the differential effects of a long exposure to
social programs that use a proxy means test to target beneficiaries, an approach that
is very common in social programs in developing countries.
In the next section, I explain the institutional background and operational aspects of
BDH since its implementation. Section 2.3 discusses the three sources of adminis-
trative data used in this paper and the methodology used to build the panels. Section
2.4 presents the empirical strategy used to identify the different impacts of BDH.
Section 2.5 presents evidence on the validity of the identification strategy. Section
2.6 presents the results from the RD design. Section 2.7 discusses some robustness
checks using administrative data from a standardized exam taken at the end of high
school and section 2.8 concludes.
2.2 Background
Ecuador is a middle-income country that has experienced significant progress in
terms of poverty reduction in the last decade. In 2005, Ecuador’s GNI per capita
was $7,310 in PPP-adjusted current U.S. dollars.3 At that time 84.3% of the rural
3Source: World Bank World Development Indicators.
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population lived in poverty as well as 35.1% of the urban population.4. By 2013,
Ecuador’s GNI per capita was US$10,720 in PPP-adjusted current U.S. dollars.5
However, poverty remained a major concern for policymakers with 57.8% of the
rural population and 24.8% of the urban population living in poverty.6
The reduction in poverty has been accompanied by a marked improvement in the
main educational indicators as well as in amoremodest reduction of child labor. The
Ecuadorian educational system has three phases: (i) initial education, for children
ages 3 to 5 is not compulsory; (ii) basic general education, is compulsory and lasts
9 years for children ages 5 to 15 years, and (iii) the Baccalaureate lasts 3 years for
children ages 15 to 18 years and is not compulsory. Since 2012, at the end of the
Baccalaureate, students have to pass a standardized exam (ENES exam) to apply to
university. Until October 2008, public education was free only up to the tenth year
of Basic General Education for children aged 5 to 15 years7. In October 2008, the
new constitution declared that public education should be free from the first year
of basic education up to the undergraduate level from the 2008-2009 school year
onwards.
Primary education is almost universal and most of the recent efforts of the govern-
ment have focused on raising the secondary education enrollment rates. Gender
differences in educational attainment are small when compared for all males and
all females (García-Aracil and Winter, 2006). By 2003, the net enrollment rate for
basic general education was 84.1% and increased up to 90.4% in 2008 and up to
95.7% in 2014. While the net enrollment rate for baccalaureate was 42.1% in 2003;
4Source: Sistema Integrado de Indicadores Sociales del Ecuador (SIISE)
(http://www.siise.gob.ec)
5Source: World Bank World Development Indicators
6Source: SIISE (http://www.siise.gob.ec)
7Education was free at public schools, however, most schools charged so-called "voluntary
contributions" at the beginning of the school year. Those contributions were eliminated after the
reform in 2008.
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53.6% in 2008 and 65.1% in 2014.8
Despite the progress made in terms of schooling since 2003, youth unemployment,
among individuals between 15 and 24 years of age, remained the highest among
all the age groups even though it decreased from 22.6% in 1998 to 9.7% in 2014
(García et al., 2016). On the other hand, the rate of child work for children ages 5
to 14 years has decreased significantly since 2007, when 8% of children in said age
range reported having a job, compared to 2014, when only 3% of children ages 5 to
14 worked9.
BDH was implemented in 2003, when the incumbent government merged two ex-
isting cash transfer programs: Bono Solidario (BS) and Beca Escolar (BE) and
became the first program to use a proxy means test to target the poorest families in
Ecuador.10 BDH uses a proxy means test called “Selben index”, which is computed
every five years using the information contained in a Social Registry called “Registro
Social” (RS). The RS is a census of poor households that contains individual and
household-level information on all potential BDH beneficiaries including age, gen-
der, education level, household composition, characteristics of the house, access to
public services, among others. The index is computed using a principal components
analysis that assigns numerical values to categorical variables. Around 30 variables
that are highly correlated with consumption were considered to compute the index.
Most of these variables are categorical or ordinal and describe the characteristics
of the household head and of the house. With categorical variables the distance
8Source:http://www.siise.gob.ec/agenda/index.html?serial=13
9Source: Compendio Estadístico INEC, 2014. Using data from the labor force survey ENEMDU.
http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/compendio-estadistico-2014/
10BS was an unconditional transfer to compensate poor families for the elimination of gas and
electricity subsidies in 1998, and targeted mothers with earnings below 40 USD per month, people
with disabilities, and senior citizens. By 2003, it had about 1 million beneficiary households (World
Bank, 2005). The program had an open inscription process that relied on the identification of needy
families by parish priests, who were considered to have reliable knowledge of whom among their
parishioners was poor. BEwas a CCT program that started in the late 1990s and consisted of monthly
transfers of 5 USD per child (up to two children per household), conditional on children’s enrollment
in school and a 90% attendance rate (Carrillo and Ponce Jarrín, 2009).
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between categories 1 and 2 may not be equal to the distance between categories
2 and 3, so they cannot be treated as quantitative variables. Consequently, the
principal components analysis by alternating least squares algorithm (PRINCALS)
(De Leeuw and Van Rijckevorsel, 1980) is used to estimate optimal scaling and
principal components simultaneously. Finally, using the percentage contribution of
each variable to the total variance of the principal component model it is possible
to generate an index that ranges from 0 and 100 that reflects the socio-economic
situation of the households (Fabara, 2009).
To select the cutoff of eligibility, given that theRSmostly covers poor households, the
same process is reproduced using a nationally representative survey. Households are
sorted considering their Selben score and the score corresponding to the households
in the fourth decile is selected as the cutoff of eligibility (Fabara, 2009).11 The
Selben index correctly predicts that 95% of households in the poorest quintile are
eligible for the benefits and erroneously excludes 5 percent of them (Fiszbein et al.,
2009).
The amount of the monthly transfer was US$15 in 2003 for individuals with families
in the lowest 20% of the Selben distribution, and US$11.50 for those located in the
next 20% of the distribution (equivalent to 12% and 9% of the minimum wage in
2003 respectively). Since then, the amount has increased progressively. In 2007,
the transfer increased to US$30 (18% of the minimum wage) for individuals in the
bottom 40% of the Selben distribution. In 2009, the transfer was raised to US$35
(16% of the minimum wage) and in 2013 it was set at US$50 per month (16% of
the minimum wage).
BDH was initially publicized as a CCT; eligible women with children aged 0 to 18
years were required to take their children for health checkups and to enroll them
11This is why more than 40% of the households in the RS fall below the chosen cutoff.
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in school.12 Compliance with the conditions was supposed to be monitored every
two months; however, due to lack of administrative capacity, this did not happen.
Nevertheless, the program used radio and television spots to explicitly link transfers
with the conditions, and some BDH administrators stressed the importance of school
enrollment at the implementation stage (Schady et al., 2008). Furthermore, in 2008,
the Ministry of Social Inclusion (MIES) started a process of notifying some mothers
who were not satisfying the conditions; however, no further action was taken to
sanction non-compliance.13
By 2014, BDH had 10 years of operation and people who were eligible during the
two phases of the program could have received the transfer for a maximum of 10
years. From 2003 until 2008, hereafter the first phase of the program, BDH targeted
women with children aged 0-18 years scoring less than 50.65 points (Ponce and
Bedi, 2010). In 2009 a new Selben score was computed (Selben II), using most
of the variables used in the estimation of the previous score and the information
from the second wave of the RS.14 From August 2009 until March 2013, the new
eligibility cutoff was set at 36.5 points (Buser, 2015).15
Figure 2.1 shows the chronology of BDH implementation and, specifically, the
change in the targeting rule in 2009 that coincided with the collection of the second
wave of the RS and marked the beginning of the second phase of the program.
Figure 2.1 also shows the different lengths of treatment that exist and the children of
interest in this study. Regarding the former, a short exposure means that individuals
were eligible during one of the phases of the program either phase one or two; while
12The amount of the transfer does not depend on the age or number of other eligible children in
the household, which may lead parents to choose the child in whom they want to invest the most.
13See Executive Decree No. 347-A of April 25 of 2003 published in the Official Registry No. 76
on May 7 of 2013.
14Cording to the Agreement MIES No. 00037
15Another change in the eligibility rule happened on March 2013 (according to the ministerial
agreement No. 197 of 28 March 2013), when the beneficiaries whose score was between 32.5 and
36.5 points were excluded from the program.
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Figure 2.1: Timeline of the implementation of BDH
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Selben I cutoff: 50,65 Selben II cutoff: 36,5 New cutoff: 32,5
First Phase Second Phase
Age 0-18 Age 5-23
Short exposure 1
Age 0-18 Age 10-23
Long exposure
Age 0-18 Age 5-23
Short exposure 2
long exposure means that individuals were eligible during the two phases of the
program. Finally, individuals who were not eligible for the transfer may remain in
this state during phase one, phase two or both.
The group of interest in this study is children aged 0-18 years when the program
was launched in 2003, who grew up being exposed to BDH during phase one, phase
two or both. At the end of phase one, these children were approximately 5 to 6 years
older, and by the end of phase two, they were approximately 10 to 11 years older.
Their exact age depends on the date they were surveyed in the first, second and third
wave of RS. It is worth noting that for the analysis of the differential effects of BDH,
the minimum age at the end of phase two is 10 years and the maximum age is 23
years because older children would not be eligible for treatment at the beginning of
phase two.
2.3 Data and descriptive statistics
2.3.1 Description of the Data
I use social registry data called Registro Social (RS) and BDH payments data. The
RS is considered a census of the poor because the first wave was conducted in 215 of
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the 223 registered counties in the 2010 census, and therefore covers most of the poor
areas of the country. Furthermore, the secondwave of the RS covers 2,393,377 of the
3,392,851 households that were registered in Ecuador in 2008 (Ponce and Falconí,
2011).16 The RS records relevant information about BDH potential beneficiaries,
including individual socio-economic information at the family and individual level,
the ID number of the members (when available) and the Selben score assigned to
each household. The geographic areas covered by the RS were selected using a
poverty map that used information from the 2001 national census.
Three waves of the RS have been collected so far. The first wave was collected
between 2001 and 2007. Of the 6,303,352 individuals that were surveyed 79% were
surveyed before 2003 and 56.47% were surveyed in 2002 alone. The second wave
was collected between 2007 and 2013. 70% of the 8,068,957 individuals in this
wave were surveyed before 2009 and 68% were surveyed in 2008. Finally, the third
wave contains the information of 6,930,701 individuals of which 36% was collected
in 2013 and 64% in 2014.
The main challenge in linking the three waves of the RS is that many people do not
report an ID (particularly children in the first wave of RS). For this reason, I use
probabilistic record linkage to match individuals across waves using the two names
and two last names recorded in the data and a common household ID as match keys.
I also use an algorithm that takes into account the fact that some family members
leave or join the household as time goes by (More details on the data linkage can be
found in Appendix A.).17
The second source of administrative data is on BDH payments. These data are
collected on a monthly basis and give an account of the amount and periodicity with
16Ecuador’s population was 12,628,596 inhabitants by the year 2000, 14,447,600 inhab-
itants by 2008 and 15,661,312 inhabitants by 2013 according to the World Bank data
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports)
17400,000 individuals in the three-waves panel moved to (or from) other households
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which beneficiaries collect their transfers from the different financial institutions.
Compliance rates are high, on average, close to 90% of the individuals in the data set
cash the transfers at least once every year. I merged the RS panel and payments data
and assigned the actual treatment status to children who were living with women
who claimed the transfer each year.
2.3.1.1 Descriptive statistics
I am able to follow 4,631,690 individuals across waves 1 and 2 of the RS and
5,439,749 individuals across waves 2 and 3. More importantly, I am able to follow
2,961,079 individuals across the three waves of the RS. The size of the three-waves
panel is bounded by the number of matches between waves 1 and 2 because fewer
people reported an ID in wave 1 (mainly children born in the 80’s). There is also the
fact that in the second wave there was an important influx of potential beneficiaries,
which explains why wave 2 has 1.7 million more observations. Finally, in the last
wave, at least 1.1 million individuals were not surveyed. The main reason was that
during the data collection period, around 2,458 sectors were excluded from the RS
leaving 735,479 individuals out of the survey.18
To tackle these issues that affect the matching rates, I adjusted the sampling weights
on each panel-wave so that the totals of the adjusted weights on key characteristics
match the corresponding population totals in eachwave of RS. This process is known
as raking or sample-balancing, and the key characteristics used in the process are
known as auxiliary variables. Typical auxiliary variables include age, gender, years
of education and geographic variables like province or county (see the Appendix A
for more details).
The matching rate for households is high – 67% for waves 1 and 3 and 54% for wave
18This is less problematic than it seems because only a small fraction of the excluded households
are close to threshold of eligibility based on their Selben Score. The data administrators also
confirmed that the excluded sectors were left out because were more aﬄuent on average.
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2 –. On the other hand, the matching rate for individuals in the three-waves panel
is around 37% to 47% in each wave of the RS (see Tables A.4 to A.6 in Appendix
A).19 However, once I focus on the groups of interest described in Figure 2.1 and
on children who are close to the Selben cutoffs, the matching rates go up to 70% for
some age groups as shown in Table 2.15.
In general the sample in the three-waves panel reproduces quite well the distribution
of the Selben score in each wave, as shown in Figures 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4. Around 30
variables are involved in the estimation of the Selben index, among them, character-
istics of the household head, features of the house, access to services, the number
of household members who have migrated, assets, etc. The fact that the distribution
in the panel-wave and the corresponding wave are very similar means that the panel
represents households of all socio-economic backgrounds and that the households
that I am not able to follow are not concentrated around the Selben cutoffs.
Furthermore, I formally test whether the eligibility status affects the probability to
be in the three-waves panel among individuals who are close to the threshold of
eligibility. I construct an indicator equal to one if the child is in the three-waves
panel and zero otherwise and examine the association between this indicator and
being eligible to receive the transfer. Table 2.15 shows that children in eligible
households are not more likely to be in the three-waves panel compared to similar
ineligible children. Only for children ages 18 and 19 years in wave 3, being eligible
increases the likelihood of being in the panel in 1,3 percentage points.
The three-waves panel allows me to identify the individuals that were treated during
the two phases of the program as well as those who left or joined the program at
the beginning of phase two. It allows me to track the trajectory of the individuals in
terms of their eligibility status, education and labor market outcomes. By following
19The matching rate for individuals goes up to 71% when we consider only households where at
least one individual reported an ID. These households constitute the so called "likely to be linked"
sample.
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Figure 2.2: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in the first wave of RS and
and the corresponding panel wave
Figure 2.3: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in the second wave of RS and
and the corresponding panel wave
44
Figure 2.4: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in the third wave of RS and
and the corresponding panel wave
the children instead of the mothers, I make sure that I will not estimate the long-term
effects of BDH on children that recently joined the household of a woman who was
treated since 2003, but on children who lived with a treated woman since 2003 and
may be currently living with her or not.
Table 2.1 shows the number of individuals who changed their eligibility status after
the introduction of Selben II in 2009. There is substantial mobility in and out of
the program. In fact, 20% of the people in the panel who were initially eligible to
receive the transfer left the program by 2009 because they no longermet the selection
criteria, and 28% of ineligible individuals became eligible. Looking specifically
at the individuals around the Selben threshold established in 2003 (namely +/-
5 points from the 50.65 points cutoff), almost 35% of the individuals who were
originally ineligible changed their status to eligible and 45% of those who were
eligible became ineligible, which points to significant contamination of the original
assignment groups.
45
Table 2.1: Eligibility status for individuals after the the introduction of Selben II in
2009
Selben II
Ineligible Eligible Total
Se
lb
en
I
Ineligible 148,417 58,274 206,691
72% 28% 100%
Ineligible +/- 5p 88,642 47,529 136,171
65% 35% 100%
Eligible 433,123 1,735,492 2,168,615
20% 80% 100%
Eligible +/- 5p 173,275 213,518 386,793
45% 55% 100%
Total 581,540 1,793,766 2,375,306
24% 76% 100%
Total +/- 5p 261,917 261,047 522,964
50% 50% 100%
Notes: The table shows the transition matrix of the eligibility status to BDH before and after the
introduction of Selben II. The total is 2,375,306 individuals instead of 2,961,043 because in the first
wave not all the households had kids below age 18.
2.4 Empirical Strategy
2.4.1 Regression discontinuity design
The discontinuity in the assignment rule allows me to recover the local causal effects
of exposure to BDH by comparing the outcomes of similar individuals who are just
below the threshold (hence eligible for the transfer) and just above the threshold
(not eligible for the transfer). Given that the Selben score predicts substantial but
not perfect changes in the probability of treatment, meaning that the probability of
treatment does not jump from 0 to 1 when the forcing variable crosses the threshold,
I use a Fuzzy RD design. In the Fuzzy RD design, the treatment effect is obtained
by dividing the jump in the outcome variable (Y) at the threshold to the jump in
the treatment probability at the threshold as in an instrumental variable approach or
the analogous Wald estimator. The different graphs in Figure 2.5 show the jump in
the treatment probability at the Selben I threshold (50.65 points) and at the Selben
II threshold (36.5 points) for each year starting in 2005, the first year for which
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Figure 2.5: Proportion of treated households with respect to the threshold by year
(a) 2005 (b) 2006 (c) 2007
(d) 2008 (e) 2009 (f) 2010
(g) 2011 (h) 2012 (i) 2013
Notes: The graphs use RS data merged with administrative payments data. The sample is individuals
that were surveyed before 2003 in the first wave and before 2009 in the second wave. The graphs
show the proportion of households that received the treatment each year. The cutoff for the years
2005-2008 is 50.65 points and the cutoff for the years 2009-2013 is 36.5 points. The change in
the assignment rule happened in August 2009 but the 2008 graph also exhibit some adjustment. In
particular the 2008 payments dataset contains 676,068 individuals while the 2007 and 2009 datasets
contain 1,127,909 and 1,280,367 individuals respectively.
payment data is available.
In the next section, I explain how I estimate the impact of BDH at the end of each
phase of the program, as well as the differential impact of a long exposure (during
phases one and two) versus a shorter exposure to BDH (during phase one).
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2.4.2 Estimation
Several non-parametric methods have been proposed in the literature to estimate
the local average treatment effect (LATE). One corresponds to the series estimation
approach, which consists of the inclusion of polynomial functions of the forcing
variable and provides estimates of the regression function over all the values of
the forcing variable. The other non-parametric approach is kernel regressions. In
the simplest case of the rectangular kernel, one computes the local average of the
outcome (Y) in the closest bin to the left and right of the cutoff point and compare
those means to get the RD estimate. However, Hahn, Todd, et al. (2001) argue that
if the true model is upward sloping on both sides of the threshold, the RD estimate
from kernel regression would be biased; moreover, any attempt to reduce the bias by
reducing the bandwidth size would lead to very imprecise estimates in the absence
of a large number of observations near the cutoff. To solve this problemHahn, Todd,
et al. (2001) suggest running local linear regressions at each side of the threshold
instead of computing local averages within the closest bins. Hahn, Todd, et al.
(2001) also proved that this approach reduces bias by one order of magnitude.
In the case of BDH, eligible individuals are located on the left-hand side of the
cutoff, meaning that only people with a lower Selben score can benefit from the
transfer. Following Lee and Lemieux (2010), the regression model on the left-hand
side of the cutoff point (S ≤ c) is:
Y = αl + fl(S − c) +  (2.1)
Y is the outcome variable, fl(.) and fr(.) are functional forms of the Selben score (S)
that measures the distance to the cutoff c, αl is the intercept. The regression model
at the right hand side of the cutoff point (S > c) is:
Y = αr + fr(S − c) +  (2.2)
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It is preferable to estimate the treatment effect with a pooled regression on both sides
of the threshold. The advantage of this approach is that it directly yields estimates
and standard errors of the treatment effect τ:
Y = αr + τT + f (S − c) +  (2.3)
where τ = αl − αr and f (S − c) = fr(S − c) + T[ fl(S − c) − fr(S − c)] . The
treatment status T is instrumented by D, which is a binary variable that takes a value
of 1 when the Selben score is below the cutoff and 0 otherwise. It is important
to let the regression function differ on both sides of the cutoff point by including
interaction terms between T and S. In the linear case where fl(S − c) = βl(S − c)
and fr(S − c) = βr(S − c), the pooled regression is:
Y = αr + τT + βr(S − c) + (βl − βr)T(S − c) +  (2.4)
The simplest fuzzy RD estimator uses only D as instrument without polynomial
interactions of f (S − c) with D. In this case, I allow for interaction terms in the first
and second stage.
2.4.3 Short exposure
To estimate the effects of a short exposure to BDH at the end of phase one, I compare
the outcomes (observed at the end of phase one) of children who were marginally
eligible or not based on their proximity to the Selben score cutoff of 50.65 points
set on 2003. Likewise, to estimate the effects of a short exposure to BDH, during
phase two only, I restrict the sample to children who were not treated during phase
one and compare the outcomes of children observed at the end of phase two with a
Selben II score close to the cutoff for eligibility fixed at 36.5 points in 2009.
The analysis of the effects of each phase of the program is particularly important
in this setting because BDH was publicized as a CCT. However, due to lack of
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administrative capacity the conditions were never enforced so it is likely that most
of the impact was achieved in the first phase of the program when the transfer was
believed to be conditional at least for a short period of time (DeBrauwandHoddinott,
2011; Baird et al., 2014; Benhassine et al., 2015). Furthermore, in October 2008,
education became free in all public schools and universities in Ecuador, which
may have caused the transfer to cease to have an effect on eligible children, since
education became free for all eligible and ineligible children. It is important to
contrast the results obtained in each of the phases separately to be able to identify
the possible reasons why the effects of BDH may be different during phase one and
two.
To estimate the effects of a short exposure to BDH, I estimate equation 2.4, where Y
is the outcome variable observed at the end of phase one or at the end of phase two
depending on the case. I instrument treatment with individual eligibility using the
corresponding cutoff depending on whether I am evaluating the effects at the end
of phase one or at the end of phase two. I try several bandwidths (+/-2.5, +/-5 and
+/-7.5 points with respect to the cutoff) and test the robustness of the estimates to
the inclusion of higher order polynomial terms. I estimate regressions for different
age groups and include county fixed effects, gender, race and school year dummies
because each wave of the RS was collected over more than one year.
Since each wave of the RS was collected over several years in the analyses I restrict
the sample to individuals that were surveyed before 2003 in the first wave or who
were surveyed before 2009 in the second wave. This is important for the balance
tests of pre-treatment characteristics and also because in this way I avoid having
cases where people respond to the first survey very late and shortly after respond to
the following survey or cases where the information, on the contrary, is very spaced.
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2.4.4 Differential effect of a long exposure vs a short exposure
A significant number of individuals changed their eligibility status after the intro-
duction of Selben II in 2009. As a consequence, comparing the outcomes of children
from treated households versus untreated households ten years later using the origi-
nal assignment in 2003 would lead to underestimation of the treatment effect of the
program, since both groups were exposed to the treatment at some point in time.
Another way to estimate long-term effects is to measure the differential impact of
a long exposure to BDH (during phases one and two) versus a short exposure to
BDH (during phase one). To do this, I compare the outcomes observed at the end of
phase two of children who were marginally treated (or not) during phase two among
children who were treated during phase one. Since most of these individuals were
eligible during phase one, by comparing households that are very close in terms
of their Selben II score, I would be comparing two groups of people that are very
similar in terms of observable and unobservable characteristics.
To estimate the differential impact of a long exposure (during phases one and
two) versus a short exposure to BDH (during phase one), I restrict the sample to
individuals who were treated during the first phase of the program and estimate
equation 2.4, where Y is the outcome variable observed at the end of phase two and
(S− c) is a function of the Selben II score (S) that measures the distance to the cutoff
(36.5 points).
As with the short-term effects, I instrument treatment with individual eligibility and
try several bandwidths (+/-2.5, +/-5 and +/-7.5 points with respect to the cutoff)
as well as low polynomials of the distance to the cutoff to check the robustness
of the RD estimates to different specifications. I estimate separate regressions for
different age groups and include county fixed effects, a gender dummy and school
year dummies in the regressions. I restrict the sample to individuals that I follow
51
across the second and third wave of the RS that were surveyed before 2009 in the
second wave.
2.5 Assessing the validity of the identification strategy
For the identification strategy to be valid, individuals should not be able to pre-
cisely manipulate their Selben score. This is unlikely in this setting because the
Selben index is a complex “composite index” and its methodology has never been
disclosed. People do not know the weights associated with their responses when
they are surveyed, making it very difficult for them to determine which answers will
make them end up on the left side of the cutoff. Furthermore, the change in the
methodology in 2009, which involved the use of new variables to build the index,
made cheating even more difficult. Figure 2.6 shows that there is no evidence of
bunching or manipulation of the Selben I or Selben II scores. Moreover, the density
tests shown in Table 2.2 fail to reject the hypothesis that the difference in densities
on the two sides of the cutoff is zero.20 These results rule out possible self-selection
or non-random sorting of units into eligible or ineligible groups.
For identification, it is also important that there are no imbalances in baseline char-
acteristics. To test for balance in the pre-treatment characteristics, I use a regression
discontinuity approach and estimate local regressions of different polynomial orders
using the observations within +/-2.5 points of distance to the cutoff. The variables
were chosen from the list of variables used to estimate the Selben score.
I did this with the people who were surveyed before 2003 in the first wave of the RS,
and with the people who became eligible for phase two, who were surveyed before
2009 in the second wave. I also tested whether among the former eligible children,
those who were considered eligible or not for the second phase of the program had
balanced characteristics. Results of the linear and quadratic specifications as well
20Cattaneo et al. (2016) propose a set of manipulation tests based on a novel local polynomial
density estimator, which does not require pre-binning of the data as opposed to McCrary’s test.
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Figure 2.6: Frequency distribution of Selben I and Selben II score
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Table 2.2: Density tests for Selben I and Selben II
Left of
Selben I
cuttof
Right of
Selben I
cuttof
Left of
Selben II
cuttof
Right of
Selben II
cuttof
Observations 651103 171121 555666 244332
Effective Observations 43763 36769 39043 40559
Bias corrected density 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Standard error 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Bandwidth values 1.54 1.55 2.00 2.27
Standard error test 0.00 0.00
p-value 0.64 0.94
Notes: Density tests based on Cattaneo et al. (2016). This local polynomial density estimator does
not require pre-binning of the data as opposed to McCrary’s test.
as the omnibus joint F-tests are reported in Tables 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5. In all the cases,
at least for one of the specifications, the p-value on the omnibus F test was not
statistically significant.
Table 2.3 shows that the pre-treatment characteristics of marginally eligible children
in 2002 (around +/-2.5 points of the cutoff) present some minor imbalances in
the linear specification that disappear in the quadratic specification. The quadratic
specification performs better in terms of the omnibus joint F-test, but the linear
specification was preferred in terms of the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and
the goodness of fit test performed by jointly testing the significance of a set of bin
dummies included as additional regressors in the model in order to select the optimal
order of the polynomial.
Table 2.4 shows that among people who were not treated before 2009, the pre-
treatment characteristics of the two comparison groups were balanced, including in
terms of the Selben I score for both the linear and quadratic specifications. The
omnibus joint F-test favors the linear specification, which is also preferred based on
the AIC criterion and the goodness of fit tests.
Finally, I tested whether children who were treated in phase one, and were assigned
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Table 2.3: Balance tests for pre-treatment characteristics (before 2003) for the
analysis of a short exposure during phase one
Linear specification Quadratic specification
Variables Pt. Est Std. Err Pt. Est Std. Err
Does the household own land -0.0117** (0.00546) -0.0180** (0.00818)
Electricity 0.00138* (0.000731) 0.000621 (0.00110)
Does not have exclusive shower 0.00343 (0.00300) 0.00270 (0.00459)
Overcrowding 0.000363 (0.00630) -0.000143 (0.00950)
Household members 0.00916 (0.0188) 0.00474 (0.0283)
Total earners including children 0.000235 (0.0106) -0.0111 (0.0159)
Adult members who work 0.00771 (0.00701) 0.000952 (0.0105)
Members below 18 years 0.00678 (0.0132) 0.0286 (0.0199)
Children studying 0.0114 (0.0119) 0.0271 (0.0179)
Education level of the head 0.0190* (0.0109) 0.0105 (0.0164)
Does the head have a job 0.00901** (0.00451) 0.00267 (0.00677)
Does the head speaks native languages -0.000442 (0.00223) 5.01e-05 (0.00334)
Is the head retired -0.000450 (0.000859) 0.000284 (0.00122)
Years of education of the head 0.0471 (0.0463) 0.0434 (0.0694)
Joint F-test 19.50 10.32
P-value 0.1467 0.7386
Observations 94,965 94,965
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample
is households surveyed before 2003 in the first wave of RS that have an adult woman and children
below age 18. Overcrowding is equal to 1 if the ratio of family members to bedrooms is above 3 and
0 otherwise.
to be treated or not in phase two based on their Selben II score, had balanced pre-
treatment characteristics at the beginning of phase two. Results from the linear and
quadratic specification show that those characteristics are well balanced including
in terms of the Selben I score, meaning that in the neighborhood of the cutoff point,
assignment in 2009 was independent of the first assignment in 2003. As shown in
Table 2.5. Both specifications performed well in terms of the omnibus joint F-test,
while the linear specification was slightly preferred based on the AIC criterion and
the goodness of fit test.
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Table 2.4: Balance tests for pre-treatment characteristics (before 2009) for the
analysis of short exposure during the second phase of the program
Linear specification Quadratic specification
Variables Pt. Est Std. Err Pt. Est Std. Err
Selben I score -0.0977 (0.192) 0.122 (0.289)
Land -0.00466 (0.00706) -0.0116 (0.0107)
Electricity 0.000447 (0.00140) 0.00167 (0.00212)
Does not have exclusive shower 0.00153 (0.00847) -0.00725 (0.0126)
Overcrowding -0.00290 (0.00856) -0.00510 (0.0128)
Household members 0.0220 (0.0382) 0.0683 (0.0575)
Total earners including children -0.00413 (0.0159) 0.0280 (0.0234)
Adult members who work -0.00189 (0.0140) 0.0120 (0.0211)
Members below 18 years 0.0238 (0.0287) 0.0357 (0.0431)
Children studying 0.0161 (0.0268) 0.00128 (0.0402)
Education level of the head -0.0176 (0.0387) 0.0198 (0.0583)
Does the head have a job -0.000451 (0.00970) 0.0203 (0.0147)
Does the head speaks native languages -0.000207 (0.00365) -0.000543 (0.00540)
Is the head retired -0.00123 (0.00126) -0.00281* (0.00163)
Years of education of the head 0.0240 (0.0966) 0.133 (0.145)
Joint F-test 4.77 12.88
P-value 0.9939 0.6113
Observations 22,811 22,811
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.Sample is
households surveyed before 2009 in the second wave of RS that have an adult woman and children
below age 18. Overcrowding is equal to 1 if the ratio of family members to bedrooms is above 3 and
0 otherwise.
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Table 2.5: Balance tests for pre-treatment characteristics (before 2009) for the
analysis of long vs short exposure to BDH
Linear specification Quadratic specification
Variables Pt. Est Std. Err Pt. Est Std. Err
Selben I score -0.0108 (0.0809) -0.0926 (0.121)
Land -0.00157 (0.00417) -0.00212 (0.00622)
Electricity 0.000776 (0.000881) 0.000221 (0.00138)
Does not have exclusive shower -0.00264 (0.00495) 0.00254 (0.00737)
Overcrowding -0.000476 (0.00548) 0.00724 (0.00818)
Household members -0.0115 (0.0251) -0.000694 (0.0375)
Total earners including children -0.00601 (0.0105) -0.00974 (0.0157)
Adult members who work -0.00797 (0.00879) 0.00444 (0.0132)
Members below 18 years -0.0155 (0.0193) -0.0133 (0.0287)
Children studying -0.00847 (0.0171) -0.0134 (0.0254)
Education level of the head -0.0236 (0.0225) -0.0424 (0.0337)
Does the head have a job -0.00344 (0.00606) -0.000756 (0.00902)
Does the head speaks native languages -0.000198 (0.00226) 0.000904 (0.00323)
Is the head retired 0.000573 (0.000592) 0.000565 (0.000881)
Years of education of the head -0.0445 (0.0580) -0.0849 (0.0864)
Joint F-test 7.23 5.71
P-value 0.9508 0.9842
Observations 56,872 56,872
Notes: Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Sample is
households surveyed before 2009 in the second wave of RS that have an adult woman and children
below age 18. Overcrowding is equal to 1 if the ratio of family members to bedrooms is above 3 and
0 otherwise.
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2.6 Results
In this section, I present results of the 2SLS regressions in equation 2.4 that uses
the treatment assignment as instrument for the actual treatment. Considering that
there is some variation in treatment duration across households, I restrict the sample
in the three-waves panel to households that were treated for at least three years in
each of the phases of the program. The percentage of observations that meet this
requirement is close to 99% of the sample, which is why the results for the complete
sample are almost identical.21
2.6.1 Effects of a short exposure to BDH measured at the end of phase one
2.6.2 Education outcomes
Table 2.6 reports on the short-term effects of BDH on enrollment and years of
education. Columns 1 and 3 show the results of the reduced form regressions (ITT),
while columns 2 and 4 show the results of the 2SLS regression in equation 2.4.
All the regressions include time and county fixed effects, individual-level control
variables like gender and race and are estimated on the sample of individuals that
are located within +/- 2.5 points of the Selben I cutoff.
I report the results for children aged 10 to 21 years by the end of phase one. The
results for younger children can be found in Table 2.16 in the Appendix. These
children were between 4 and 16 years old when the first phase began in 2003. By
choosing these age groups, I am able to observe the effects of BDH on children who
began treatment at all the juncture ages in their academic progress which are age 5,
12 and 15. These are juncture ages because at age 5 parents decide to enroll their
children at elementary school, at age 12 they decide to enroll them in high school and
at age 15 they decide whether or not to enroll them in Baccalaureate. Furthermore,
21It is worth noting that I replicated the analysis of the short term effects of BDH by the end of
phase 1 using the two-waves panel that follows around 4,6 million individuals across waves 1 and 2
and found similar results to the ones I report in section 2.6.1 using the three-waves panel.
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Table 2.6: Short-term effects of BDH on enrollment and years of education by
the end of phase one
Enrollment Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2008 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 10 year olds -0.00518 0.0130 0.00678 0.212** 5561
(0.00422) (0.00836) (0.0468) (0.0886)
Pre- treatment mean 0.992 0.992 5.160 5.160
Effect on 15 year olds -0.0201* 0.0255 0.0180 0.147 6464
(0.0121) (0.0224) (0.0662) (0.117)
Pre- treatment mean 0.886 0.886 8.863 8.863
Effect on 16 year olds 0.0172 0.0127 0.0512 -0.0454 5861
(0.0149) (0.0264) (0.0830) (0.146)
Pre- treatment mean 0.839 0.839 9.291 9.291
Effect on 17 year olds -0.00243 0.0872** -0.107 0.170 5449
(0.0183) (0.0357) (0.0911) (0.174)
Pre- treatment mean 0.723 0.723 9.791 9.791
Effect on 18 year olds 0.000474 0.0836* 0.103 0.321 5343
(0.0210) (0.0437) (0.105) (0.214)
Pre- treatment mean 0.539 0.539 10.42 10.42
Effect on 19 year olds -0.0220 0.0511 -0.110 0.296 5099
(0.0215) (0.0431) (0.111) (0.227)
Pre- treatment mean 0.433 0.433 10.54 10.54
Effect on 20 year olds 0.00882 0.111** 0.105 0.0170 4698
(0.0219) (0.0456) (0.124) (0.257)
Pre- treatment mean 0.379 0.379 10.73 10.73
Effect on 21 year olds -0.0732*** 0.0608 -0.110 0.441 4335
(0.0222) (0.0483) (0.142) (0.323)
Pre- treatment mean 0.331 0.331 10.70 10.70
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of
ITT and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the
cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben
I cutoff (50,65 points). All the regressions control for gender and race of the
individuals.
I study children aged 4 to 16 years in 2003, because the analysis focuses on children
who were treated for at least three years during phase one.
The results of the reduced form regressions in column 1 show negative effects of
BDH on enrollment for some age groups, one reason is that the program did not
reach all the households with a Selben score below the threshold of eligibility.
Figure 2.5 shows that before 2009, take up was always below 80% in the area closer
to the threshold. Once I correct for the endogeneity of take up by instrumenting the
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actual treatment with the assignment to treatment, the effects turn positive for all
the age groups.
According to the 2SLS estimates reported in column 2, BDHwas effective in raising
the enrollment rates of 10 to 21 year olds. However, the effect was statistically
significant only for 17, 18 and 20 year olds who were around 12, 13 and 15 years
when the program started in 2003. Enrollment increased by 8.7 percentage points
by the end of phase one among 17 year olds and by 8.3 and 11 percentage points
for 18 and 20 year olds respectively. Schady et al. (2008) also investigates the
short-term impacts of BDH on enrollment and other education and labor market
outcomes. They study a randomized experiment carried out in 2003-2005 and find
that school-aged children (6-17 years) from households who won the lottery were
3.2 to 4.0 percentage points more likely to be enrolled in school than children in
households who did not win. Since Schady et al. (2008) report an average effect
for school-aged children is hard to compare their estimates to the results discussed
here. However, I cannot rule out that some age groups may have had similar effects
to the ones I reported here that may have disappeared in the average.
Given that when the program started most people believed that one of the conditions
to receive the transfer was to send children to school, I expected to see positive
effects on enrollment, however, what is more important is whether these children
completed more years of schooling. Columns 3 and 4 report on the short-term
effects of BDH on years of education by the end of phase one. The reduced form
specification reported in column 3 show some negative coefficients that turn positive
after instrumenting the actual treatment with the assignment to treatment. Only 10
year olds, who were 5 years old when the first phase began experienced an increase
in their years of education by 0.21 years, for children aged 15, 17, 18, 19, 20 and 21
years in 2008/2009, the effects were positive but not statistically significant.
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The observed gains in enrollment are in line with a higher probability of graduating
from high school for 18 year olds. For this group, being treated for at least three years
during phase one increased the likelihood of graduating by 8.7 percentage points by
the end of phase one (See column 2 of Table 2.7). This increase is equivalent to an
18% raise relative to a 48.7% pre-treatment high school graduation rate. Treated
individuals aged 17 and 19 years by the end of phase one also experienced a higher
probability of graduating from High School, although not statistically significant.
Furthermore, there was a positive effect of BDH on the likelihood of having some
college education among young adults aged 19 year old in 2008/2009. These young
people were 14 years old when the program started in 2003 and were old enough
to benefit from free education at college level (established in 2008). The likelihood
of having some college education increased by 7.4 percentage points for this group,
relative to a pre-treatment rate of 17.3%, which implies a 43% raise. For 20 and 21
year olds, the effect of BDH was also positive but not statistically significant.
2.6.3 Labor market outcomes
Table 2.8 shows the results of the ITT and 2SLS regressions of the effect of BDH
on the probability of having a job by the end of phase one. In line with previous
literature (Skoufias and Parker, 2001; Janvry et al., 2006; Attanasio et al., 2012;
Schady et al., 2008), the sign of the job coefficients is contrary to the sign of the
enrollment coefficients for 16, 17, 18, 20 and 21 year olds. The 2SLS estimates
reported in column 2 show that the likelihood of having a job was negative but not
statistically significant for most age groups and negative and statistically significant
for 21 year olds (who were 16 in 2003). By the end of phase one, BDH reduced
the employment rate of this age group by 12.5 percentage points relative to a pre-
treatment rate of 56%, which implies a 22% reduction for this group. Themagnitude
of this effect is comparable to the 9.9 percentage points decrease in paid employment
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Table 2.7: Short-term effects of BDH on high school graduation and on the
likelihood of having some college education by the end of phase one
High School Has some college
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2008 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 17 year olds -0.0478*** 0.0249 5449
(0.0166) (0.0306)
Pre- treatment mean 0.186 0.186
Effect on 18 year olds 0.00984 0.0870** 5343
(0.0211) (0.0441)
Pre- treatment mean 0.487 0.487
Effect on 19 year olds -0.0350* 0.0369 -0.0290 0.0737** 5099
(0.0203) (0.0419) (0.0178) (0.0355)
Pre- treatment mean 0.573 0.573 0.173 0.173
Effect on 20 year olds -0.00882 0.0323 4698
(0.0206) (0.0417)
Pre- treatment mean 0.228 0.228
Effect on 21 year olds -0.0375* 0.0482 4335
(0.0213) (0.0466)
Pre- treatment mean 0.246 0.246
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of ITT
and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff.
Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben I cutoff
(50,65 points).All the regressions control for gender and race of the individuals.
reported by Edmonds and Schady (2012) who evaluate the impacts of BDH after 17
months of BDH’s implementation on children aged 11–16 at baseline.
2.6.4 Effects of a short exposure to BDH measured at the end of phase two
2.6.5 Education outcomes
In terms of education outcomes, what makes the second phase of the program
different from the first phase is that by the end of phase two, children attained more
years of education but no significant effects were found in terms of enrollment. One
possible explanation is that the size of the transfer was smaller in the first years of the
program, furthermore, parents believed that BDH was conditional on enrollment.
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Table 2.8: Short-term effects of BDH on the likelihood
of having a job by the end of phase one
Has a job
(1) (2)
Age in 2008 ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 15 year olds 0.0136 0.0195 6465
(0.00896) (0.0166)
Pre- treatment mean 0.0670 0.0670
Effect on 16 year olds -0.0142 -0.00178 5868
(0.0117) (0.0211)
Pre- treatment mean 0.101 0.101
Effect on 17 year olds 0.0177 -0.0287 5453
(0.0163) (0.0321)
Pre- treatment mean 0.200 0.200
Effect on 18 year olds 0.00423 -0.00627 5350
(0.0198) (0.0411)
Pre- treatment mean 0.337 0.337
Effect on 19 year olds 0.00693 0.0344 5105
(0.0209) (0.0418)
Pre- treatment mean 0.449 0.449
Effect on 20 year olds -0.00196 -0.0600 4703
(0.0217) (0.0455)
Pre- treatment mean 0.507 0.507
Effect on 21 year olds 0.0288 -0.125*** 4345
(0.0214) (0.0474)
Pre- treatment mean 0.562 0.562
County and time FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county
level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. The table reports on the results of ITT and
2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the dis-
tance to the cutoff. Sample is children with a score
within +/-2.5 points from the Selben I cutoff (50,65
points). All the regressions control for gender and
race of the individuals.
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However, since the condition was on enrollment and not on grade progression, there
were no effects on years of education.
By contrast, in phase two, not only parents received a bigger transfer, but also,
education became free after tenth grade with the reform of 2008. This may have
reinforced the effect of BDH especially at the juncture ages of 12 and 15 years,
when children decide whether or not to enroll at high school and at the first year of
Baccalaureate, respectively.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.9 report on the short-term effects of BDH on enrollment
by the end of phase two. My preferred specification is in column 2 and shows
that BDH did not have a significant positive effect on enrollment for any of the age
groups. If anything, there was a significant reduction on the enrollment rate of 19
year olds by 22.4 percentage points.
Columns 3 and 4 show the impacts of BDH on years of education by the end of phase
two. Results from the 2SLS regressions show a positive and statistically significant
effect on years of schooling for 17 and 20 year olds. The total years of education
for 17 year olds increased by 1.2 years, relative to a pre-treatment mean of 10.11
years for this age group. While, for 20 year olds, schooling increased by 1.9 years,
relative to a pre-treatment mean of 11.12 years of education.
Table 2.10 shows the short-term effects of BDH on high school graduation rates
and the likelihood of having some college education by the end of phase two. The
2SLS estimates reported in column 2 show a negative and statistically significant
effect on the high school graduation rate among 18 year olds. Children who are
close to finishing elementary school or tenth grade are less likely to drop out of
school at least until they reach that goal. 18 year olds were around 13 years when
the second phase of the program began and they were two years away from finishing
tenth grade; so, receiving the transfer may not have been enough incentive to prevent
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Table 2.9: Short-term effects of BDH on enrollment and years of education by
the end of phase two
Enrollment Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 10 year olds 0.00597 -0.00765 -0.128 -0.899** 468
(0.0146) (0.0293) (0.151) (0.384)
Pre- treatment mean 0.988 0.988 4.960 4.960
Effect on 15 year olds 0.0347 0.0949 0.0247 0.445 1289
(0.0251) (0.0643) (0.155) (0.423)
Pre- treatment mean 0.919 0.919 9.103 9.103
Effect on 16 year olds -0.0650** -0.0694 -0.346** 0.398 1381
(0.0285) (0.0704) (0.166) (0.399)
Pre- treatment mean 0.869 0.869 9.458 9.458
Effect on 17 year olds -0.0105 0.0480 -0.0143 1.204** 1482
(0.0346) (0.0952) (0.181) (0.512)
Pre- treatment mean 0.728 0.728 10.11 10.11
Effect on 18 year olds -0.0376 -0.0708 -0.254 -0.141 1483
(0.0386) (0.110) (0.190) (0.555)
Pre- treatment mean 0.447 0.447 10.70 10.70
Effect on 19 year olds 0.0314 -0.224** 0.293 -0.267 1450
(0.0375) (0.106) (0.197) (0.521)
Pre- treatment mean 0.344 0.344 10.97 10.97
Effect on 20 year olds -0.0205 0.193 -0.347 1.882** 1334
(0.0371) (0.129) (0.223) (0.825)
Pre- treatment mean 0.279 0.279 11.12 11.12
Effect on 21 year olds -0.0421 0.0790 -0.0365 -0.158 1261
(0.0366) (0.175) (0.255) (1.204)
Pre- treatment mean 0.256 0.256 11.20 11.20
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of ITT
and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff.
Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II
cutoff (36.5 points). All the regressions control for gender and race of the
individuals.
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Table 2.10: Short-term effects of BDH on high school graduation and on the
likelihood of having some college education by the end of phase two
High School Has some college
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 17 year olds 0.00363 0.0240 1482
(0.0292) (0.0764)
Pre- treatment mean 0.168 0.168
Effect on 18 year olds -0.0492 -0.224* 1483
(0.0384) (0.115)
Pre- treatment mean 0.505 0.505
Effect on 19 year olds 0.0178 0.0446 0.0477 -0.0516 1450
(0.0380) (0.102) (0.0311) (0.0870)
Pre- treatment mean 0.624 0.624 0.167 0.167
Effect on 20 year olds -0.00727 0.381*** 1334
(0.0360) (0.130)
Pre- treatment mean 0.212 0.212
Effect on 21 year olds -0.0549 -0.115 1261
(0.0369) (0.177)
Pre- treatment mean 0.248 0.248
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results
of ITT and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to
the cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the
Selben II cutoff (36.5 points). All the regressions control for gender and
race of the individuals.
some of them from leaving school. I also present results for 17 and 19 year olds to
allow for the possibility of early and late high school graduations. The effects were
positive but not statistically significant for these groups.
On the other hand, column 4 shows that 20 year olds in 2014, who were 15 when the
second phase began in 2008/2009 were in fact 38.1 percentage points more likely to
have some college education. This is equivalent to a 180% increase relative to the
pre-treatment rate.
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2.6.6 Labor market outcomes
Table 2.11 reports on the short-term effects of BDH on the employment rate of 15 to
21 year olds by the end of phase two. Column 2 shows that BDH had a negative and
statistically significant effect on the employment rate of 17 year olds. The probability
of working drops by 12.5 percentage points for this group, relative to a pre-treatment
rate of 14.3% which is equivalent to an 87% reduction. This is consistent with the
results reported in Table 2.9 that showed a statistically significant increase of 1.2
years of education for this age group accompanied by a positive effect, although not
statistically significant, in enrollment.
2.6.7 Differential effects of a long versus a short exposure to BDH
2.6.8 Education outcomes
In this section, I discuss the differential effects of a short exposure to BDH (treatment
during phase one) versus a long exposure to BDH (treatment during phases one and
two). I focus on children aged 10 to 23 years at the end of phase two, who were
treated during phase one and were 5 to 18 years old when they were assigned to be
treated (or not) at the beginning of phase two. Since I restrict the sample to children
that received treatment for at least three years in each of the phases of the program,
the final sample contains children aged 10 to 21 years by the end of phase two.
Table 2.12, shows the differential effects of BDH on enrollment and years of educa-
tion by the end of phase two. Column 2 shows the results of the 2SLS regressions in
equation 2.4. It shows positive differential effects on enrollment for children aged
10, 14 and 16 years in 2013/2014, who were 0, 4, and 6 years in 2003. However,
none of the age groups were significantly more likely to be enrolled in an educa-
tional establishment after being treated during the two phases of the program when
compared to similar children that were treated only during the first phase.
Column 4 shows the results for years of education. The general results are not
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Table 2.11: Short-term effects of BDH on the employ-
ment rate by the end of phase two
Has a job
(1) (2)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 15 year olds -0.0141 0.0528 1289
(0.0176) (0.0461)
Pre- treatment mean 0.0480 0.0480
Effect on 16 year olds 0.0163 -0.0117 1381
(0.0207) (0.0531)
Pre- treatment mean 0.0770 0.0770
Effect on 17 year olds 0.0163 -0.125* 1482
(0.0269) (0.0726)
Pre- treatment mean 0.143 0.143
Effect on 18 year olds 0.00301 -0.0260 1483
(0.0371) (0.107)
Pre- treatment mean 0.311 0.311
Effect on 19 year olds 0.0173 0.0928 1450
(0.0396) (0.107)
Pre- treatment mean 0.440 0.440
Effect on 20 year olds 0.0453 -0.165 1334
(0.0421) (0.150)
Pre- treatment mean 0.523 0.523
Effect on 21 year olds -0.0575 0.240 1261
(0.0427) (0.218)
Pre- treatment mean 0.587 0.587
County and time FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county
level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the re-
sults of ITT and 2SLS regressions using a linear
polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is
children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the
Selben II cutoff (36.5 points). All the regressions
control for gender and race of the individuals.
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Table 2.12: Differential effects of BDH on enrollment and years of education
Enrollment Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 10 year olds -0.00379 0.0166 0.00307 0.280** 1787
(0.00650) (0.0110) (0.0609) (0.114)
Pre- treatment mean 0.988 0.988 4.960 4.960
Effect on 11 year olds 0.00869* -0.00686 0.0399 -0.159* 3401
(0.00447) (0.00788) (0.0479) (0.0927)
Pre- treatment mean 0.987 0.987 5.917 5.917
Effect on 12 year olds 0.00381 -0.00729 -0.0550 -0.0670 7002
(0.00447) (0.00811) (0.0406) (0.0759)
Pre- treatment mean 0.980 0.980 6.817 6.817
Effect on 13 year olds 0.00397 -0.0147 0.000286 0.0401 7470
(0.00557) (0.0103) (0.0484) (0.0890)
Pre- treatment mean 0.971 0.971 7.677 7.677
Effect on 14 year olds -0.00218 0.0119 0.0316 0.0613 7629
(0.00731) (0.0142) (0.0528) (0.100)
Pre- treatment mean 0.949 0.949 8.481 8.481
Effect on 15 year olds -0.0130 -0.00875 8.24e-05 -0.0803 6767
(0.00923) (0.0183) (0.0631) (0.117)
Pre- treatment mean 0.919 0.919 9.103 9.103
Effect on 16 year olds -0.0257** 0.0353 -0.165** -0.0312 7084
(0.0112) (0.0229) (0.0679) (0.140)
Pre- treatment mean 0.869 0.869 9.458 9.458
Effect on 17 year olds -0.0108 -0.0239 -0.0563 -0.0606 6678
(0.0156) (0.0320) (0.0752) (0.151)
Pre- treatment mean 0.728 0.728 10.11 10.11
Effect on 18 year olds 0.0139 -0.0135 -0.106 -0.217 5734
(0.0187) (0.0386) (0.0878) (0.182)
Pre- treatment mean 0.447 0.447 10.70 10.70
Effect on 19 year olds -0.0189 -0.0289 0.0275 -0.0322 5409
(0.0185) (0.0426) (0.0933) (0.211)
Pre- treatment mean 0.344 0.344 10.97 10.97
Effect on 20 year olds 0.0301* -0.0613 0.0137 -0.291 5127
(0.0176) (0.0411) (0.103) (0.234)
Pre- treatment mean 0.279 0.279 11.12 11.12
Effect on 21 year olds 0.0209 -0.0501 -0.0429 -0.182 4605
(0.0183) (0.0434) (0.118) (0.281)
Pre- treatment mean 0.256 0.256 11.20 11.20
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of ITT
and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the cutoff.
Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II
cutoff (36.5 points). All the regressions control for gender and race of the
individuals.
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very encouraging either. The only group that experienced an increase in years of
schooling were 10 year olds. These children had not reached the first year of age
when the program started in 2003. By the end of phase two, they increased their
years of education in 0.28 years, relative to a pre-treatment mean of 4.96 years for
that age group, which is equivalent to a 6% increase in schooling. These children
were exposed to BDH for 10 years so it is likely that the benefits received during
their first 5 years of life were spent in food and health checkups, while during
the remaining five years they were used to cover education-related expenses. These
results are in line with the evidence on the complementarity of early investments that
argue that early investments facilitate the productivity of later investments (Cunha,
Heckman, Lochner, et al., 2006).
The differential effects of BDH on high school graduation and on the likelihood of
having some college education are reported in Table 2.13. There were no statistically
significant gains in terms of the likelihood of graduating from high school for 17 to
19 year olds. The reason could be that these children were between 12 and 14 years
when the second phase began. One possible explanation is that because education
is compulsory up to age 15 they were less likely to drop out from school and after
education became free, the outcomes of those who were not treated in phase two
were at least as good as those of children treated during the two phases. Likewise,
there were no significant effects on the probability of having some college. This
probability was even negative for 21 year olds, probably because households treated
during the two phases are the most vulnerable ones.
2.6.9 Labor market outcomes
The last wave of the RS collects information on the occupation sector in which
people work. This allowsme to classify the different sectors into two general groups,
agricultural work and white-collar jobs. In this way, it is possible to investigate the
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Table 2.13: Differential effects of BDH on high school graduation and on the
likelihood of having some college education
High School Has some college
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 17 year olds 0.0101 -0.0201 6678
(0.0122) (0.0251)
Pre- treatment mean 0.168 0.168
Effect on 18 year olds -0.0151 0.00686 5734
(0.0184) (0.0379)
Pre- treatment mean 0.505 0.505
Effect on 19 year olds -0.00511 0.0155 -0.00358 0.0206 5409
(0.0187) (0.0430) (0.0142) (0.0331)
Pre- treatment mean 0.624 0.624 0.167 0.167
Effect on 20 year olds 0.0152 -0.0444 5127
(0.0155) (0.0362)
Pre- treatment mean 0.212 0.212
Effect on 21 year olds -0.00815 -0.0845** 4605
(0.0183) (0.0426)
Pre- treatment mean 0.248 0.248
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of
ITT and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the
cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben
II cutoff (36.5 points). All the regressions control for gender and race of the
individuals.
effects of BDH not only on the probability that young adults work but also on the
type of work they have.
In general, being treated during the two phases of the program reduced the likelihood
of having a job among the younger age groups. However, this effect was not
statistically significant. Similarly, there were no significant effects on the probability
of having a white collar job or a job in the agricultural sector as shown in Table 2.14.
These results are consistent with a recent study by Hahn, Islam, et al. (2018) that
examines the long-term effects of a stipend program that made secondary education
free for rural girls in Bangladesh and find no apparent effect of the stipend on the
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Table 2.14: Differential effects of BDH on the employment rate
Has a job Agriculture job White collar job
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 15 year olds 0.00515 -0.00410 0.0192 -0.183 -0.0188 -0.0783 6767
(0.00719) (0.0139) (0.0823) (0.126) (0.0900) (0.148)
Pre- treatment mean 0.0480 0.0480 0.293 0.293 0.233 0.233
Effect on 16 year olds 0.0141 -0.0109 0.0150 0.105 -0.143** -0.0461 7084
(0.00861) (0.0175) (0.0493) (0.0883) (0.0707) (0.107)
Pre- treatment mean 0.0770 0.0770 0.239 0.239 0.256 0.256
Effect on 17 year olds -0.00332 0.00744 0.00185 0.0278 -0.000628 0.0194 6678
(0.0124) (0.0251) (0.0361) (0.0730) (0.0450) (0.0913)
Pre- treatment mean 0.143 0.143 0.194 0.194 0.270 0.270
Effect on 18 year olds -0.00152 0.0275 0.0231 -0.0398 0.00414 0.0290 5734
(0.0170) (0.0353) (0.0244) (0.0452) (0.0340) (0.0614)
Pre- treatment mean 0.311 0.311 0.151 0.151 0.317 0.317
Effect on 19 year olds 0.0128 -0.00477 0.00411 0.0377 0.0313 -0.0539 5409
(0.0183) (0.0425) (0.0189) (0.0425) (0.0287) (0.0666)
Pre- treatment mean 0.440 0.440 0.144 0.144 0.337 0.337
Effect on 20 year olds 0.00931 0.0221 0.00679 -0.0381 0.0432 0.0108 5127
(0.0183) (0.0422) (0.0187) (0.0408) (0.0280) (0.0624)
Pre- treatment mean 0.523 0.523 0.129 0.129 0.362 0.362
Effect on 21 year olds -0.00188 0.0333 0.0402** 0.00300 -0.0612** 0.0633 4605
(0.0188) (0.0439) (0.0168) (0.0402) (0.0275) (0.0626)
Pre- treatment mean 0.587 0.587 0.127 0.127 0.377 0.377
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of ITT and 2SLS regressions using a linear
polynomial of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from
the Selben II cutoff (36.5 points). All the regressions control for gender and race of the individuals.
likelihood of women working in adulthood.
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2.7 Robustness checks
2.7.1 Results using ENES exam data
Considering that an important number of counties were left out of the third wave
of the RS, in this section, I use administrative data on the ENES exam (Examen
Nacional para la Educación Superior) to test the robustness of the results regarding
high school graduation. ENES is a standardized exam that students in the last year
of high school have to pass in order to go to university. It is compulsory for all
students at private and public schools; hence, taking the test is a good predictor for
high school graduation.
The exam was first administered in 2012, so it is possible to merge the 2013 and
2014 ENES databases to the last wave of my three-wave panel using the students’
IDs. Of the 336,791 students in the ENES dataset, 168,481 were also in the RS. As
in the previous section, I run similar 2SLS regressions to the ones I estimated before
using as the outcome of interest a binary variable that takes the value of one if the
child was on the ENES dataset, which implies that she was in the final year of high
school, and zero if not.
As shown in Table 2.10, being treated during the second phase of the program
significantly reduced the probability of graduating from high school among 18-
year-olds by 22.4 percentage points, whereas when using the ENES exam data, the
result was a reduction of 13.4 percentage points and was not statistically significant,
as shown in column 2 Table 2.17 in the Appendix. On the other hand, Appendix
Table 2.18 reports on the results of the differential effects of a long versus a short
exposure to BDH on the probability of high school graduation. The results were in
line to those reported in Table 2.13 that showed no statistically significant effects for
17, 18 and 19 year olds.
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2.7.2 Effects on fertility and migration
There are several factors that may affect children outcomes apart from the transfer.
One concern is that CTs could incentivize other behaviours like an increase in
fertility or migration. Poor women may choose to have children to become eligible
to receive the transfer or may choose to migrate to places with public offices where
cashing the transfers is easier. Changes in household composition may affect the
schooling decisions of poor children since a new family member implies more
expenses, forcing some children out of school. On the other hand, remittances from
migrants may also affect schooling decisions but in the opposite direction. I explore
whether BDH had effects on fertility and migration in the short and long-run. As a
proxy for fertility, I focus on the total number of children below 12 years living in the
household. To study the impacts on migration, I focus on the number of household
members who migrated since 2000 (a question that is asked in waves 2 and 3).
Results shown in Table 2.19 suggest that there is little evidence of endogenous
fertility induced by the transfer in the short or long-run for any of the age groups
except for children ages 8 and 9 years for whom I found a statistically significant
effect in the short-run. Finally, there is no evidence of impacts on migration in the
short or long-run.
2.8 Conclusions
This paper studies whether cash transfers continue to be effective after several years
targeting the same population. The availability of individual-level social registry
data allowed me to identify children that were treated during one or the two phases
of the program and track their performance in terms of education and labor market
outcomes. With this information and knowing that at the threshold of eligibility, the
second assignment to treatment (in 2008/9) was independent of the first assignment
(in 2003), I was able to disentangle the impact of a short exposure to BDH (treatment
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during phase one) versus a long exposure (treatment during phases one and two).
The short-term effects of BDH – measured after five years of its implementation –
were positive and statistically significant on enrollment among children that began
treatment at ages 8, 9, 12, 13, and 15. Children were also more likely to graduate
from high school and to have some undergraduate studies. The results by the end of
phase two (among children who were treated only during phase two) also showed
positive effects on years of education among children who began treatment at ages
12 and 15. The lack of short-term effects in enrollment by the end of phase two
may be explained by the fact that soon after implementation, people realized that
the authorities were not monitoring the conditions.
The lack of differential effects on education and labor market outcomes among
children that were treated during the two phases versus those treated during just the
first phase, is not explained by an attenuation of BDH effects for all the age groups
in phase two. In fact, the analysis of the short-term effects at the end of phase two
showed positive and important effects of BDH at juncture ages. This contradicts
the hypotheses that educational gratuity or lack of monitoring of the conditions
attenuated the effects of BDH during phase two. A more plausible reason for
the lack of differential effects is that once children reach the education level they
have planned to achieve, or alternatively, once they reach a certain age when the
opportunity cost of schooling becomes sufficiently high, an unconditional transfer
does not provide enough incentive to keep them at school.
The only group that experienced positive differential effects in years of education
after being exposed during the two phases of the program were children aged 0
when BDH began in 2003. Children who began treatment at an older age did not
experience similar gains despite being treatedwith similar intensity possibly because
once cognitive gaps appear, the process cannot be reversed with CTs. It is likely that
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older children were already lagging behind perhaps with low grades and attendance
problems, which explains why BDH did not have positive effects on their education.
These results are in line with the notion that human capital investment exhibits
both self-productivity and complementarity and explains why late investments that
attempt to compensate for the lack of adequate early investments can be very costly
and ineffective (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, et al., 2006).
Regarding labor market outcomes in the short-run, results were not conclusive
about whether the negative effect on the likelihood of having a job for 17 year olds
in 2013/2014 was caused by a concurrent raise in enrollment for this age group.
Moreover, being exposed to BDH for two phases versus just one did not give treated
children an advantage in the labor market by the end of phase two. The reason could
be that children exposed during the two phases of the program did not achieve more
years of education after all. It is possible that people treated during the two phases
could be more vulnerable, and that other things that are not captured by the Selben
score like social networks or lack thereof, important to access the job market, could
be attenuating the effects of BDH on labor market outcomes.
The lack of monitoring of the conditions is one of the factors that may explain why
BDH did not achieve its goal of improving educational attainment consistently in
the long-run. Had the transfer been conditioned on school registration and on grade
progression it is likely that better results would have been found in terms of years
of education. In a study for Ecuador, Schady et al. (2008) found that the short-term
gains fromBDHwere significantly larger among households who believed that there
was a school enrollment requirement attached to transfers. Evidence from micro-
simulation models for Mexico and Brazil also conclude that conditions attached
to transfers explain the bulk of the effect of CCT programs on school enrollment
(Ferreira and Leite, 2002; Todd and Wolpin, 2006). Another reason for the lack of
lasting effects is that the transfer was not big enough to compensate for the wages that
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older children could get in the labor market. Finally, when there are other children
at home, there is no way to prevent parents from spending the transfer on the older
children instead of those below 18 years. This would also cause an attenuation of
the program’s impact.
Looking strictly at the effects of BDH on education and labor market outcomes, the
results from this paper stress the need for a redesign of BDH. Attanasio et al. (2012)
argue that for the case of PROGRESA, a revenue neutral change that increases
the grants for secondary school children while eliminating it for primary school
children would have positive effects on enrollment on the latter and minor effects
on the former. I would expect similar results for the case of BDH considering
that in Ecuador education is compulsory until age 15. Transfers should also take
into account the number of children in the household and should increase with age
in order to reduce the opportunity cost of work for children aged 15 to 18 years.
Furthermore, given the results found in this paper, the government should also
increase the transfers to poor mothers with children below 5 years.
Finally, it is worth noting that even when BDH became inefficient in the long-run in
improving the educational outcomes of children, it does not mean necessarily that
this applies also to health outcomes. Future research should look at the long-term
effects of BDH on other outcomes to inform any reform to the program.
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Table 2.15: Selective matching and BDH eligibility
Ages First Wave Second Wave Third Wave
0 and 1 year olds 0.0106
(0.00798)
N 29886
Mean 0.388
2 and 3 year olds -0.00136
(0.00800)
N 29218
Mean 0.383
4 and 5 year olds 0.00143
(0.00826)
N 27783
Mean 0.385
6 and 7 year olds 0.00342 -0.00181
(0.00707) (0.00664)
N 37439 39476
Mean 0.385 0.377
8 and 9 year olds 0.00499 0.00357
(0.00716) (0.00677)
N 36551 39518
Mean 0.388 0.459
10 and 11 year olds 0.00821 0.00794 0.00184
(0.00728) (0.00711) (0.00527)
N 35711 35999 51686
Mean 0.389 0.456 0.253
12 and 13 year olds 0.00937 0.00465 0.00630
(0.00712) (0.00704) (0.00560)
N 37580 35826 55086
Mean 0.392 0.421 0.648
14 and 15 year olds 0.00829 0.0106 -0.00219
(0.00720) (0.00723) (0.00556)
N 36146 33618 50046
Mean 0.385 0.388 0.710
16 and 17 year olds 0.00732 -0.00418 -0.00381
(0.00694) (0.00747) (0.00583)
N 38343 30019 45604
Mean 0.386 0.356 0.711
18 and 19 year olds -0.00492 -0.00561 0.0135**
(0.00741) (0.00794) (0.00635)
N 33554 26732 39267
Mean 0.392 0.345 0.694
20 and 21 year olds -0.00185 0.0106 0.00203
(0.00757) (0.00806) (0.00700)
N 32022 24884 34839
Mean 0.389 0.310 0.647
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample
includes children in each wave of RS data within +/- 2.5 points
of the eligibility thresholds in each wave. The dependent vari-
able is a dummy equals to 1 if a child is in the 3-waves panel
and 0 otherwise. Models include county, year of survey FE.
Control covariates include child’s gender, age. Each coefficient
comes from a separate regression by age group.
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Table 2.16: Short-term effects of BDH on enrollment and years of education by
the end of phase one
Enrollment Years of Education
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Age in 2008 ITT 2SLS ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 6 year olds -0.00452 0.00560 -0.0636 0.103 2925
(0.00683) (0.0133) (0.0493) (0.0836)
Pre- treatment mean 0.984 0.984 1.449 1.449
Effect on 7 year olds 0.00731 0.00610 -0.00226 0.0771 5660
(0.00489) (0.00875) (0.0346) (0.0655)
Pre- treatment mean 0.990 0.990 2.344 2.344
Effect on 8 year olds -0.00179 -0.00564 0.0653* 0.0843 6326
(0.00442) (0.00739) (0.0353) (0.0648)
Pre- treatment mean 0.991 0.991 3.264 3.264
Effect on 9 year olds 0.00800** -0.00115 0.0198 0.0421 6038
(0.00354) (0.00536) (0.0394) (0.0699)
Pre- treatment mean 0.993 0.993 4.221 4.221
Effect on 10 year olds -0.00518 0.0130 0.00678 0.212** 5561
(0.00422) (0.00836) (0.0468) (0.0886)
Pre- treatment mean 0.992 0.992 5.160 5.160
Effect on 11 year olds -0.00207 -0.00215 0.0485 -0.00706 6411
(0.00507) (0.00929) (0.0497) (0.0846)
Pre- treatment mean 0.980 0.980 5.992 5.992
Effect on 12 year olds -0.00904 0.0161 0.0140 0.0577 7009
(0.00601) (0.0116) (0.0510) (0.0905)
Pre- treatment mean 0.963 0.963 6.796 6.796
Effect on 13 year olds 0.000741 0.0297** -0.0253 0.0744 7135
(0.00849) (0.0151) (0.0583) (0.103)
Pre- treatment mean 0.942 0.942 7.520 7.520
Effect on 14 year olds 0.00231 0.0383** 0.00406 0.0674 6649
(0.00950) (0.0179) (0.0670) (0.121)
Pre- treatment mean 0.923 0.923 8.233 8.233
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parenthe-
ses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of
ITT and 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial of the distance to the
cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben I
cutoff (50,65 points). Models include county and year of survey FE. Control
covariates include child’s gender, age.
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Table 2.17: Short-term effects of BDH by the end of phase two using ENES data
Enes exam
(1) (2)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 17 year olds -0.0313 0.0559 1482
(0.0376) (0.100)
Effect on 18 year olds -0.0251 -0.134 1483
(0.0393) (0.112)
Effect on 19 year olds -2.21e-05 0.0478 1450
(0.0365) (0.0986)
County and time FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Table reports the coefficients of ITT and 2SLS regressions. Sample is children who took the ENES exam and
has a Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5 points) who were untreated on phase 1.
All the regressions control for gender and race of the individuals.
Table 2.18: Differential effects of a long versus a short exposure measured by the
end of phase two using ENES data
Enes exam
(1) (2)
Age in 2014 ITT 2SLS N
Effect on 17 year olds -0.0352** -0.0239 6678
(0.0172) (0.0352)
Effect on 18 year olds 0.0198 -0.0353 5734
(0.0188) (0.0387)
Effect on 19 year olds 0.00128 -0.0666 5409
(0.0180) (0.0421)
County and time FE Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. P-values from goodness of fit
test after standard errors. Table reports the coefficients of ITT and 2SLS regressions. Sample is children who
took the ENES exam and has a Selben score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II cutoff (36.5 points) who
were treated on phase 1. All the regressions control for gender and race of the individuals.
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Table 2.19: Short-term effects and differential effects of BDH on fertility and migration
Short-term effects Differential effects
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ages
Children
<=12 years Migrants N
Children
<=12 years Migrants N
Effect on 6 and 7 year olds 0.0289 -0.00776 8587
(0.0666) (0.0177)
Pre- treatment mean 2.325 0.0420
Effect on 8 and 9 year olds -0.158*** 0.0123 12364
(0.0543) (0.0155)
Pre- treatment mean 2.331 0.0510
Effect on 10 and 11 year olds -0.0610 -0.00864 11973 0.0506 -0.0833 5188
(0.0520) (0.0150) (0.0887) (0.0574)
Pre- treatment mean 2.166 0.0460 2.207 0.0310
Effect on 12 and 13 year olds -0.0643 -0.00764 14147 0.0862 -0.0191 14473
(0.0500) (0.0128) (0.0539) (0.0140)
Pre- treatment mean 1.453 0.0530 1.680 0.0310
Effect on 14 and 15 year olds 0.00519 -0.000401 13116 -0.00412 0.0137 14397
(0.0488) (0.0126) (0.0517) (0.0156)
Pre- treatment mean 0.961 0.0530 1.173 0.0350
Effect on 16 and 17 year olds -0.0809 -0.00661 11321 0.00904 -0.0424 13762
(0.0546) (0.0162) (0.0534) (0.0285)
Pre- treatment mean 0.921 0.0590 1.034 0.0380
Effect on 18 and 19 year olds -0.0706 -0.0138 10463 0.00849 -0.00367 11143
(0.0644) (0.0185) (0.0638) (0.0185)
Pre- treatment mean 0.911 0.0650 0.971 0.0340
Effect on 20 and 21 year olds 0.0692 -0.0227 9071 0.0578 -0.00140 9742
(0.0743) (0.0230) (0.0707) (0.0157)
Pre- treatment mean 0.953 0.0620 0.969 0.0320
County and time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. The table reports on the results of 2SLS regressions using a linear polynomial
of the distance to the cutoff. Sample is children with a score within +/-2.5 points from the Selben
I cutoff (50,65 points) for the short-term effects and within +/-2.5 points from the Selben II
cutoff (36,5 points) for the differential effects. Models include county, year of survey FE. Control
covariates include child’s gender, age. For columns 1 and 2 the age is reported by the end of
phase1 and for columns 3 and 4 age is reported by the end of phase 2.
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C h a p t e r 3
LABOR MARKET REGULATION AND HOSPITAL QUALITY
Abstract
I evaluate the impact on in-hospital mortality of a reform that made all health
professionals working part-time switch to full-time contracts at public hospitals in
Ecuador. I take advantage of the staggered adoption of the reform and hospital panel
data to implement an event study to evaluate the impact of the reform. The results
for the sample of admissions to the emergency department show that mortality in
public hospitals decreased by 0.1% on the adoption year and by 0.2% one year
later. Results were robust to several alternative specifications and to the inclusion
of pre-reform hospital characteristics that could have been used by policymakers
to decide the order of implementation. More importantly, I show that the effects
reported in this paper cannot be attributed to changes in other quality indicators at
the hospital level like the length of stay or by changes in the patient mix.
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3.1 Introduction and literature review
Recent studies in developed countries suggest that there is a trend of declining
working hours of doctors (Swami et al., 2017; Broadway et al., 2017).1 In response
to this phenomenon and a growing demand for healthcare services, several countries
have implemented policies that operate in the intensive margin to increase working
hours and improve health care coverage. In the United Kingdom, for instance,
the government launched a 7-day opening of General Practitioner (GP) practices
to improve primary care access for patients (Dolton and Pathania, 2016), and in
Australia, the government provides financial incentives for GPs to offer additional
after-hours coverage to patients (Swami et al., 2017).
Hiring on-call staff remains the more common response to sudden surges in demand.
The problem with on-call staff is that when these professionals are brought into the
hospital on very short notice; they are likely to be unfamiliar with the procedures,
practices, equipment and their colleagues, and are therefore expected to have worse
results than regular staff (Bartel et al., 2014). Furthermore, evidence from stated
preference studies suggests that GPs would pay a large proportion of their annual
income just to avoid on-call work, which suggests that policies that operate on the
intensive margin would have little impact on increasing the total hours worked by
GPs (Broadway et al., 2017).
This paper studies the effects on hospitalmortality of a labor reform that increased the
number of hours worked by doctors at public health facilities in Ecuador. The reform
replaced progressively all existing part-time contracts with full-time contracts and
affected all healthcare professionals (excluding those in administrative jobs). There
are several reasons to believe that this reform would reduce in-hospital mortality.
First, it is reasonable to expect that higher staff-patient ratios would lead to a
1Some of the reasons for this decline are a shift in preference for working predictable and fewer
hours and increased participation of women in the medical workforce
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reduction in hospital mortality, in fact, much of the early literature on the relationship
between staffing levels and hospital quality finds a negative correlation between
staffing levels and patient mortality, measured as risk-adjusted 30-day mortality and
failure to rescue rates (Aiken et al., 2017; Needleman, Buerhaus, Matteke, et al.,
2002; Needleman, Buerhaus, Pankratz, et al., 2011). Second, the reduction in the
number of part-time and on-call contracts is expected to reduce disruptions to team
functioning which in turn would reduce mortality (Bartel et al., 2014).
However, other studies have found evidence of diminishing returns to nurse staffing
improvements. One example is the study by Sochalski et al. (2008) that uses
within-hospital variation over time to assess whether hospitals that increased nurse
staffing levels saw improvements in mortality among acute myocardial infarction
patients. The results show diminishing returns to nurse staffing improvements and
lack of significant evidence that staffing reduces mortality. This “flat of the curve”
argument that emphasizes inefficiency of medical spending has also been found by
Fisher, Wennberg, et al. (2003) who argue that a 30 percent reduction in Medicare
spending in high-use regions would not have negative effects on patient outcomes
or satisfaction. Hence, it is not clear whether increases in staffing would necessarily
translate into better outcomes for patients, a fact that is corroborated by several
empirical studies that have found mixed results, which I discuss briefly below.
The main challenges to uncover a causal relationship between changes in staffing
levels and in-hospitalmortality reside on omitted variable bias and selection of sicker
patients to the best hospitals. Even after controlling for severity of the conditions,
if the unobserved component of the severity of illness affects a patient’s choice of
hospital, then the selection problem remains and this endogenous sorting would
lead to underestimation of the beneficial effect of higher staffing levels (Cook et al.,
2012). To limit these concerns, other studies have used hospital-level panel data
that control for time-invariant unobserved hospital characteristics, minimizing the
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omitted variable problem in cross-sectional studies.
A natural solution to the selection problem is to randomly assign patients to hospitals
with different staffing levels and then compare the outcomes of patients. Since this is
not possible, researchers have to use natural experiments that create exogenous shifts
to hospital staffing and use that variation to study the impact on patients’ outcomes.
Cook et al. (2012) for example, evaluate the impact of California Assembly Bill 394,
which mandated maximum levels of patients per nurse in the hospital setting. They
instrument the observed patient-nurse ratios by the difference between the required
ratio and the ratio observed before the reform. They find that the reform decreased
patient/nurse ratios but did not improve patients’ outcomes, as opposed to other
studies that use the same IV strategy to analyze the effects of similar reforms in the
US, but register significant effects on quality of care (Lin, 2014; Tong, 2011).2
Matsudaira (2014) also evaluates the case for minimum nurse-to-patient ratios at
nursing homes. He uses a difference-in-difference strategy that compares changes
in quality of care for firms with varying degrees of exposure to the minimum staffing
law and finds no impact of the regulation on overall facility quality. Finally, Evans
and Kim (2006) exploits natural variation in patient loads registered at particular
days in the week and find that patients admitted when patient loads are high tend to
have higher mortality, however, the effects they report are small and not statistically
significant for some specifications. Moreover, the variation they isolate is temporary
as suggested by Matsudaira (2014) given that is caused by temporary shocks, and
thereforemay not identify the effect of a permanent increase in nurse staffing contrary
to the reform I study in this paper.
This paper contributes to at least two strands of the literature. The first one studies the
effects of staffing regulation and alternative work arrangements on hospital quality
2Is worth noting that a potential problem with this IV strategy is a possible correlation between
policy-induced changes in nurse staffing and patient acuity (Tong, 2011).
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and the second more broadly relates to the effects of labor market regulation on firm
outcomes. Most of the literature on the effects of labor market regulation on firm
outcomes focuses on employment protection legislation (EPL) reforms (Cappellari
et al., 2012; Cingano et al., 2016; Griffith and Macartney, 2014). EPL affects
firm outcomes through the increase in dismissal costs, which increases job security
for existing workers. Efficiency wage arguments suggest that higher job security
increases the value of employment for the worker and their (unobservable) effort,
improving firm outcomes (Griffith and Macartney, 2014). This paper is related to
the EPL literature because, like these regulations, the reform of Ecuador increased
the labor stability of workers in the healthcare sector. More importantly, to the best
of my knowledge, there are no other studies that evaluate the effects of a reform that
drastically eliminates the possibility of hiring part-time staff in the future.
The labor reform that I study in this paper affected all public hospitals at different
points in time according to an official implementation schedule. Hence, I use an
event study to evaluate the effects of the reform on in-hospital mortality. The key
identifying assumption in the event study is that the timing of adoption of the reform
has to be random so that after controlling for time fixed effects and group fixed
effects, there are no pre-existing differences in the outcome of interest between
hospitals that were treated before and later. In other words, hospitals treated at
different points in time follow parallel trends in the outcome of interest before the
reform.
I build a dataset that merges information on hospital resources, hospital admissions,
and budgets and to deal with the selection of patients to hospitals, I present results
for the sample of admissions to the emergency department and contrast with the
results obtained for the complete sample. The results for the sample of admissions
to the emergency department show that mortality in public hospitals decreased by
0.1% on the adoption year and by 0.2% one year later. Results were robust to
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several alternative specifications and to the inclusion of pre-reform characteristics
that could have been used by policymakers to decide the order of implementation.
The main contributions of this paper are: First, to the best of my knowledge, it is the
first paper that studies the effects of a reform that replaced all part-time contracts with
full-time contracts in the healthcare sector. Second, unlike the previous literature
that has mostly focused on nurse staffing regulations, this paper studies a reform that
affected all health professionals. Finally, it is one of the few papers looking at these
topics in a developing country context. The rest of the paper is organized as follows:
Section 3.2 explains the structure of the health system in Ecuador and describes
the implementation of the labor reform at public sector hospitals. Section 3.3
describes the three sources of administrative data that are used to build the balanced
panel of hospitals that will be used in all the analysis. Section 3.4 discusses the
empirical strategy. Section 3.5 presents evidence on the validity of the identification
strategy. Section 3.6 discusses the results of the event studies and some alternative
specifications. Section 3.7 presents some additional robustness checks; and, Section
3.8 concludes.
3.2 Background
In this section, I describe the Ecuadorian health system and the process of imple-
mentation of the labor reform that started in 2009 and ended in 2014 with almost
every part-time contract in the public sector being replaced by a full-time contract.
3.2.1 The health care system
Ecuador has a mixed health system made up of the public and private sectors. The
public sector comprises the Ministry of Public Health (MSP), with its institutional
providers which cater to individuals who lack health insurance and the National
System of Social Security which caters formal workers. The National System of
Social Security is made up of the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security (IESS),
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which includes Rural Social Insurance, the Armed Forces Social Security Institute,
and the National Police Social Security Institute (Giovanella et al., 2012). The
private sector is made up of for-profit institutions (hospitals, clinics, community
clinics, physicians’ offices, pharmacies) and private non-profit organizations such
as NGOs, popular medical service organizations, social service associations, etc.
(Giovanella et al., 2012).
Although the largest number of facilities with hospital capacity belong to the private
sector, the public sector concentrates the highest percentage of hospital admissions.
In 2009, the Ministry of Public Health was in charge of 125 public hospitals, the
Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security had 19 and the remaining 44 belonged to
the other arms of the National System of Social Security. The private sector, on the
other hand, had 534 facilities with hospital capacity. In terms of hospital discharges,
the public sector covers nearly 62% of the total, while private hospitals cover only
38% of the total.3. Unlike the public sector, in the private sector, there is a great
turnover of hospitals. Only during the period between 2014 and 2015, 19 health
facilities entered the market; among them, 17 were private and 2 were public, while
90 left the market, 88 were private and 2 were public4.
The public sector also hires the biggest share of healthcare professionals. Among
those who registered their degrees between 2014 and 2018, 54.64% of the total
worked in the public sector and 30.13% worked in the private sector, while the
remaining 15.22% remains unclassified.5 There are no statistics available about the
qualifications held by health professionals in the public and private sector but in the
aggregate, 25% hold a graduate degree, 68% hold an undergraduate degree and 7%
hold a technical degree.6 There is also very little information about the situation of
3Source: Hospital Discharges Yearbook INEC 2014.
4Source: Hospital Discharges Yearbook INEC 2014.
5Ministry of Health - ACESS statistics: http://www.calidadsalud.gob.ec/acess-app-servicio-
ciudadano/public/estadistica/personalSalud.jsf
6Ministry of Health - ACESS statistics: http://www.calidadsalud.gob.ec/acess-app-servicio-
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the health workforce in Ecuador. Most of the available information is published by
the National Statistics Office and comes from hospital resources administrative data
at the establishment level because of the confidential nature of micro-data.7
For many years, the professionals working at the Ministry of Health received the
lowest remunerations of the public sector. As an example, the remuneration of a
specialist physician was almost half of the market remuneration (Giovanella et al.,
2012). As part of a wider reform which sought to standardize the salaries of all
public officials, the government decided to move from a system that allowed hiring
workers for 4 and 6 hours a day8 to an 8-hour-a-day system in all the establishments
and institutions of the public sector. In the next section, I explain in more detail the
implementation of this labor reform in the public health system.
3.2.2 The labor reform
Employment contracts in the public sector can be indefinite or fixed-term. Indefinite
contracts are called ‘nombramientos’ and can be provisional or definitive. Fixed
term contracts have a maximum duration of twelve months renewable for one more
year. By 2003, only 20% of the health care professionals working at public hospitals
had an indefinite contract (nombramiento), while the other 80% had a fixed term
contract (Merino, 2006). This situation remained almost unchanged until 2012.9
Regarding workloads, contracts can be full-time, part-time or occasional/on-call.
Full-time contracts involve 8 hours of work per day, part-time contracts involve less
than 8 hours of work per day and on-call contracts are those whose object is the
attention of emergent or extraordinary needs, not linked to the habitual activity of
ciudadano/public/estadistica/personalSalud.jsf
7TheResolution 001-INEC-DIJU-NT-2015 establishes a lengthy process for researchers to access
administrative microdata and when access is possible, the requirements for data processing are very
demanding.
8These types of contracts were common in the healthcare and education sectors among others.
9Source:https://www.salud.gob.ec/ministerio-de-salud-entrega-500-nombramientos-a-
profesionales-del-ramo/
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the employer, hence their duration shall not exceed thirty days in a year. Before
2008, more than 50% of public hospitals hadmore than 60% of their payroll working
less than 8 hours per day. This situation changed drastically with the enactment of a
series of resolutions by the Ministry of Labor that banned the creation of new part-
time contracts and replaced the existing part-time contracts with full-time contracts
at all public institutions. The result was a sharp decline in the share of health
professionals with part-time and occasional/on-call contracts and a marked increase
in the share of full-time contracts.
Table 3.1 shows how the share of full-time, part-time and occasional/on-call con-
tracts changed at public hospitals from the period between 2004 and 2007 to the
period between 2012 and 2014. Hospitals are classified in quartiles of the share of
part-time staff (SPTS) hired in 2004-2007.10 Hospitals in the last quartile, thosewith
the higher share of part-time staff in 2004-2007, experienced the biggest increase
in the share of full-time staff in 2012-2014 (an increase of 77 percentage points),
as well as the biggest reduction in the share of part-time staff, (a reduction of 75
percentage points).
The reform was implemented in a staggered way, following the resolutions issued
by the Ministry of Labor for the effect. The first resolution (SENRES 2009-90) was
enacted inMay 2009 and affected only health care professionals working at facilities
of the Ministry of Public Health. The resolution affected professionals with fixed-
term contracts and applied at the moment of contract renewal. Adoption within
this group of hospitals was progressive according to the implementation schedule
that the Ministry of Labor and the Ministry of Health created for that purpose.11
A second resolution (MRL-2011-33) was issued in February 2011 and included
10The share of part-time staff is the ratio of part-time workers to total staff hired in a year
11Several documents state that there was an official schedule that would determine the hospitals
or groups of hospitals that would implement the reform first, one of them is the Agreement 916 of
October 2011.
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Table 3.1: Change in the share of full-time, part-time, and occasional/on-call contracts
in public hospitals
Mean 2004-2007 Mean 2012-2014 Difference N
Share full-time doctors (%)
25 > SPTS ≥ 0 73 94 21 41
50 > SPTS ≥ 25 50 91 41 50
75 > SPTS ≥ 50 32 93 62 46
100 > SPTS ≥ 75 12 89 77 47
Share part-time doctors (%)
25 > SPTS ≥ 0 13 3 -10 41
50 > SPTS ≥ 25 38 7 -31 50
75 > SPTS ≥ 50 63 6 -57 46
100 > SPTS ≥ 75 86 11 -75 47
Share occasional/on-call doctors (%)
25 > SPTS ≥ 0 13 2 -11 41
50 > SPTS ≥ 25 12 2 -10 50
75 > SPTS ≥ 50 6 1 -5 46
100 > SPTS ≥ 75 2 0 -2 47
Notes: The sample corresponds to an unbalanced panel of 184 public hospitals from
the Hospital resources dataset compiled by the National Statistics Institute (INEC).
employees with indefinite appointments working at establishments of the Ministry
of Health.
Given that by 2011, circa 80% of health professionals working at the Ministry of
Health had a fixed-term contract12, the hospitals that adopted the reform in 2009 and
2010 had already undergone the biggest changes by the time the second resolution
was issued. While hospitals that had not adopted the reform yet continued to do
so progressively according to the official schedule. A third resolution (MRL-2011-
464), was issued in October 2011, with the intention of including all the facilities of
the Ecuadorian Institute of Social Security. Finally, a fourth resolution (MRL-DM-
2014-652) was published in November 2014 and included the remaining facilities
of the Public Health System. Figure 3.1 shows the timetable of the reform.
The reform affected all health care professionals including physicians, dentists,
12https://www.salud.gob.ec/ministerio-de-salud-entrega-500-nombramientos-a-profesionales-
del-ramo/
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Figure 3.1: Timeline of the reform
2004... 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
SENRES 90
05/2009
MSP
MRL 33
02/2011
MSP
MRL 464
10/2011
IESS
MRL 652
11/2014
Others
obstetricians, psychologists, nurses, and medical technologists and excluded only
the administrative positions because those professionals were already working 8
hours per day. All health care professionals were offered a proportional raise to
compensate them for the hours that were added to their contracts.
The reform affected a group of highly educated professionals with sector-specific
skills. Hence, mobility to other sectors of the economy is unlikely in particular
for specialist physicians. However, horizontal movements to the private health care
sector cannot be discarded as well as migration. Unfortunately, the analysis of
spillover effects to the private sector is beyond the scope of this paper and there is
no available information to quantify the extent of migration in the health sector.
3.3 Data and sample
In this section, I explain the three sources of administrative data that I use in the
analysis, namely, hospital resources data, hospital discharges data (patient-level
data) and hospitals’ budget data. Then, I explain the process to build the balanced
panel of hospitals that constitute the main sample in this study and discuss the
outcomes of interest to this study.
3.3.1 Hospital resources data
I use administrative data on hospital resources (Recursos de Salud) compiled by
the National Statistics Institute (INEC) from 2004 to 2014.13 This dataset includes
13By the time of this study, individual-level data – that would allow me to identify the health
professionals that were affected by the reform and their response in terms of working hours or job
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all public and private hospitals in the country. Hospital resources data contain
information on the number of health care professionals in any of the three types
of contract: full-time, part-time and occasional/on-call.14 In the dataset, full-time
contracts are defined as those involving 8 hours of work per day, part-time contracts
involve 4 to 6 hours of work per day and occasional/on-call require two hours or less
of work per day.15 Other available variables are medical equipment and number of
consultations, exams, and tests reported in every hospital on a calendar year basis.
To identify the year when hospitals adopted the reform I requested the official
implementation schedule to the Ministry of Health, however, the information I have
only allows identifying the period when the different groups of public hospitals
adopted the reform, not the specific dates when each hospital adopted it. Hence,
to identify the adoption dates for each hospital, I use a data-driven approach based
on three conditions. First, I calculated the growth rate of total part-time workers at
hospital level with respect to the average for 2006-2007 and assumed that treatment
started on the first year I observed a large reduction in the growth rate of part-
time contracts. Since there are only 144 hospitals it is possible to test several
thresholds (including -15%, -25%, -35%, -45%, -55%, and -65%) and determine
which threshold better identifies the most likely adoption year based on visual
inspection of the leaps in the series. In addition to this, I calculated the average
reduction in part-time contracts for each group of public hospitals and found that
during the adoption periods established by the Ministry of Labor, the different
groups of hospitals experienced reductions in the number of part-time in the order
transitions – was not available. Recently, I got an authorization to access these type of data, which I
plan to use in the next stage of this project.
14The specialties considered are general practitioners, surgeons, pediatricians, gynecologists, ob-
stetricians, traumatologists, anesthesiologists, cardiologists, neurologists, psychiatrists, ophthalmol-
ogists, otolaryngologists, neonatology, intensivists, hematologists, pulmonologists, plastic surgeons,
nephrologists, gastroenterologists, gerontologists, oncologists, urologists, residents, nurses, nutri-
tionists, psychologists, health educators, sanitary engineers, environmental engineers, physiotherapy
technician, anesthesiology, food technologists.
15The staffing hours reported in my data do not differentiate between patient-care hours and hours
devoted to administrative work, teaching,etc.
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of 35% or above, so I selected 35% as the threshold to identify the adoption year at
the hospital level.
Furthermore, from the replication of the analyses using other thresholds (not shown)
is possible to conclude that lower rates (below 25%) are problematic and cause the
parallel trend tests in the event studies to fail, as expected, since with less stringent
criteria for the treatment variable, I erroneously identify as the adoption year any
year with a small change, and, comparisons are done between less similar hospitals.
On the other hand, rates above 35% rendered similar results in the event study
regressions to the ones obtained with the 35% threshold.
Since the reform is expected to increase the number of doctor-hours at public
hospitals, the second condition to identify the adoption year is that there has to be
an increase in the number of full-time equivalent doctors in the hospital. Full-time
equivalent doctors per hospital are obtained by adding the number of doctors on
each type of contract times the number of hours worked per day and dividing this
by 8. Finally, the adoption year has to be within the adoption period determined
by the resolutions of the Ministry of Labor for the different groups of hospitals.
For hospitals of the Ministry of Health, the adoption date had to occur after the
enactment of Resolution SENRES-2009-90. For the hospitals of the Ecuadorian
Institute of Social Security, the adoption date had to occur at any point after the
enactment of Resolution MRL-2011-464 and for the rest of health facilities, the
adoption year was 2014 since this is the last year of the data and corresponds to the
year when Resolution MRL-2014-652 was enacted. Consistent with this, out of the
144 public hospitals in my final sample, 42 hospitals in the panel adopted the reform
in 2009, 17 in 2010, 23 in 2011, 36 in 2012, 3 in 2013 and 23 in 2014.16
16I plan to use the complete implementation schedule as soon as I get access to it, but I do not
expect to see significant changes in the results, considering that the resolutions of the Ministry of
Labor establish relatively short adoption periods and that for my identification strategy I do not
require the exact date of adoption, just the year.
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Drawing from the time-series literature on structural breaks, other studies have used
data-driven methods to recover missing information, for instance, to determine the
breakpoint for a regression-discontinuity design when the true breakpoint is not
known (Chay et al., 2005; Carneiro et al., 2018). In my case, to identify structural
breaks in the number of part-time contracts – that would signal the adoption of the
reform –, I used a longer panel of hospital resources data covering the period 2000-
2014. Unfortunately, with 15 observations per hospital, I was not able to identify
the precise year of adoption within the period indicated in the resolutions of the
Ministry of Labor.17
3.3.2 Hospital discharge data
Hospital-specific mortality rates are the most commonly used outcome-based mea-
sure of hospital quality (Gowrisankaran and Town, 1999). To study the effects of
the reform on hospital mortality, I use hospital discharge data from 2004 to 2014.
These data are compiled by the National Statistics Institute (INEC) and provide
information on each patient discharged from public and private hospitals, including
the patient’s condition at the moment of discharge (alive or not) and other patient
characteristics like age, sex, province and county of residence, precise date of hospi-
talization and discharge, reason of hospitalization using the corresponding ICD-10
code, and length of stay.
A limitation of hospital discharge data is that is not possible to construct several
risk-adjusted mortality rates and 30 days mortality indicators since patients’ survival
is not observed after hospital discharge. However, it is still possible to study in-
hospital mortality and this is the indicator that I will focus on throughout this paper.
Using the ICD-10 code attached to every admission and the condition at the moment
of discharge (alive or not), I obtain average mortality rates at hospital level for the
17I used the Stata commands ‘sbsingle’ and ‘sbknown’ to identify structural breaks.
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complete sample of admissions and for admissions to the emergency department.
I also compute hospital level weights defined as the ratio of hospital discharges to
total discharges in the public sector in a year.
3.3.3 Budget data
Budget data is available for 101 public hospitals for the period between 2004 to
2014 and was accessed via a special petition to the Ministry of Finance. It contains
very disaggregated information about all types of expenses and for some years have
been classified into seven more general groups: (i) wages; (ii) medication; (iii)
long-term goods; (iv) maintenance and repairs; (v) infrastructure; (vi) hospital and
complementary medical services; and, (vii) other expenses. I use this information
to control for hospital budget in the regressions. I distinguish between personnel
expenditures and all other expenditures because the former are strongly correlated
with the labor reform, while the latter are expected to be less affected, so this is the
variable that I use as a control in the analyses.
3.3.4 Analytical sample
For the main sample in this study, I merged hospital discharge data and hospital
resources data and constructed a balanced panel of hospitals covering the period
between 2004 and 2014.18 I used a balanced panel to reduce the likelihood of
confounding effects due to changes in the supply of services at the local level, which
is expected to affect mortality.
Before obtaining average mortality rates at hospital level, I restricted the sample
to patients who were discharged within one year of admission to avoid having
unusually large hospital stays in the sample; and, as is standard in the literature, I
ignored patients aged 75 years and older and newborns and neonates because they
18I am currently restricted to this period of analysis until I get access to the hospital IDs for 2005,
2015 and 2016.
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can have high mortality rates for reasons having no relation to the quality of care
received that may bias the estimates of the impact of the reform (Evans and Kim,
2006).
The main sample contains 144 public hospitals with information for all the years,
which represent 86.95% of all the discharges in the public sector in the period
of analysis. The sample drops to 101 hospitals in the regressions that control for
hospital budget. Table 3.2 provides a brief description of the public hospitals in the
sample of 144 public hospitals and Table 3.9 in the appendix shows a description of
the sample of 101 public hospitals.
Table 3.2: Characteristics of hospitals in the sample. Balanced panel of 144 public
hospitals
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Admissions 12487 13005 13564 13191 13019 12225
Mortality 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Mortality within 48 hours 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mortality after 48 hours 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Mortality (ED) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Mortality within 48 h. (ED) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Mortality after 48 h. (ED) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Full-time staff 61.39 79.20 183.59 248.49 251.25 285.23
Part-time staff 160.70 157.57 71.75 32.37 18.96 28.97
Occasional staff 0.72 0.68 0.51 0.63 0.33 0.06
Full-time equiv. doctors 168.74 182.83 229.00 268.49 262.97 303.31
Patients - staff ratio 79.30 78.23 67.56 56.74 60.22 52.21
Length of stay (days) 4.41 4.40 4.36 4.31 4.41 4.59
Case mix index 1.42 1.42 1.43 1.42 1.43 1.43
Imaging equipment 7.09 7.83 8.50 8.41 9.45 9.61
Diagnostic equipment 8.27 8.90 9.38 10.40 10.79 14.15
Treatment equipment 14.53 13.11 16.88 13.52 16.21 17.18
Operating rooms 9.70 9.53 9.49 7.13 8.37 7.27
Notes: The sample corresponds to a balanced panel of 144 public hospitals.
3.3.5 Outcomes
I study the effects of the labor reform on in-hospital mortality, an outcome that is
frequently used in the literature (Evans and Kim, 2006; Bell and Redelmeier, 2001;
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Pronovost et al., 1999). In-hospital mortality is defined as the ratio of deaths to
total discharges in a hospital. The problem with in-hospital mortality is that not all
deaths are recorded during the hospital stay. However, part of the deaths that occur
after discharge are unrelated to the care received, like when patients do not follow
the recommendations for an adequate recovery.
In Ecuador, the leading causes of death are ischemic heart diseases, diabetes, cere-
brovascular and hypertensive diseases, pneumonia and car accidents.19 In this paper,
I distinguish between mortality within the first 48 hours of hospital admission and
after 48 hours because the first 48 hours are crucial in determining patients’ survival,
which has given rise to the term "golden hours", in particular with regards to my-
ocardial infarction, stroke, birth-related bleeding, among other conditions. (Fisher
and Gardner, 2012; Herlitz et al., 2010; Karoshi and Keith, 2009; Latense, 2009;
Sircar et al., 2007)
Furthermore, several studies on the management of traumatic injuries have shown
that most deaths occur in the first 24 to 48 hours (Jayawardena et al., 2007; Deme-
triades et al., 2004; Valdez et al., 2016). The trimodal distribution of traumatic
death was first described by Trunkey in 1983, who demonstrated that most deaths
occur in the first 24 hours. In fact, most patients with traumatic injuries die after
the first 6 hours of admission (Demetriades et al., 2004). However, it has been
documented that fewer patients die after arrival to a surgical center, which high-
lights the importance of the early presence of an experienced trauma surgeon, timely
surgical intervention, and improvement in bleeding control (Valdez et al., 2016).
All this suggest that a labor reform like the one I study in this paper, that increased
the number of doctor hours and consequently raised the likelihood of having more
specialists available at all times would have a direct effect on mortality within 48
hours. I also expect that these effects would be bigger than the ones stemming from
19Source: http://www.ecuadorencifras.gob.ec/vdatos/
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nurse staffing reforms alone where the literature has reported null effects.
3.4 Empirical Strategy
3.4.1 Identification strategy
To credibly assess the impact of the labor reform on in-hospital mortality, ideally,
hospitals should be randomly assigned to adopt the reform or not. Since this is
not possible, I adopt a quasi-experimental approach that takes advantage of its
staggered implementation. To claim causality, the reform itself should not respond
to deficiencies in the public health system. I argue that the reform was exogenous to
the health system because it was part of wider public sector reform to homogenize
wages at all public institutions. Moreover, there was an official implementation
schedule that established the timing of adoption for every hospital and as I will show
in amoment, it was exogenous to hospital performance, meaning that the government
did not assign hospitals with higher or lower mortality rates to be treated first.
Not only hospitals did not get to choose their adoption dates but also there is
no evidence that the government decided the implementation schedule based on
hospitals’ observable characteristics. Proof of this are several conversations with
former authorities of the Medical Association of Pichincha and Guayaquil who
confirmed that there were no clear guidelines – based on observable characteristics
of the hospitals – which would allow them to anticipate the approximate date on
which they should initiate the process. That is why hospital directors should call the
Ministry of Health to consult on the dates in which they should initiate the process.
A final piece of evidence to support the argument that the government did not
decide the implementation schedule based on hospitals’ observable characteristics
is that the results of the econometric models – that I will discuss shortly – remained
robust to the inclusion of pre-reform characteristics that could be considered by
the authorities that designed the implementation schedule. All these elements lend
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themselves to the implementation of an event study.
3.4.2 Event study
In an event study all the groups in the panel are treated at different points in time. The
key identifying assumption is that the timing of the treatment is random so that after
controlling for time fixed effects and group fixed effects, there are no pre-existing
differences in the outcome of interest between the groups that were treated before
and the ones that were treated later, which is equivalent to a test for parallel trends
in a difference-in-difference model. In this way, any difference that is observed after
the adoption of a reform can be attributed to the policy. Following Dobkin et al.
(2018) the basic specification of a non-parametric event study is the following:
Yjt = α j + λt +
b∑
k=a
Dkjtθk + X jtβ + Cjtγ +  jt (3.1)
where Yjt is the mortality rate at hospital j in year t, α j are hospital fixed effects to
control for any systematic differences across hospitals, λt are year fixed effects to
control for shocks to mortality rates that are common to all hospitals in a year. The
inclusion of hospital fixed effects is a natural approach to addressing potential bias
related to attrition; with this, the impact of the labor reform is estimated entirely
off of within-hospital changes and therefore should not be contaminated by any
differential attrition correlated with the level of hospital mortality (Dobkin et al.,
2018). However, if there is heterogeneity in treatment effects across hospitals, the
event study coefficients could still be affected by compositional changes in the group
of hospitals used to identify a given relative year coefficient θk , for that reason I use
a balanced panel of hospitals (Dobkin et al., 2018).
Let t˜ be the adoption year, so Dkjt ≡ 1{t = t˜ + k} are indicators for time relative to
adoption and θk are coefficients on said indicators. In all the specifications, I set
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a = −3 and b = 3.20 The coefficients θk when k > 0 reflect the effect of the reform
one, two and three years after the adoption year relative to the omitted period θ−1
which is the period immediately before adoption and is different across hospitals
since it depends on the adoption year.  jt is the error term. Standard errors are
clustered at county level.
X jt is a vector of time-variant controls at the hospital level that include patient
demographics at the hospital level like the share of patients in different age groups,
the share of female patients and a proxy for hospital budget. Cjt is a vector of
county-level characteristics and contains the number of public and private health
facilities in the county. To account for zeros in the data, the log transformation
log(variable +1) is used for the main outcomes and for the control variables. If the
implementation schedule was determined taking into account pre-treatment hospital
characteristics or county-level characteristics that are fixed in time, these would be
controlled for by the hospital fixed effects dummies. But, if the implementation
schedule was determined based on current hospital or county-level characteristics
like the supply of health services at the local level or current hospitals’ budget, one
should control for those variables in the regressions.
Unfortunately, any labor reform will necessarily affect the current budget allocated
to hospitals through changes in the wage bill. Yet, failure to control for budget in a
regression that explains in-hospital mortality would introduce bias in the estimates.
In order to control for this, I subtracted all personnel-related expenditures from
hospitals’ budgets and created a variable that contains only "other expenditures".
If we were suspicious that the assumption of independence between the timing of
adoption and the outcome was violated (Dobkin et al., 2018) we would estimate a
20I chose the period of analysis to be within 3 years of the adoption year because hospital panel
data is only available until 2014 and because analyzing pre-trends before 2006 means moving to
far from the period of the Correa administration, to a period when health care policies were very
different.
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parametric event study. The baseline specification allows for a linear pre-trend in
event time r . The basic specification is the following:
Yjt = α j + λt + δr +
3∑
k=0
Dkjtθk + X jtβ + Cjtγ +  jt (3.2)
Since equation 3.2 includes a linear pre-trend in event time (k), the coefficients of
interest θk , reflect the change in the outcome relative to any preexisting time trend
δ (Dobkin et al., 2018). Note that apart from δr all other elements in the equation
remain the same as in equation 3.1, except that I set a = 0 and b = 3. Researchers
normally implement first the non-parametric event study to test for pre-trends and
if this fails then they implement the parametric event study that controls for any
existing pre-trend.
The two assumptions for the difference-in-difference estimator to provide accurate
estimates of treatment effects also need to be met by the event study. First, time
effects must be common across the treatment and control group. Second, the
composition of the comparison groups must remain stable before and after the
policy change (Blundell andMacurdy, 1999). In other words, hospitals that adopted
the reform earlier than others should have been exposed to similar shocks than those
that adopted it later. Also, hospital composition should follow similar trends in early
and late adopters and should remain unaffected after the reform so that changes in
mortality can be attributed to the reform and not to changes in case mix that could
be caused by other reasons.
3.4.3 The selection problem
In Ecuador, public and private hospitals are required by law to treat all emergency
patients no matter whether they have insurance or not. Only after the emergency
has been overcome and the patient is stable can payment be requested for the care
received. In case the patient does not have insurance, the State covers the cost of
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care.21 Hence, to deal with the problem of non-random sorting of sicker patients to
better hospitals, I focus on admissions to the emergency department, where patients
have less discretion about the hospitals where they are treated.22 Other studies have
used the exogenous variation in ambulance assignment to hospitals (Doyle et al.,
2015) or have focused on admissions for "nondeferrable" conditions to circumvent
the selection problem (Doyle et al., 2015; Card et al., 2009).
3.5 Assessing the validity of the identification strategy
I argue that the reform was exogenous to hospitals’ performance because hospitals
did not decide when to adopt the reform. Instead, they followed an official schedule.
To test that the reform was exogenous to hospitals’ performance, I implement the
event study described in equation 3.1 and check for pre-trends in mortality (Autor,
2003; Dobkin et al., 2018; Frakes, 2013). The test for the exogeneity of the reform
is equivalent to a test for pre-trends in the outcome, meaning that each θk for k < 0
should not be statistically different from zero.
In this test, after controlling for hospital and year fixed effects, the coefficient θ−3,
for example, reflects the difference in the mortality reported in t-3 by hospitals that
were treated in year t (for which D−3jt = 1), versus the mortality reported by those
same hospitals over time (from t-2 until t+3, for which D−3jt = 0) and also relative to
the mortality reported by hospitals treated in other years (for which D−3jt = 0). This
excludes other hospitals treated in the same year t because for them D−3jt = 1. If the
timing of adoption is truly random, mortality should not be significantly different
across time for the same hospital and neither across hospitals treated at different
years, once hospital and year fixed effects are controlled for in the model. If this is
21See Art.365 of the Constitution and Art.7 of the Ecuadorian Health Law.
22Since patient discharge data do not include a variable to distinguish between emergency ad-
missions and other admissions, I have requested a list of the most common Emergency Department
conditions to the Ministry of Public Health. For the moment, I use the Emergency Department
ICD-10-AM Principal Diagnosis Short List published by the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority
of Australia, since is the most comprehensive list that I have found so far.
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true, then any change in mortality observed after the adoption of the reform can be
interpreted as the causal effect of the reform.
Figure 3.2 shows the evolution of the coefficients of the indicator variables relative
to the adoption year (θk) when the outcome is mortality rate among all admissions.
It includes time and hospital fixed effects, additional controls, including the share
of patients in different age groups, the share of female patients and the number of
public and private health facilities in the county. All analyses include hospital level
weights defined as a share of total discharges.
Figure 3.2 shows that during the three years prior to adoption, hospitals that imple-
mented the reform in year t had a similar mortality rate to hospitals that adopted it at
other years. The difference only becomes statistically significant on the implemen-
tation year and later, showing a reduction in mortality that will be discussed in the
next section, where I present in more detail these results and those of several other
specifications. Figure 3.3 also shows that there is no evidence of pre-existing trends
in mortality when looking at the sample of admissions to the emergency department.
The absence of pre-trends is taken as evidence in favor of the strict exogeneity of
the policy change but is not sufficient to remove all concerns about policy endo-
geneity. It may be that pre-trends were not detected due to limited statistical power
(Freyaldenhoven et al., 2018). The inclusion of hospital fixed effects to control for
permanent differences across hospitals in the timming of adoption and outcomes
would solve the endogeneity of the policy only if the systematic determinants of
adoption are additive, time-invariant hospital characteristics; however, if the source
of endogeneity are time variant characteristic, the problem remains (Besley and
Case, 2000). One solution is to find an instrument for policy adoption across hos-
pitals. In cross-state fixed effect estimation and difference-in-difference estimation,
possible instruments are variables that account for changes in political represen-
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Figure 3.2: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is mortality
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
tation that determine policy adoption at the state level. However, in my setting,
the reform was decided in a centralized way and all hospitals had to abide by it.
Another approach for handling possible policy endogeneity is to explicitly control
for the variables that may have been considered by the policymakers when choosing
which hospitals would be treated first (Duflo, 2001). One example is total staff hired
in 2007 since is possible that hospitals in need of more staff may choose to adopt the
reform earlier. Since these variables are fixed in time, they must be interacted with
a time-varying variable (the year in this case), otherwise, they would be absorbed
by the hospital fixed effects.
In the next section, I present the results of the event study controlling for pre-reform
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Figure 3.3: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is mortality
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
characteristics and contrast them with the results of the basic specification in 3.1. It
is reassuring that the estimates of both specifications are very similar. However, due
to lack of statistical power, most of the coefficients of the specification that controls
for pre-reform characteristics are not statistically significant. To tackle this problem,
I estimate a slightly different model, where I impose the restriction that there are
no pre-trends in the outcomes of interest so that instead of including the complete
set of leads and lags relative to the adoption date, I assume that the coefficients of
all the leads are zero. Before discussing these results, I present the results of the
non-parametric event study from equation 3.1 and show that in fact there are no
pre-trends in any of the outcomes of interest. I estimate the following specification:
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Yjt = α j + λt +
3∑
k=0
Dkjtθk + Cj,2007 ∗ δ jt + X jtβ + Cjtγ +  jt (3.3)
where Yjt is the mortality rate at hospital j in year t, α j are hospital fixed effects, λt
are year fixed effects. Dkjt ≡ 1{t = t˜ + k} are indicators for time relative to adoption
(lags), δ jt are dummy variables that indicate the year and Cj,2007 is the logarithm of
total staff hired in 2007.
This increases efficiency and leads to more precise estimates of the effects of the
program since now the reference category is not just the period immediately be-
fore adoption but all the periods before adoption. The increase in precision of
the estimates is evidenced by an increase in the number of statistically significant
coefficients.
3.6 Results
In this section, I present the results of the non-parametric event study described in
equation 3.1, and as robustness checks, I also present the results of the specification
that controls for pre-treatment characteristics (equation 3.3) and of the parametric
event study specified in equation 3.2. The main outcome of interest is overall in-
hospital mortality; however, I also investigate the effects on mortality within the
first 48 hours of admission and after 48 hours of admission. To deal with the
problem of non-random sorting of sicker patients to hospitals, I present results for
the full sample of admissions and for the sample of admissions to the emergency
department. All analyses include hospital level weights defined as the share of total
discharges in a year.
3.6.1 Overall mortality
Columns 1 to 3 in Table 3.3 report the results of different specifications of equation
3.1. The specification in column 1 does not include hospital fixed effects while
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Table 3.3: Estimates from the event study regressions. Mortality among all admissions and among
admissions to the emergency department
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Panel Panel FE
Controls
for budget
Pre
reform
controls
Parametric
ES
Panel A: Mortality among all admissions
Efect in t 0.000122 -0.000610* -0.000245 -0.000912* -0.000550**
(0.849) (0.056) (0.438) (0.065) (0.050)
Efect in t+1 0.000952 -0.00117* -0.000994 -0.00155 -0.000994
(0.307) (0.076) (0.105) (0.204) (0.300)
Efect in t+2 0.00240* -0.000935 -0.000854 -0.00172 -0.000626
(0.088) (0.332) (0.254) (0.337) (0.656)
Efect in t+3 0.00228 -0.000879 -0.00132 -0.00217 -0.000472
(0.145) (0.408) (0.183) (0.330) (0.769)
Pre-reform means 0.0100 0.00900 0.00900 0.00900 0.00900
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.00166 0.453 0.513
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.672 0.932 0.950 0.937 0.932
Panel B: Mortality among admissions to the emergency department
Efect in t -0.000425 -0.00108** -0.000644 -0.00123 -0.000984*
(0.584) (0.019) (0.298) (0.125) (0.097)
Efect in t+1 -0.000133 -0.00211*** -0.00179** -0.00241* -0.00193*
(0.913) (0.009) (0.012) (0.098) (0.095)
Efect in t+2 0.00138 -0.00176 -0.00198 -0.00280 -0.00150
(0.444) (0.130) (0.129) (0.200) (0.381)
Efect in t+3 0.00126 -0.00159 -0.00234 -0.00310 -0.00125
(0.560) (0.276) (0.144) (0.267) (0.555)
Pre-reform means 0.0140 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130 0.0130
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.0726 0.908 0.663
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Linear trends Yes
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.643 0.924 0.916 0.930 0.924
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 reports on the results of equation 3.1 without including
hospital fixed effects while the specification in column 2 includes hospital fixed effects. The
specification in column 3 is estimated on the sample of 101 public hospitals for which budget
data is available and controls for a proxy for the annual budget. Column 4 reports on the results
of the event study in equation 3.3 and controls for total staff hired in 2007 interacted with the
year. Column 5 shows the results of the parametric event study in equation 3.2.
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the specification in column 2 includes hospital fixed effects. Both specifications
are estimated on the sample of 144 public hospitals in the balanced panel. The
specification in column 3 on the other hand, is estimated on the sample of 101
public hospitals for which budget data is available and controls for a proxy of the
yearly budget allocated to public hospitals. Column 4 reports on the results of the
event study in equation 3.3 and controls for total staff hired in 2007 interacted with
the year to deal with possible endogeneity in adoption. Finally, column 5 shows the
results of the parametric event study in equation 3.2 that controls for a linear trend
in event time.
In all the specifications, I report on the effects of the reform up to three years after
adoption and present separate results for the complete sample of admissions and for
the sample of admissions to the emergency department. Panel A in Table 3.3 shows
that the estimated effects of the reform vary very little across specifications. My
preferred specification is in column 2, it includes hospital and time fixed effects and
a set of controls including the share of patients in different age groups, the share of
female patients and the number of public and private health facilities in the county.
The specifications in columns 3 to 5 serve as robustness checks for the results in my
preferred specification.
Results in column 2, panel A, show that for the complete sample of admissions, the
reform reduced mortality by 0.06% on the adoption year relative to a pre-reform
mean of 0.9%, meaning that mortality decreased in 0.7 per 1000 individuals on
the adoption year relative to the year immediately prior adoption (k = −1). The
effect was statistically significant at 10% level. Similarly, one year after adoption,
there was a statistically significant reduction in mortality of 0.1%, equivalent to 1
per 1000 individuals. The results reported in column 2 are very similar to those in
columns 3 to 5. Results in column 3 are the least similar though, possibly because
they are estimated on a selected sample since hospitals for which budget data are
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available seem to be slightly different to the rest of hospitals as shown in Table 3.9
in the Appendix.23
Panel B shows the results for the sample of admissions to the emergency department.
In general, results are bigger in magnitude and remain statistically significant even
after including additional controls like a proxy for hospital budget and pre-reform
characteristics. Column 2 shows that on the adoption year, mortality decreased
by 0.1% and one year later it decreased by 0.2% relative to a mean mortality rate
of 1.3% (in k = −1), which means that one year after adoption, mortality among
admissions to the emergency department dropped in 0.8 and 1.5 per 1000 individuals
respectively. These results were significant at 5% and 1% level, respectively.
3.6.2 Mortality within 48 hours of admission
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show that three years prior to adoption, there is no evidence
of pre-trends in mortality within 48 hours. This is true for the complete sample of
admissions and for the sample of admissions to the emergency department. Given
that there are no pre-trends before adoption, my preferred specification is once again
the non-parametric event study described in equation 3.1 and reported in column 2
of Table 3.4.
Mortality within 48 hours of admission decreased progressively after adoption.
This was true for the complete sample and for the subsample of admissions to the
emergency department. However, the effects on the sample of admissions to the
emergency department were larger than for the complete sample. Column 2 in
panel A shows that for the complete sample, mortality within 48 hours decreased
by around 0.06% in the adoption year and the years that followed, relative to a
pre-reform rate of 0.3% which is equivalent to a reduction of 2 persons per 1000
individuals in each case.
23I have requested information on the budgets of more public hospitals and I plan to use these
data in the future.
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Figure 3.4: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is mortality within
48 hours
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The points in each figure represent
the estimated effects from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range
plot with capped spikes present the 95 percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by
the share of hospital discharges among all discharges in a year.
For the sample of admissions to the emergency department, Panel B shows that
mortality decreased between 0.08% and 0.1% after the adoption of the labor reform
relative to a pre-reform rate of 0.4%. This effect is equivalent to amortality reduction
of 2.3 per 1000 individuals.
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Figure 3.5: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is mortality within
48 hours
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
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Table 3.4: Estimates from the event study regressions. Mortality within 48 hours, among all admissions
and among admissions to the emergency department
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Panel Panel FE
Controls
for budget
Pre
reform
controls
Parametric
ES
Panel A: Mortality within 48 hours among all admissions
Efect in t -0.000568** -0.000528** -0.000228 -0.000607*** -0.000549***
(0.025) (0.011) (0.381) (0.001) (0.006)
Efect in t+1 -0.000494** -0.000582*** -0.000400 -0.000711*** -0.000598**
(0.038) (0.000) (0.177) (0.000) (0.014)
Efect in t+2 -0.000231 -0.000502* -0.000485 -0.000681* -0.000504
(0.637) (0.064) (0.192) (0.060) (0.260)
Efect in t+3 -0.000593 -0.000650** -0.000730** -0.000916** -0.000655
(0.299) (0.015) (0.034) (0.036) (0.182)
Pre-reform means 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300 0.00300
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.790 0.774 0.332
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.568 0.826 0.840 0.832 0.826
Panel B: Mortality within 48 hours among admissions to the emergency department
Efect in t -0.000741** -0.000750** -0.000476 -0.000688** -0.000663**
(0.014) (0.012) (0.240) (0.037) (0.043)
Efect in t+1 -0.000839** -0.00104*** -0.000860 -0.000906** -0.000878**
(0.014) (0.001) (0.111) (0.039) (0.032)
Efect in t+2 -0.000432 -0.000878** -0.00103 -0.000777 -0.000652
(0.474) (0.013) (0.123) (0.183) (0.296)
Efect in t+3 -0.000808 -0.00109*** -0.00145** -0.00101 -0.000786
(0.228) (0.006) (0.012) (0.147) (0.260)
Pre-reform means 0.00400 0.00400 0.00400 0.00400 0.00400
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.931 0.800 0.925
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Linear trends Yes
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.539 0.792 0.758 0.798 0.792
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. Column 1 reports on the results of equation 3.1 without including hospital fixed effects while
the specification in column 2 includes hospital fixed effects. The specification in column 3 is estimated
on the sample of 101 public hospitals for which budget data is available and controls for a proxy for the
annual budget. Column 4 reports on the results of the event study in equation 3.3 and controls for total
staff hired in 2007 interacted with the year. Column 5 shows the results of the parametric event study
in equation 3.2.
118
3.6.3 Mortality after 48 hours of admission
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 add further evidence about the exogeneity of the reform since they
show that there are no pre-trends in mortality rates after 48 hours of admission for
the complete sample and for the sample of admissions to the emergency department.
Column 4 in Table 3.5 shows that for the complete sample and for the subsample
of admissions to the emergency department, the reform had a negative but not
statistically significant effect on mortality after 48 hours.
Figure 3.6: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is mortality after
48 hours
000 0 -.001 0 0
-.0
12
-.0
08
-.0
04
0
.0
04
.0
08
.0
12
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
Year relative to the reform
Pre-reform Mean is 0.007
Mortality after 48 hours
Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
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Figure 3.7: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is mortality after
48 hours
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
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Table 3.5: Estimates from the event study regressions. Mortality after 48 hours among all
admissions and among admissions to the emergency department
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Panel Panel FE
Controls
for budget
Pre
reform
controls
Parametric
ES
Panel A: Mortality after 48 hours among all admissions
Efect in t 0.000677 -9.35e-05 -1.30e-05 -0.000311 -6.97e-06
(0.116) (0.660) (0.956) (0.547) (0.979)
Efect in t+1 0.00145* -0.000587 -0.000593 -0.000827 -0.000383
(0.054) (0.370) (0.336) (0.484) (0.673)
Efect in t+2 0.00266*** -0.000423 -0.000363 -0.00101 -9.05e-05
(0.006) (0.615) (0.533) (0.531) (0.940)
Efect in t+3 0.00287*** -0.000223 -0.000591 -0.00123 0.000217
(0.007) (0.819) (0.522) (0.554) (0.880)
Pre-reform means 0.00800 0.00700 0.00700 0.00700 0.00700
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.00121 0.261 0.529
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.685 0.944 0.957 0.949 0.944
Panel B: Mortality after 48 hours among admissions to the emergency department
Efect in t 0.000292 -0.000348 -0.000160 -0.000555 -0.000338
(0.612) (0.438) (0.737) (0.527) (0.593)
Efect in t+1 0.000698 -0.00109 -0.000943 -0.00151 -0.00106
(0.484) (0.261) (0.197) (0.356) (0.419)
Efect in t+2 0.00183 -0.000881 -0.000955 -0.00201 -0.000832
(0.158) (0.454) (0.336) (0.361) (0.625)
Efect in t+3 0.00206 -0.000499 -0.000904 -0.00207 -0.000435
(0.197) (0.744) (0.533) (0.478) (0.843)
Pre-reform means 0.00900 0.00800 0.00800 0.00800 0.00800
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.0721 0.986 0.686
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Linear trends Yes
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.656 0.934 0.926 0.941 0.934
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 reports on the results of equation 3.1 without including
hospital fixed effects while the specification in column 2 includes hospital fixed effects.
The specification in column 3 is estimated on the sample of 101 public hospitals for which
budget data is available and controls for a proxy for the annual budget. Column 4 reports
on the results of the event study in equation 3.3 and controls for total staff hired in 2007
interacted with the year. Column 5 shows the results of the parametric event study in
equation 3.2.
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3.7 Robustness checks
To make sure that the observed effects were caused by the labor reform, hospital
composition should follow similar trends in early and late adopters, and should not
be affected by the reform so that the reduction in mortality can be attributed to
the increase in the available doctor-hours and not to changes in the patient mix, for
instance, which can be explained by other reasons. Neither should I observe changes
in other indicators of hospital quality that would explain a reduction in mortality
after the reform. To test this, I estimate the event study in equation 3.1 and show
evidence of the stability in hospitals’ patient mix, and length of stay.
3.7.1 Case mix index
In all the analyses, I use a balanced panel of hospitals so that the event study
coefficients are not affected by compositional changes in the group of hospitals used
to identify a given relative year coefficient (Dobkin et al., 2018). However, a concern
that remains is that hospital patient mix itself could have changed across time. To
test this, I generate two alternative measures of the patient mix at the hospital level.
The first one is the case mix index (CMI), which is calculated by summing the
diagnosis-related group (DRG) weights for all the discharges and dividing by the
number of discharges. Ecuador does not use DRG groups, and there is no official
definition for a CMI for Ecuador, so to construct the CMI, I matched the ICD-10
code reported as the main reason for admission into hospital with the corresponding
DRG code used by The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), which
also provide the weights associated to each DRG.24
For the second measure of patient mix, I obtained the weight that each condition
represented within the total admissions to a given hospital in 2007. I assigned these
24Since health care costs and reimbursement systems are different in the US, I just use the fact
that the DRG weights are fixed in time and provide an easier way to distinguish more complicated
cases from simpler ones.
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fixed weights to each admission in the remaining years using the ICD-10 codes.
Finally, I added all the weights corresponding to the different conditions observed in
a hospital in each year to get an alternative measure of the patient mix at the hospital
and year level.
Figure 3.8 shows graphical evidence on the parallel trends assumption for the loga-
rithm of the CMI.
Figure 3.8: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is the case mix
index
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
Using equation 3.1 I test the parallel trends assumption by evaluating the coefficients
θk for k < 0, and checking that are not statistically different from zero. Figure 3.8
shows that three years before adoption hospitals treated at different points in time
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Table 3.6: Estimates from the event study regressions. Case Mix Index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Panel Panel FE
Controls
for budget
Pre
reform
controls
Parametric
ES
Efect in t 0.00481 -0.00234 -0.000433 -0.00545 -0.00441
(0.385) (0.468) (0.937) (0.175) (0.246)
Efect in t+1 0.0101* -0.00157 0.00660 -0.00523 -0.00443
(0.095) (0.746) (0.359) (0.498) (0.495)
Efect in t+2 0.0180* -0.00627 0.00482 -0.0115 -0.00947
(0.074) (0.350) (0.641) (0.250) (0.285)
Efect in t+3 0.0293* -0.00248 0.00769 -0.0110 -0.00686
(0.062) (0.771) (0.476) (0.324) (0.506)
Pre-reform means 1.270 1.250 1.250 1.250 1.250
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.209 0.470 0.0494
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Linear trends Yes
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.864 0.945 0.940 0.946 0.945
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 reports on the results of equation 3.1
without including hospital fixed effects while the specification in column 2 includes
hospital fixed effects. The specification in column 3 is estimated on the sample of
101 public hospitals for which budget data is available and controls for a proxy for
the annual budget. Column 4 reports on the results of the event study in equation
3.3 and controls for total staff hired in 2007 interacted with the year. Column 5
shows the results of the parametric event study in equation 3.2.
are not significantly different in terms of their CMI. The observed parallel trend
before adoption in the CMI provides further evidence that endogenous sorting of
more severe cases to certain hospitals is not correlated to the timing of adoption
meaning that any sorting of patients to hospitals acts in the same way on average for
the group of hospitals that adopted the reform earlier and those that adopted it later.
Table 3.6 shows the results for different specifications and samples. Like the results
reported in section 3.6, my preferred specification is in column 2 and shows that the
reform did not have a significant effect on CMI in none of the years that followed
the adoption. All in all, the results of the event study on CMI lend credibility to the
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results found in section 3.6. Hospitals that adopted the reform at different points
in time followed similar paths in terms of the CMI three years before and after the
adoption of the reform. Table 3.7 shows similar results when the outcome of interest
is the logarithm of the proposed measure of patient mix.
Table 3.7: Estimates from the event study regressions. Patient Mix
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Panel Panel FE
Controls
for budget
Pre
reform
controls
Parametric
ES
Efect in t 0.0366 -0.0100 -0.0244 -0.0401 -0.0271
(0.349) (0.657) (0.418) (0.206) (0.356)
Efect in t+1 0.174*** 0.0576 -0.00782 0.0104 0.0368
(0.000) (0.163) (0.857) (0.836) (0.464)
Efect in t+2 0.245*** 0.0692 -0.0176 0.0403 0.0491
(0.001) (0.249) (0.758) (0.625) (0.564)
Efect in t+3 0.282** 0.0811 0.00133 0.0340 0.0531
(0.014) (0.430) (0.991) (0.800) (0.699)
Pre-reform means 414 460 460 460 460
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.00518 0.112 0.602
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Linear trends Yes
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.856 0.972 0.975 0.973 0.972
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 reports on the results of equation 3.1
without including hospital fixed effects while the specification in column 2 includes
hospital fixed effects. The specification in column 3 is estimated on the sample of
101 public hospitals for which budget data is available and controls for a proxy for
the annual budget. Column 4 reports on the results of the event study in equation
3.3 and controls for total staff hired in 2007 interacted with the year. Column 5
shows the results of the parametric event study in equation 3.2.
3.7.2 Length of stay
To attribute the observed reduction in mortality to the labor reform, an additional
check looks at changes in other indicators of hospital quality that would explain the
observed effects. While some quality indicators like patient satisfaction are directly
linked to the care provided by hospital staff and the number of doctors and nurses
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available at different times, indicators such as length of stay will be less affected by
staffing changes.
Figure 3.9: θk estimates from the event study when the outcome is the length of stay
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of 144 public hospitals. The figure plots the estimates
from my preferred specification of the event study in equation 3.1. The range plot depicts the 95
percent confidence intervals. All estimates are weighted by the share of hospital admissions among
all admissions in a year.
Length of stay depends on the availability of beds in a hospital, but it may also be
affected by staff availability if, for example, when there is not enough staff, doctors
decide to discharge some patients before they have fully recovered. Other reasons
for sudden changes in length of staymay respond to budgetary shocks, sudden surges
in demand or changes in the severity of patients (caused by an epidemic or natural
disaster). Some studies suggest that sufficient nurse-to-patient ratios are associated
with lower hospital mortality and reduced length of stay (Pham et al., 2011). It has
also been found in the literature that hospitals utilizing more licensed nurses and
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fewer unlicensed aides have a shorter residual length of stay because the former are
more experienced and have acquired more human capital (Bartel et al., 2014).
To check for pre-trends in the average length of stay at hospitals treated at different
points in time, I estimate the event study regression in equation 3.1. The outcome of
interest is the logarithm of the length of stay. Figure 3.9 and the results presented in
column 2 of Table 3.8 show that length of stay remained comparable across hospitals
treated at different points in time during the three years before and after adoption.
Table 3.8: Estimates from the event study regressions. Length of stay
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Specification Panel Panel FE
Controls
for budget
Pre
reform
controls
Parametric
ES
Efect in t -0.0256 -0.00497 0.00962 -0.00928 -0.00487
(0.453) (0.612) (0.402) (0.471) (0.644)
Efect in t+1 -0.0261 -0.00427 0.0226 -0.0107 -0.00601
(0.649) (0.689) (0.316) (0.434) (0.681)
Efect in t+2 -0.0258 0.0132 0.0441 -1.83e-05 0.00890
(0.769) (0.443) (0.389) (0.999) (0.692)
Efect in t+3 -0.0772 -0.000216 0.0321 -0.0218 -0.00575
(0.477) (0.990) (0.221) (0.485) (0.787)
Pre-reform means 4.080 4.030 4.030 4.030 4.030
P-value (F-test of leads) 0.631 0.708 0.536
Panel Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital FE No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hospital Linear trends Yes
N 900 900 622 900 900
R2 0.767 0.962 0.960 0.962 0.962
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at county level shown in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Column 1 reports on the results of equation 3.1 without
including hospital fixed effects while the specification in column 2 includes hospital
fixed effects. The specification in column 3 is estimated on the sample of 101 public
hospitals for which budget data is available and controls for a proxy for the annual
budget. Column 4 reports on the results of the event study in equation 3.3 and
controls for total staff hired in 2007 interacted with the year. Column 5 shows the
results of the parametric event study in equation 3.2.
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3.8 Conclusions
In this paper, I evaluate the impact on in-hospital mortality of a reform that made
all health professionals working part-time switch to full-time contracts at public
hospitals in Ecuador. The reform was born from the need to homogenize wages at
all public institutions, not in response to deficiencies in certain areas of the public
health system. Adoption was progressive according to the resolutions issued by
the Ministry of Labor which established a particular adoption date for each of the
different groups of hospitals that constitute the public health system (Ministry of
Health, IESS, and others), and a more specific schedule that set the order of adoption
for hospitals within those groups. I argue that the timing of adoption was exogenous
to hospital performance. This statement is based on the evidence from parallel trend
analysis showing that three years before adoption, mortality was not different across
hospitals that adopted the reform earlier and later. Furthermore, the results from
the event study were robust to the inclusion of pre-treatment characteristics which
could have been used by policymakers to decide the order of implementation.
The results from the event study for the complete sample of admissions show that the
reform caused a reduction in mortality of 0.06% on the adoption year and of 0.1%
one year later. For the sample of admissions to the emergency department, results
are bigger in magnitude and remain statistically significant even after including
additional controls like other hospital expenditures and pre-reform characteristics.
Mortality decreased by 0.1% on the adoption year and by 0.2% one year later. The
reduction in mortality was driven by a drop in mortality rates within the first 48
hours of admission, while changes in mortality after 48 hours of admission were not
statistically significant.
The results were stronger for the subsample of admissions to the emergency depart-
ment possibly because a second objective of the reform was to guarantee continuous
attention in emergencies and hospitalization. So the emphasis was placed on in-
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creasing the availability of physicians in the emergency and surgery departments,
which would also explain that effects were driven by a reduction in mortality within
the first 48 hours of admission. Unfortunately, the information on hospital budgets
does not allow me to identify the funds that were allocated to each department, so I
can not present more evidence in this regard.
These results are also consistent with nonrandom selection of patients to hospitals,
which leads to the underestimation of the intention to treat effects of the labor
reform on the complete sample of admissions. It is possible that sicker patients
normally seek treatment at more specialized hospitals, which would counteract the
beneficial effect of an increase in the number of doctor hours due to the reform in
those hospitals. Consequently, the true effects of the reform should be closer to the
observed on the subsample of admissions to the emergency department.
I tested several specifications to tackle possible concerns of endogeneity in adoption
and the results remained robust to the inclusion of pre-treatment characteristics and
other time-variant controls. More importantly, I provided evidence that the effects
of the labor reform reported in this paper can confidently be attributed to the labor
reform and not to changes in other quality indicators at the hospital level like the
length of stay or by changes in the patient mix.
All in all, the evidence provided in this study is consistent with the hypothesis
that increasing staffing levels at hospitals reduce in-hospital mortality. The reform
reduced the number of part-time professionals which is also expected to have a
negative effect on in-hospital mortality rates (Bartel et al., 2014) resulting from
reducing disruptions to team functioning that are more common in places with a
high number of part-time and on-call workers. Results are also consistent with the
literature that documents that job security increases the value of employment for
the workers which in turn increases workers’ unobservable effort, improving firms’
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outcomes (Griffith and Macartney, 2014). Unfortunately, data on the productivity
per hour of work is not available at the individual level so it is not possible to
disentangle the effect of an increase in the number of doctor-hours from changes in
effort on hospital performance.
A labor reform like the one studied in this paper is also expected to have other
welfare increasing effects. With more doctor-hours, hospitals can reduce waiting
times, and treat more patients. This would also cause a reduction in out of pocket
health care expenditures on the side of patients. However, the elimination of labor
flexibility in the public sector is also expected to affect the labor supply in the private
sector (Cheng et al., 2018; Faggio and Overman, 2014; Propper and Van Reenen,
2010). I have requested individual-level data that will allow me to identify the
health professionals that were affected by the reform, and how they reacted to the
reform, by changing their working hours or leaving or joining the public sector. This
information will allow me to study in the future the spillover effects of the labor
reform on private hospitals’ performance.
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3.9 Appendix
Table 3.9: Characteristics of hospitals in the sample of 101 public hospitals for which
budget data is available
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Admissions 12487 13005 13564 13191 13019 12225
Mortality 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Mortality within 48 hours 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mortality after 48 hours 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Mortality (ED) 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03
Mortality within 48 h. (ED) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
Mortality after 48 h. (ED) 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
Full-time staff 61.39 79.20 183.59 248.49 251.25 285.23
Part-time staff 160.70 157.57 71.75 32.37 18.96 28.97
Occasional staff 0.72 0.68 0.51 0.63 0.33 0.06
Full-time equiv. doctors 168.74 182.83 229.00 268.49 262.97 303.31
Patients - staff ratio 79.30 78.23 67.56 56.74 60.22 52.21
Length of stay (days) 4.41 4.40 4.36 4.31 4.41 4.59
Case mix index 1.42 1.42 1.43 1.42 1.43 1.43
Imaging equipment 7.09 7.83 8.50 8.41 9.45 9.61
Diagnostic equipment 8.27 8.90 9.38 10.40 10.79 14.15
Treatment equipment 14.53 13.11 16.88 13.52 16.21 17.18
Operating rooms 9.70 9.53 9.49 7.13 8.37 7.27
Notes: The sample corresponds to the 101 public hospitals for which budget data is
available.
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C h a p t e r 4
THE EFFECTS OF MALPRACTICE REFORM ON PROCEDURE
CHOICE AND PATIENT OUTCOMES
Abstract
This paper studies the impact of increased liability risk facing physicians, on the
use of c-sections and on indicators of maternal and infant health. I take advantage
of a legal reform that led to the hardening of sentences for cases of professional
malpractice in Ecuador. I use a difference-in-difference strategy that compares
the outcomes of two neighboring countries, Ecuador and Colombia, before and
after the introduction of the reform and perform several parallel trend tests on the
outcomes of interest and test for the stability of the demographic composition of both
countries to support my identification strategy. During the five quarters following
the reform, Ecuadorian doctors reduced the c-section rate by 1.1% among women
aged 15 to 24 years, and by 0.9% among women aged 25 to 34 years. The c-section
rate remained unaffected for women aged 35 to 44 years, possibly because doctors
have less discretion over riskier births. Interestingly, the observed reduction in the
c-section rate did not affect the health outcomes of mothers or newborns.
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4.1 Introduction and literature review
Financial incentives play an important role in doctors decisions (McGuire, 2000).
This argument has been identified as one of the main reasons behind rising health
care costs in many countries (Kessler and McClellan, 1996; Shurtz, 2014). Doctors
value their own income as well as patients’ health, so when procedures are elective
and relatively low-risk, they tend to prescribe the most profitable treatment (Shurtz,
2014). In this scenario, the medical malpractice liability system has two main ob-
jectives: providing redress to individuals who suffer negligent injuries, and creating
incentives for doctors to provide appropriately careful treatment to their patients
(Kessler and McClellan, 1996).
A large literature has found that the liability system is an important determinant of
health care provision (Baicker et al., 2006; Frakes, 2013; Kerschbamer and Sutter,
2017; Kessler and McClellan, 1996). In the field of obstetrics, Baicker et al. (2006)
argue that mother’s characteristics only explain 8.6% of the geographic variation in
c-section rates, while county socio-economic characteristics account for 27.3% of
the variation, followed by medical malpractice liability that accounts for 14.8% of
the variation. This paper evaluates the impact of increased liability risk on procedure
choice in obstetrics and linked to this, it also looks at the impacts on infant health and
maternal mortality. I focus on c-sections because this is a commonly used elective
procedure that has been raising in the last decade in both developed and developing
countries (Schulkind and Shapiro, 2014). Furthermore, obstetrics is a specialty
that is particularly exposed to malpractice risk due to possible complications during
labor. Some of the risks associated to c-sections include infections, hemorrhage,
injury to organs for the mother, complications with the anesthesia and brain damage
in newborns due to oxygen deprivation arising from delays in performing a c-section
(Dubay et al., 1999).
The theoretical models of procedure choice in response to changes in malpractice
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pressure predict that a legal change that increases physician liability will decrease
procedure use if and only if the error rate when the procedure is chosen is higher
than the error rate when the procedure is not chosen (Currie and MacLeod, 2008).
Then, if the marginal procedures are being performed on a low (high) risk patient
for whom the risk of performing the procedure is higher (lower) than not performing
it, it is expected that an increase in the liability pressure will decrease (increase)
procedure use.
The early literature on the effects of liability fears on procedure use reports mixed
evidence (Tussing and Wojtowycz, 1992; Baldwin et al., 1995; Sloan et al., 1997;
Localio et al., 1993). These studies are problematic because are based on the
analysis of cross section data and are prone to omitted variable bias. More recently,
Dubay et al. (1999) uses the variation in the timing of implementation of tort reforms
across states to instrument malpractice premiums and found higher c-section use
when malpractice claims risk was higher.1
On the other hand, Currie and MacLeod (2008) argue that while the probability
of a suit can respond quickly to tort reforms, malpractice premiums are affected
by tort reforms only with a relatively long and uncertain lag. For instance, in the
US, the mean time between an injury and the settlement of a claim is six years.
Consequently, Currie and MacLeod (2008) directly evaluate the impact of different
types of tort reforms on procedure use and the health outcomes of mothers and
their infants. They find that reform of the rule of joint and several liability, which
increased liability risk, reduced c-sections, but caps on noneconomic damages, that
decreased liability risk, increased them. They also found that the observed increases
in procedure use induced by caps on noneconomic damages did not affect infant
1In another paper, Dubay et al. (2001) study whether malpractice liability pressure causes
physicians to limit their supply of obstetric services including prenatal care. They found that
malpractice liability pressure was associated with greater prenatal care delay and fewer prenatal care
visits but that such pressure did not affect infant health.
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health.
In this paper, I exploit the exogenous variation on malpractice pressure induced by
a reform of the Penal Code in Ecuador that led to the hardening of sentences for
cases of professional malpractice. The reform is an exogenous event to the health
system since it was a consequence of a major reform to the Penal Code which had
not been reformed since 1971. Furthermore, there is no evidence suggesting that
the inclusion of the articles related to malpractice in the new Penal Code responded
to an unusual growth in the number of malpractice lawsuits in the country.
My analysis of the impact of changes in malpractice pressure on doctors’ decisions
and ultimately on patients’ outcomes is more in line with the study by Currie and
MacLeod (2008) that takes a reduced form approach and directly evaluates the im-
pact of different tort reforms on c-section rate using panel data methods. I use a
difference-in-difference strategy that compares the outcomes of two neighboring
countries, Ecuador and Colombia, before and after the introduction of the malprac-
tice reform. Both countries are very similar in terms of several socio-demographic
characteristics of their populations and in terms of access to health services for preg-
nant women. Furthermore, their malpractice legislations were very similar before
the passing of the new Penal Code in Ecuador.
The high c-section rate observed in Ecuador and Colombia in the period prior to the
reform suggests an excess of unnecessary c-sections. Themalpractice reform studied
in this paper creates a unique opportunity to asses whether the excess c-sections can
be deemed as socially wasteful or not. For this, I test whether the observed reduction
in c-sections is accompanied by a deterioration of infant or maternal health, in which
case the extra c-sections are deemed necessary, otherwise they are deemed wasteful
(Kessler and McClellan, 2002; Dubay et al., 2001).
Better decision making in response to the reform would result in a reallocation
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of procedures from fewer low-risk to high-risk cases (Currie and MacLeod, 2017;
Currie and MacLeod, 2008). Along these lines, the results from this paper show
that doctors responded to the reform by reducing the c-section rate among women
aged 15 to 34 years but not among women aged 35 to 44 years. Furthermore, the
reduction in the number of c-sections did not affect the health outcomes of mothers
or newborns. Conversely, the share of low birth-weight babies decreased driven by
the reduction in c-sections one quarter after the reform; and, earlymaternal mortality
remained at the same pre-reform rates.
The contributions of this paper are threefold: First, it is to the best of my knowledge,
the first study looking at the impact of malpractice reforms in a developing country.
Second, is one of the few studies that evaluate a policy that effectively tackles the
problem of overprovision of elective procedures in developing countries. Another
study that addresses a similar question is the one by Cohen et al. (2015) that studies
ways to better target subsidized drugs in Kenya. Third, this paper contributes more
generally to the literature on over-treatment, which is one of the main drivers of
health costs and a source of concern throughout the world (Kessler and McClellan,
1996; Adhvaryu, 2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 4.2 describes the Ecuadorian
and Colombian Health Systems as well as their respective malpractice legislation.
Section 4.3 discusses the empirical strategy which is based on a difference-in-
difference model that compares the two neighboring countries before and after the
Ecuadorian malpractice reform. Section 4.4 explains the process to homogenize
the vital statistics and death certificates data of the two countries, to finally build a
balanced panel at the municipality level which constitutes the main sample for this
study. Section 4.5 presents a careful assessment of the validity of the identification
strategy by showing evidence of parallel trends on the outcomes of interest before
the reform in the two countries and of the stability in the demographic composition
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of both countries before and after the reform. Section 4.6 present the main results
of the paper, followed by additional robustness checks in section 4.7, and section
4.8 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Ecuador’s Health system and malpractice legislation
The health system in Ecuador is mixed, composed by the public and the private
sector. The public health system operates a fee for service model. Health care
services are financed by general taxation and are provided free of charge at the point
of use. The Ministry of Health (MSP) and the Social Security Institution (IESS)
control most public hospitals and clinics and provide health services to the majority
of the population.
The referential price of a vaginal delivery (for reimbursement purposes) at a public
hospital is around 78% the price of a c-section (Ministerio de Salud Pública del
Ecuador, 2014). This difference is much higher in the private sector and would
explain the high c-section rates observed in the private sector (Gruber, Kim, et al.,
1999; Gruber and Owings, 1996; Currie, Gruber, et al., 1995).
A recent study about the prevalence of c-sections in Ecuador concluded that between
2001 and 2013, c-sections accounted for 57.5% of births in the private sector and
22.3% of births in the public sector but, only 51% of c-sections in the public
sector were justified by parallel reports of prenatal maternal or fetal complications,
including prenatal hypoxia, multiple pregnancies, or labor dystocia; while, in the
private sector, 22% appeared to have such justification (Ortiz-Prado et al., 2017).
In Ecuador, as in many other countries, obstetricians and surgeons are particularly
exposed to malpractice risk. Yet, the level of litigiousness is lower compared to
countries with well developed malpractice liability systems like the US. Proof of
this is that until August 10, 2014, the Ecuadorian Penal Code did not consider
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an autonomous criminal type for the cases of professional malpractice. The Penal
Code of 1971 only typified unintentional homicide and unintentional injurieswithout
distinguishing the cases when the author was a doctor. For this reason, most of the
malpractice trials that did not involve the death of a patient used to be resolved in
civil courts with sanctions involving reparation for damages but not jail time. This
situation changed after the enactment of the new Penal Code.
The first and second debates to approve the new Penal Code occurred in June 2012,
and October 9th, 2013, respectively. News about the latter was widely publicized by
the media and on October 24, 2013, tensions reached a peak with doctors protesting
in the streets threatening with quitting their jobs if the articles related to malpractice
were included in the final version of the new Penal Code. Despite opposition from
health-care professionals, the new Penal Code was published in the Official Registry
with the status of law on February 10th, 2014, setting August 10, 2014, as the official
implementation date. Figure 4.1 depicts the timeline of the reform.
Figure 4.1: Timeline of the reform
2013q3 2013q4 2014q1 2014q2 2014q3 2014q4 2015q1 2015q2 2015q3 2015q4
II Debate
Protests
Publication
10/02/2014
Implementation
10/08/2014
Pre-reform period Post-reform period
The new Penal Code contains two articles that define the punishments for cases of
unintentional manslaughter and injuries linked to professional malpractice. Art.146
states that unintentional manslaughter due to professional malpractice shall be pun-
ished with imprisonment of one to three years. Aggravating circumstances could
increase the punishment to five years. However, Art. 146 also describes a list of
conditions that must be met in order to bring a case of professional malpractice,
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each of which has to be assessed by a medical specialist. Similarly, Art. 152 of
the new Penal Code establishes that the punishment for a professional who injures
a patient ranges from thirty days to seven years in jail.
According to the Office of the Prosecutor, in 2007, 89 malpractice complaints were
filed in the country. In 2008, the number of complaints raised to 147, followed by
112 complaints in 2009 and 166 complaints in 2010.2 All these figures before 2014
should be taken with caution though. It was only with the new classification of
the criminal types, that it became much easier to distinguish cases of unintentional
manslaughter due to professional malpractice from the other multiple cases of
unintentional manslaughter3 For that reason, official statistics are only available
since August 2014. From that date, the number of claims has actually dropped from
176 in 2015 to 158 in 2016 and 110 in 2017.
Themalpractice reformwas enacted in August 2014 at the national level, eliminating
the possibility of exploiting variation across areas that adopted the reform at different
points in time. In similar circumstances, several papers have used a difference-in-
difference strategy that compares changes in the outcomes of a treated country
relative to a comparable country or a set of states that serve as a valid control
group to evaluate the impact of a policy or reform in the treated country (Banerjee
et al., 2002; Lindo and Packham, 2017). In the next section, I explain the empirical
strategy and the reasons for choosing Colombia as a control group for Ecuador.
4.3 Empirical strategy
The difference-in-difference strategy makes the counterfactual assumption that the
outcome of interest would have grown at the same rate in the treated and in the control
2Source: Proyecto de ley reformatoria al Código Penal para la tipificación de los delitos de mala
práctica y falta de atención médica.
3This did not happen with injuries. All types of injuries are described in Art. 152. For that
reason the Office of the Prosecutor does not keep statistics on the claims related to injuries caused
by doctors.
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country had the reform or policy change did not occur. While this assumption is
not directly testable, it is possible to test if the outcome of interest was growing at
the same rate in the pre-reform period in both groups. A second condition requires
that the composition of both groups remain stable before and after the policy change
(Blundell and Macurdy, 1999).
Identification also hinges on the exogeneity of the reform that is being studied. I
argue that the malpractice reform in Ecuador was an exogenous event to the health
system since it was a consequence of the reform to the Penal Code which had not
been reformed since 1971. Furthermore, there is no evidence that indicates that the
introduction of Arts. 146 and 152 responded to an unusual growth in the number of
malpractice lawsuits in Ecuador.
To evaluate themalpractice reform, I comparemunicipalities in Ecuador and Colom-
bia before and after the reform. Instead of estimating an average effect in the post-
reform period, I estimate a flexible specification that allows the estimated effects
to vary across time with a set of quarter indicators relative to the reform date. I
estimate the following regression:
Yjt =α j + λt +
5∑
k=−4
(Treat j × δkjt)γk + X jtβ +  jt (4.1)
where Yjt is the outcome of interest in municipality j, and quarter t, α j are munic-
ipality fixed effects to account for any systematic difference across municipalities.
λt are quarter fixed effects that control for time shocks that affect municipalities in
the two countries in the same way. Treat j is an indicator which equals one if the
municipality belongs to Ecuador and zero if belongs to Colombia.
Since the outcomes of interest are driven by fertility decisions and woman’s pref-
erences about the type of delivery, there is no reason to expect a discrete jump in
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the first quarter after the reform took place (Lindo and Packham, 2017). I allow
the estimated effects to vary across time with a set of interaction terms between the
treatment and time indicators relative to the third quarter of 2014 (Treat j × δkjt).
For that let t˜ = 0 on the third quarter of 2014, when the reform took place, and
δkjt ≡ 1{t = t˜ + k}.
Given that different municipalities will react in different ways to the malpractice
reform, γk report on the intention to treat effects of the reform across municipalities
at different points in time. The coefficients of the leads included in the model, allow
testing the parallel trends assumption required for identification. The reference
category corresponds to the second quarter of 2014. For the parallel trends test
to be successful, the coefficients of the pre-treatment interactions relative to the
omitted term should not be significantly different from zero. If this is true, then the
coefficients of the 5 interaction terms
∑5
k=1(Treat j×δkjt) after the reform correspond
to the dynamic effects of the reform.
X jt is the vector of time-varying controls that include the proportion of the black
and indigenous population (the omitted category is mestizo) in the municipality,
the share of women in different age groups and the average gross value added per
capita in the municipality. In all the specifications, the errors  jt are clustered at the
municipal level. To account for zeros in the data, the log transformation log(variable
+1) is used for the main outcomes and for the control variables.
As a robustness check, I add municipality-specific linear trends, in order to address
concerns about different preexisting time trends in the municipalities of the two
countries which may introduce bias to the estimates. In said specification, the
coefficients of interest γk , reflect the change in the outcome relative to any preexisting
time trend.
To choose a valid control group for Ecuador, I first discarded other South American
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countries that have a federal organization and consequently different structures of
their health systems compared to Ecuador; these include Argentina, Brazil, and
Venezuela. I also discarded Chile because it is a high-income country, while
Ecuador remains an upper-middle income country according to the classification of
the World Bank. Besides, Chile and more recently Uruguay (via Law 18,211 of
2011) are countries with integrated insurance systems were social security coverage
exceeds 70% of the population (Giovanella et al., 2012).
For geographic proximity and cultural similarities, the natural candidates are Colom-
bia and Peru. The main difference between the two is that Peru had already an
autonomous criminal type for cases of professional malpractice by the time of the
reform in Ecuador, while Colombia did not (Asociación Nacional de Clínicas y
Hospitales Privados del Ecuador, 2013).4 Furthermore, the c-section rate in Peru in
2015 was 35.4%,5 far below the c-section rate of 51% in Ecuador, while in Colom-
bia the c-section rate was 45% in 2014. I also discarded Bolivia as the control
group, because it registers an even lower c-section rate compared with Ecuador
(33% in 2016).6 Furthermore, by 2014 Bolivia also had a specialized criminal type
for wrongful injuries linked to professional malpractice (Asociación Nacional de
Clínicas y Hospitales Privados del Ecuador, 2013).
The identifying assumption in the difference-in-difference model is not violated
if the countries that are being compared have different levels of the outcome of
interest. It is only necessary that the outcomes grow at the same rate in both
countries before the reform. However, a country with very different levels of
the outcome of interest is likely to have different unobservable characteristics, for
4Another issue with Peru was the lack of available microdata on death certificates by the time I
was working on the main analysis in this paper. In face of a deficient system to register deaths. In
2015, MINSA and RENIEC developed SINADEF, a web application that allows doctors to prepare
an online death certificate.
5Source: Statistical bulletin of births Peru (2015)
6Source: https://www.minsalud.gob.bo/images/Documentacion/EDSA-2016.pdf
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example, restrictions in medical protocols or little taste for surgical procedures that
make the c-section rate low. Fixed unobserved characteristics are controlled for by
country fixed effects, but, if the difference is explained by time variant unobservable
characteristics or a different demographic composition in the country, this would
violate the parallel trends assumption, since it is necessary that both countries have
a similar composition, so that both countries respond to common shocks in the same
way.
Based on the previous discussion and given that Ecuador and Colombia are very
similar in terms of socio-demographic characteristics, Colombia was selected as the
control group for Ecuador. Access to health care is similar in both countries because
the Constitutions of both countries guarantee citizens the unalienable right to health
care as a fundamental right (Escobar-Córdoba, 2012). Furthermore, it is against
the law to deny access to health care at public or private establishments in case
of emergencies in both countries. While in Ecuador, all citizens have unrestricted
access to health care at public sector hospitals and clinics; in Colombia, there is a
universal health insurance scheme whereby all citizens, irrespective of their ability
to pay, are entitled to a comprehensive health benefits package.
In Colombia, the General Insurance System established the Subsidized Regime (SR)
to cover people identified as being poor through a proxy means test, and the Contrib-
utory Regime (CR) to cover formal workers and their families (Giedion and Villar,
2009). The contributory regime in Colombia is equivalent to the Social Security
regime for formal workers in Ecuador, while the subsidized regime, requires that
poor individuals pay a small share of the basic premium, which costs approximately
137 US dollars per person per year (Giedion and Villar, 2009). Like in Ecuador, the
Colombian government provides insurance for free for the poorest individuals and
coverage for diseases that are not included in the Obligatory Health Plan through
public hospitals. The Territorial Entities are responsible for the poor uninsured
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population (PNNA), who receive health care for free with charge to the resources of
the General System of Participations.7
In Ecuador, workers with Social Security affiliation have maternity coverage and
uninsured individuals can seek attention at public hospitals free of charge at every
level of care. Similarly, in Colombia, theObligatoryHealth Plan covers the provision
of health services in prenatal care, delivery care and postpartum control in the
subsidized and contributory regimes. The insurance rate in Colombia is close to
90% while in Ecuador by 2012, it was close to 45% (Naranjo, 2014). However, this
does not mean that the uninsured population in Ecuador have no access to health
care services. The public health system guarantees unrestricted access to health care
to the uninsured population. Hence, a fairer comparison between the two countries
would contrast the share of the Colombian population in the contributory regime
(41.45% in 2013) to the share of the Ecuadorian population with social insurance
(41.2% in 2012)8; and, to assess the differences in terms of access to health care
between the two countries, one should look at indicators like the share of births at
a hospital or clinic or the share of births assisted by a doctor or obstetrician, which
are very similar in both countries.
Regarding the malpractice legislation in Colombia, the current Penal Code does
not consider an autonomous criminal type for the cases of professional malpractice
and when a patient dies, as a result of malpractice, the legal figure of unintentional
manslaughter is used, just as it used to be in Ecuador before the passing of the new
Penal Code. Furthermore, when dealing with injuries, sanctions in Colombia range
from one to three years of imprisonment for injuries that cause inability to work
beyond thirty days without exceeding ninety days, and from two to five years for
injuries that cause inability to work for more than 90 days.9 Similarly, in Ecuador,
7By 2014, 859,090 individuals were in this category.
8Source: Giedion and Villar (2009) and Naranjo (2014)
9Source: Colombian Penal Code published in Law 599 published in July 2000.
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before the passing of the new Penal Code, injuries causing inability to work below
30 days used to be punished with imprisonment from six months to two years
and injuries causing inability to work beyond 90 days used to be sanctioned with
imprisonment from one to three years.10
There is very limited information about the number of malpractice claims filled in a
year in Colombia because this information is not shared in a systematic way with the
public (Tamara et al., 2012). However, the study by Tamara et al. (2012) mentions
that between January 1st, 2006 and December 31st, 2010, the authors were able to
collect information on 535 reports related to 402 cases, corresponding to 82% of
the reports written during the study period. Once Again, the number of malpractice
claims is very similar to the one observed in Ecuador, which gives an idea that the
level of litigiousness in both countries is also comparable.
Ecuador and Colombia are also similar in terms of socio-demographic characteris-
tics. Table 4.1 compares the characteristics of women of fertile age who gave birth
four quarters before the reform and five quarters later in Ecuador and in Colombia.
In both countries, the share of mixed-race population is above 90% before and after
the reform and the percentage of mothers in each age bracket is also fairly balanced
across the two countries. Furthermore, in terms of education, in both countries
around 20% of the population has achieved some level of postsecondary education.
Regarding social security coverage among women of fertile age, 57% of the Colom-
bian women in the pre-reform period reported being uninsured or having subsidized
insurance, while the share of women with subsidized insurance or uninsured in
Ecuador was 52%. Access to health services was also very similar in the two coun-
tries. In the pre-reform period, 99% of Ecuadorian and Colombian mothers were
assisted by a doctor or obstetrician during childbirth and the average number of
prenatal checks was 6.96 in Ecuador and 6.37 in Colombia. Another indicator that
10Source: Ecuadorian Penal Code of 1971 published in the Official Registry 147.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for Ecuador and Colombia
Pre-reform Post-reform
Variables Ecuador Colombia Ecuador Colombia
Number of counties or municipalities 758 192 758 192
Percent black 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.03
Percent indigenous 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.05
Percent mixed-race 0.93 0.92 0.92 0.92
Percent with less than high school education 0.78 0.78 0.75 0.79
Percent with more than high school education 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.20
Percent female 15-19 years old 0.22 0.18 0.21 0.21
Percent female 20-24 years old 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.27
Percent female 25-29years old 0.22 0.24 0.23 0.23
Percent female 30-34 years old 0.16 0.18 0.16 0.17
Percent female 35-39 years old 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09
Percent female 40-44 years old 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.02
Percent female 35 years or older 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.11
Percent of births assisted by a doctor 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
Born at a hospital 0.99 0.98 0.99 0.98
Born at home 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02
Contributory regimen 0.43 0.48 0.45 0.44
Subsidized regimen or uninsured 0.57 0.52 0.55 0.56
Mean prenatal checks 6.37 6.96 6.47 6.94
Percent babies born male 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.51
C-section rate 0.45 0.51 0.46 0.50
Percent of low birth-weight babies 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
Gross value added per capita 7,762.41 6,270.66 6,335.89 6,223.86
Maternal mortality rate 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06
Percent female 35 years or older who died 0.44 0.43 0.44 0.43
Source: The sample is women of fertile age in Vital Statistics data and death certificates data. The period of
analysis is four quarters before the reform and five quarters later. The weights reflect the number of births in
the municipality as a share of the total in the country or, for variables related to maternal mortality, the number
of early maternal deaths in the municipality as a share of the total deaths among women of fertile age in the
country.
is very similar in both countries is the share of low birth-weight babies, which is
almost identical in both countries and is close to 8%. Finally, the maternal mortality
rate was 5% in Colombia and 6% in Ecuador.
The information from the Health Nutrition and Population Statistics of the World
Bank allow establishing other similarities between the two countries. For instance,
by 2014, the prevalence of anemia among pregnant women in Colombia was 27.5%
and it was 26.1% in Ecuador. Furthermore, the number of Hospital beds per 1,000
people was 1.4 in 2011 for Colombia and 1.6 for Ecuador. Maternal leave benefits
– measured as a percentage of wages paid in the covered period – are covered in
152
its entirety in both counties, while the health expenditure per capita, in current
US dollars was $855.96 in Colombia and $994.40 in Ecuador in 2014 (Purchasing
Power Parity adjusted). Finally, age at first marriage for women in Colombia was
22.3 years in 2010 and 21.8 years in Ecuador.
All in all, both countries are very similar in terms of socio-demographic character-
istics, in terms of health care coverage for pregnant women and in their malpractice
legislation before the passing of the new Penal Code in Ecuador. On top of this,
the National Statistics Offices in both countries collect Vital Statistics and Death
certificates data in a very comparable fashion and with the same periodicity.
4.4 Data and sample
In this section, I describe the two sources of administrative data used to evaluate the
impact of the malpractice reform on the c-section rate and on indicators of maternal
and infant health. These are vital statistics and death certificates data for Ecuador
and Colombia. I explain the outcomes that have been selected as proxies for infant
and maternal health and describe the samples that have been chosen for the different
analyses.
4.4.1 Vital Statistics data
I use Vital Statistics data for Ecuador and Colombia to investigate the impact of the
malpractice reform on c-section utilization and infant health. The latest waves of
microdata available are for 2016 for both countries. The Ecuadorian data is compiled
by the National Statistics Office (INEC) and contain individual-level information
of all births registered in the country. The data contain the precise date of birth,
birth-weight, the height of the newborn, type of delivery, age, race, education level
of the mother, number of prenatal checkups among other variables. There is also
information about the place where the birth took place (province, county, and parish)
and the type of health-care establishment (public, private). Income information is
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not recorded on Vital Statistics data, so I used information about gross value added
per capita at the municipality level generated by the Ecuadorian Central Bank and
by the National Statistics Office of Colombia.
Vital Statistics data for Colombia is compiled by the National Statistics Office
(DANE) and contains almost the same information with some differences. First, the
type of delivery began to be recorded in Ecuador in 2011 while a longer series is
available for Colombia. Second, some variables are continuous in the Ecuadorian
data but for Colombia are recorded as categorical variables, examples are birth-
weight and height of the newborn and the age of the mother. Third, DANE collects
the Apgar score of newborns and the health insurance status of the mother, while,
INEC does not. Fourth, DANE publishes definitive data so the birth date of the
baby always corresponds to the data collection year, while the Ecuadorian data
presents several discrepancies between the birth date and the registration date. For
this reason, for Ecuador, I kept only babies born and registered in the same year or
one year later. Since the last available wave is for 2016, I do not use that wave in
any of the analyses. Despite these differences in data processing time,11 by 2015,
the indicator that measures the completeness of birth registration – the percentage
of children under age 5 whose births were registered at the time of the survey – in
Colombia was 98.6% and for Ecuador was 94%.12
Finally, DANE records the type of health insurance of the mother and the hospital
ID where the birth took place but not the type of hospital (public or private),
while INEC does not contain information on health insurance or hospital IDs but it
records the type of hospital where the birth took place which can be used to infer
the type of insurance of the mother. I classified mothers into two groups according
to their insurance status: (i) women in the contributory regime and (ii) women
11The reason is that in Colombia the process to register births and deaths is electronic, while in
Ecuador it is not.
12Source: Health Nutrition and Population Statistics of the World Bank.
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in the subsidized regime or uninsured. Women in the first group are Colombian
women in the contributory regime or special regimes (teachers, police officers, oil
companies, etc) and Ecuadorian women who gave birth at an establishment that
belongs to IESS, the private sector, non-profit organizations or in special regimes
(police officers, army, etc). Women in the second group are Colombian women who
belong to the subsidized regime or reported being uninsured and Ecuadorian women
who gave birth at home or a hospital that belongs to the Ministry of Health. It is
worth noting that women who choose to give birth at home are commonly uninsured
indigenous women.
The first outcome of interest to this study is the type of delivery. INEC began
collecting this information in 2011. Because of this, the c-section rate for Ecuador
has an artificially steep slope until mid-2012 when more mothers started reporting
that information. Hence, to study the effects of the reform on c-section utilization,
I restrict the sample to births that occurred four quarters before the third quarter of
2014 and five quarters after that date. In the robustness checks section, I extend the
period of analysis to eight quarters before and five quarters after the reform date.
The other outcome I am interested in is birth-weight, which is a measure of infant
health as well as the Apgar score. The Apgar score is known to be a reliable indicator
of acute infant health at birth that has been demonstrated to be correlated with both
morbidity and mortality (Dubay et al., 2001). Both birth-weight and Apgar score
are expected to be responsive to obstetrician behavior whereas other measures of
infant health like infant mortality are associated with the behavior of pediatricians
(Dubay et al., 2001).13
Unfortunately, the Apgar score is only recorded in the Colombian Vital Statistics
dataset and is not available for Ecuador, so I focus on birth-weight. birth-weight
13APGAR stands for activity, pulse, grimace, appearance, and respiration. The infant is given a
maximum score of 2 for each attribute, for a maximum score of 10.
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is reported as a categorical variable for Colombia and as a continuous variable for
Ecuador, so I build a low-birth-weight indicator equal to one if birth-weight is below
2500 grams and zero otherwise (Baicker et al., 2006).14
4.4.2 Death certificates data
To study the impact of the malpractice reform on maternal mortality, I use death
certificates data for Ecuador and Colombia. These datasets contain similar informa-
tion in both countries. Late registration of deaths occurs in Ecuadorian data, so for
any particular year, I only keep deaths registered in the same year or the next year.
The data contain a specific set of questions to identify and study maternal mortality.
It records the exact date of death and distinguishes between maternal deaths that
happened during pregnancy or within 42 days of childbirth and late maternal deaths,
which occurred within 11 months of childbirth. I focus on maternal deaths within
42 days of childbirth and ignore late maternal deaths because those could be related
to other factors unrelated to the physician’s work.
4.4.3 Analytical samples
The final sample from Vital Statistics contains women who gave birth within four
quarters before the enactment of the new Penal Code and five quarters after that
date. I kept only babies born and registered in the same year or one year later,
so, considering that the last wave of Vital Statistics data available for Ecuador
corresponds to 2016, the final sample includes data up to the fourth quarter of
2015.15 The sample includes women aged 15 to 44 years, as this is considered
the standard age range for fertility.16 I also restricted the sample to singletons as
14The categories in Colombian data are: 1) below 1000 g; 2) from 1000 g to 1499 g; 3) from
1500 g to 1999 g; 4) from 2000 g to 2499 g; 5) from 2500 g to 2999 g; 6) from 3000 g; to 3499 g; 7)
from 3500 g to 3999; 8) above 4000 g.
15This left me with around 6% fewer observations corresponding to late registrations.
16Because Vital Statistics data for Colombia only report the age of the mother in categories it was
not possible to select women aged 15 to 45 but aged 15 to 44.
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c-section is more common in cases of twins or triplets.
The equivalent for Ecuadorian counties are municipalities in Colombia.17 There
are 221 counties in Ecuador (hereafter municipalities), and 1,122 municipalities in
Colombia. I aggregated the data at the municipal level to build a balanced panel
of municipalities. After dropping the municipalities that did not register births in
all the periods, the final sample preserved 99.57% of the records in both countries
during the period of analysis. The final panel contains 192municipalities in Ecuador
and 758 municipalities in Colombia.
Regarding Death Certificates data, the final sample also includes women aged 15 to
44 years, but since there are significantly fewer observations about reported deaths,
and it is expected that not every municipality registers maternal deaths in every
period, I kept all the observations in the unbalanced panel.
4.5 Assessing the validity of the identification strategy
The evidence presented so far shows that Colombia is a good control group for
Ecuador. In this section, I show further evidence to back this argument. For this, I
show that the outcomes of interest follow similar trends before the reform in the two
countries. I also present evidence of the stability in the demographic composition
of both countries before and after the reform.
4.5.1 Parallel trends analysis
To formally test the parallel trends assumption on the three outcomes of interest. I
estimate the difference-in-difference model in equation 4.1 and check whether the
coefficients of the leads in the models are statistically different from zero. This is
equivalent to test that there were no differential trends in the outcomes of Ecuador
17The term county and municipality are used interchangeably in the Ecuadorian Municipal
Regime Law published in the Official Registry 331 in 1971; however, INEC refers to municipalities
as counties in the Ecuadorian Vital Statistics data.
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Figure 4.2: γk estimates from the difference-in-difference regression in equation 4.1
when the outcome is the c-section rate
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of municipalities and the period of analysis is four quarters
before the reform and five quarters later in both countries. The points in each figure represent the
γk coefficients from the difference-in-difference model in equation 4.1. The range plot with capped
spikes present the 95 percent confidence intervals. The reference period is the second quarter of
2014. The specification includes municipality fixed effects. Controls include the proportion of black
and indigenous population (the omitted category is mestizo), the share of women in different age
groups and the average gross value added per capita in the municipality. Municipality linear time
trends are not included.
and Colombia before the reform date. The reference period in all the analyses is
the second quarter of 2014, which corresponds to the quarter immediately before
the passing of the new Penal Code. The specifications include municipality fixed
effects and time variant controls to account for differences in racial composition,
age composition and average gross value added per capita across municipalities.
Figure 4.2 shows the pattern in the coefficients of the leads and lags in the model
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the c-section rate. It shows that
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Figure 4.3: γk estimates from the difference-in-difference regression in equation 4.1
when the outcome is the low-birth-weight rate
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of municipalities and the period of analysis is four quarters
before the reform and five quarters later in both countries. The points in each figure represent the
γk coefficients from the difference-in-difference model in equation 4.1. The range plot with capped
spikes present the 95 percent confidence intervals. The reference period is the second quarter of
2014. The specification includes municipality fixed effects. Controls include the proportion of black
and indigenous population (the omitted category is mestizo), the share of women in different age
groups and the average gross value added per capita in the municipality. Municipality linear time
trends are not included.
there are no statistically significant differences between the two countries in the four
quarters before the reform. The logarithm of the c-section rate starts to decrease
significantly relative to Colombia’s rate in the second quarter after the reform, which
corresponds to the first quarter of 2015.
Figure 4.3 also shows the γk coefficients from the difference-in-difference regression
in equation 4.1. The outcome of interest is the logarithm of the share of low birth-
weight babies in the municipality. The figure shows small and not statistically
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Figure 4.4: γk estimates from the difference-in-difference regression in equation 4.1
when the outcome is the maternal mortality rate
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Notes: The sample is the balanced panel of municipalities and the period of analysis is four quarters
before the reform and five quarters later in both countries. The points in each figure represent the
γk coefficients from the difference-in-difference model in equation 4.1. The range plot with capped
spikes present the 95 percent confidence intervals. The reference period is the second quarter of
2014. The specification includes municipality fixed effects. Controls include the proportion of black
and indigenous population (the omitted category is mestizo), the share of women in different age
groups and the average gross value added per capita in the municipality. Municipality linear time
trends are not included.
significant differences between Ecuador and Colombia before and after the reform.
Finally, Figure 4.4 shows the dynamic effects of the reform on the logarithm of
maternal mortality rates. It shows, like in the previous graphs small differences be-
tween Ecuador and Colombia before the reform which are not significantly different
from zero. Furthermore, there is no evidence of treatment effects in any of the five
quarters that followed the reform.
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4.5.2 Checking for stability in the composition of the two countries
The parallel trends assumption is violated if the groups that are being compared are
not similar or if their composition changes differentially across time. In Table 4.1,
I showed that women in Colombia and Ecuador have a very similar demographic
composition. Here I show that the demographic composition in both countries
followed similar paths before and after the reform. Table 4.2 shows the results of
the model in equation 4.1. The specifications in columns 1 to 3 include controls for
the age composition and gross value added per capita in the municipality, while the
specifications in columns 4 to 6 control for the ethnic composition and value added
per capita at the municipality level. I added municipality specific time trends only in
the regressions where the dependent variable is the share of mothers in the different
age groups because those variables did not follow parallel trends before the reform.
To show the complete pattern of coefficients before and after the reform date, the
third quarter of 2014 was chosen as the reference period.
The joint F-tests for the leads in themodels suggest that the share of black, indigenous
and mestizo women followed parallel trends before and after the reform in both
countries. However, the variables for the different age groups did not follow strictly
a parallel trend before the reform. The deviations in the different age groups are
small though, always close to 1% or below 1%. What is interesting is that there
was a statistically significant reduction in the share of Ecuadorian women aged 35
to 44 years that registered giving birth right after the reform which persisted several
quarters later.
Given that c-sections are more common among this age group because these women
are old enough to be having their second or third child and because the likelihood
of a c-section increases with age, a fertility drop in this group may explain part of
the observed reduction in c-sections after the reform. To test that the results are not
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Table 4.2: Stability in the demographic composition of Ecuador and Colombia
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Black Indigenous Mestizo
15-24
years
25-34
years
35-44
years
Effect in t-1 0.00219 -0.000489 -0.00166 -0.0114∗∗∗ 0.00471∗ 0.00911∗∗∗
(0.00237) (0.00107) (0.00245) (0.00289) (0.00263) (0.00236)
Effect in t-2 0.000603 -0.00107 -0.000851 -0.0125∗∗∗ 0.00266 0.0131∗∗∗
(0.00468) (0.00182) (0.00394) (0.00370) (0.00361) (0.00264)
Effect in t-3 0.00193 -0.000585 -0.000952 -0.00346 0.00205 0.00203
(0.00447) (0.00188) (0.00392) (0.00301) (0.00364) (0.00377)
Effect in t-4 -0.000449 -0.00289 0.00114 0.00727∗ -0.00610 -0.00128
(0.00440) (0.00225) (0.00403) (0.00384) (0.00443) (0.00452)
Effect in t+1 -0.00166 -0.000356 0.000876 0.0140∗∗∗ -0.00794∗∗ -0.00912∗∗∗
(0.00152) (0.00127) (0.00135) (0.00304) (0.00326) (0.00175)
Effect in t+2 -0.00849∗ -0.000715 0.00523 0.00809∗∗ 0.000231 -0.0107∗∗∗
(0.00441) (0.00210) (0.00334) (0.00407) (0.00373) (0.00265)
Effect in t+3 -0.00277 -0.000498 0.00149 0.00545∗ 0.00241 -0.00999∗∗∗
(0.00433) (0.00223) (0.00339) (0.00278) (0.00255) (0.00212)
Effect in t+4 -0.00465 -0.000560 0.00248 0.00838∗∗∗ 0.000839 -0.0122∗∗∗
(0.00367) (0.00310) (0.00350) (0.00213) (0.00249) (0.00212)
Effect in t+5 -0.00366 0.00177 0.00145 0.00180 0.00545∗∗ -0.00873∗∗∗
(0.00413) (0.00233) (0.00330) (0.00292) (0.00257) (0.00235)
P-value (leads) 0.736 0.495 0.740 0.000 0.001 0.000
Average effect (five lags) -0.004 -0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 -0.010
P-value (Average effect) 0.130 0.968 0.344 0.001 0.928 0.000
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No No No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8865 8865 8865 8865 8865 8865
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: The sample is women of fertile age in Vital Statistics data. Robust standard errors clustered at
municipality level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The period of analysis is four
quarters before the reform and five quarters later. The Table shows the results of the model in equation
4.1 and includes municipality and time fixed effects as well as controls for age and race composition at
municipality level (depending on the dependent variable) and the logarithm of the gross value added per
capita in the municipality. The reference period is the third quarter of 2014. Municipality specific time
trends are included in the models in columns 4 to 6.
driven by the fertility drop among women aged 35 to 44 years, in the robustness
checks section, I present results by age groups. It is reassuring though, that the
effects found after excluding these women are almost identical to the ones observed
for the complete sample, which will be discussed in the next section.
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Table 4.3 presents additional evidence of parallel trends on other determinants of
the c-section rate that have been discussed so far. The analysis is done separately
for women ages 15 to 24 years, 25 to 34 years and 35 to 44 years. The joint F-
tests for the leads in the models suggest that despite the differences in the social
insurance systems in Ecuador and Colombia, the share of births that were assisted
by a doctor during the four quarters prior to the reform followed a parallel trend in
both countries. This is true also for the share of babies that were born at a hospital
or at home across all age groups. Interestingly, the share of mothers aged 35 to 44
years with subsidized or contributory insurance also followed parallel trends in the
two countries.
Table 4.3: Parallel trends tests on other characteristics by age group
Age Group
Assisted by
a doctor
Born at
hospital
Born at
home
Subsidized
regime
Contributory
regime
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mothers aged 15 to 24 years
P-value (leads) 0.369 0.623 0.731 0.0390 0.0300
Observations 8099 8099 8099 8099 8099
Mothers aged 25 to 34 years
P-value (leads) 0.201 0.601 0.200 0.0650 0.0430
Observations 7836 7836 7836 7836 7836
Mothers aged 35 to 44 years
P-value (leads) 0.501 0.715 0.610 0.474 0.183
Observations 5814 5814 5814 5811 5811
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level shown in parentheses. ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is mothers aged 15 to 44 years old. The period
of analysis is four quarters before the reform and five quarters later. I report the results
of my preferred specification for each of the outcomes of interest. The weights in the
regressions reflect the number of births in the municipality in each age range as a share
of total births in each age range. All the dependent variables are in logarithms. Controls
include the proportion of black and indigenous population (the omitted category is mestizo),
the share of women in different age groups and the average gross value added per capita in
the municipality.
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4.6 Results
In this section, I present the results on the effects of the malpractice reform using
the non-parametric specification in equation 4.1. I study the effects of the reform
on the logarithm of the c-section rate in the municipality, the logarithm of the share
of low birth-weight babies and the logarithm of early maternal mortality rate also
at the municipality level. I report on the effects of the malpractice reform up to five
quarters after it’s implementation (lags) and the cumulative average effect of the five
lags in the model. Results are accompanied by an F-test of the joint significance of
the leads in the model, to formally test for parallel trends and adds to the graphical
evidence discussed in section 4.5.
4.6.1 C-section rate
Table 4.4 reports results of the effect of the malpractice reform on the logarithm of
the c-section rate in the municipality. Column 1 reports the results of the difference-
in-difference model in equation 4.1. Column 2 adds a municipality specific linear
time trend to the model and column 3 adds time variant controls to the specification
in column 2. All the models use weights that reflect the number of births in the
municipality as a share of the number of births in the country.
In Column 1, the F-test of the joint significance of the leads indicates that the
c-section rate followed parallel trends in both countries before the reform (p-
value=0.972). For this reason, my preferred specification is the one reported in
column 1, which corresponds to the estimates presented in Figure 4.2. The esti-
mates in column 1 show that the reform had a negative effect on the c-section rate
of Ecuadorian municipalities. All the lags in the model have a negative sign, yet the
effect is statistically significant starting in the second quarter after the reform. It is
worth noting that the negative effects are stronger three quarters after the passing
of the new Penal Code (-1.4% significant at 1% level). The reason may be that
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Table 4.4: Effects of the Malpractice Reform on c-section rate in Ecuador
(1) (2) (3)
C-section C-section C-section
Effect in t -0.00142 -0.00159 -0.00172
(0.00365) (0.00368) (0.00367)
Effect in t+1 -0.00153 -0.00213 -0.00215
(0.00368) (0.00342) (0.00341)
Effect in t+2 -0.0109∗∗ -0.0116∗∗∗ -0.0119∗∗∗
(0.00445) (0.00412) (0.00409)
Effect in t+3 -0.0136∗∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗
(0.00467) (0.00417) (0.00416)
Effect in t+4 -0.0114∗∗ -0.0128∗∗∗ -0.0130∗∗∗
(0.00543) (0.00399) (0.00397)
Effect in t+5 -0.0129∗∗ -0.0146∗∗∗ -0.0148∗∗∗
(0.00568) (0.00364) (0.00362)
P-value (leads) 0.972 0.960 0.961
Average effect (five lags) -0.0101 -0.0111 -0.0113
P-value (test Average effect=0) 0.0122 0.0000815 0.0000566
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No Yes Yes
Controls Yes No Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9487 9487 9487
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level shown
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The period of
analysis is four quarters before the reform and five quarters later.
Column 1 reports the results of the difference-in-difference model in
equation 4.1 using weights that reflect the number of births in the
municipality as a share of the total in the country. Column 2 adds
a municipality specific linear time trend to the model and column 3
adds some time variant controls related to race, the share of women
in different age groups and the average gross value added per capita
in the municipality.
women who got pregnant after the reform were exposed to it during the 9 months
that followed, giving doctors the chance to do more to avoid an unnecessary planned
c-section or complications leading to an emergency c-section. The estimates re-
ported in columns 2 and 3 look almost identical to the ones reported in column
1.
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4.6.2 Share of low birth-weight babies
Table 4.5 shows the effects of the reform on the logarithm of the share of low birth-
weight babies at the municipal level. In line with figure 4.3, the F-test of the joint
significance of the leads in the model shows that the share of low birth-weight babies
followed parallel trends in the two countries before the reform (p-value=0.118).
Hence, my preferred specification is in column 1. Results in column 1 show a
negative but not statistically significant effect of the reform on the quarter after it’s
implementation.
The sign of the effect is in line with the results reported in Table 4.4, since a
reduction in c-sections is associated with an increase in the birth-weight of newborns
and hence with a reduction in the share of low birth-weight babies in t+1. The
observed negative effects were not statistically significant in the specification that
did not include municipality time trends and turned statistically significant in the
specification that included municipality time trends reported in column 2. However,
after controlling for time-variant controls (in column3) like age and race composition
in the municipality and the logarithm of value added per capita, the estimates of the
time indicators that were closer to the reform date became not statistically significant.
4.6.3 Maternal mortality
Consistent with the pattern of γ coefficients shown in Figure 4.4, the p-value of
the F-test reported in column 1 of Table 4.6 shows that early maternal mortality
followed parallel trends in both countries in the pre-reform period (p-value=0.293).
The coefficients of the five lags included in the model are not statistically significant
in any of the specifications presented in columns 1 to 3 and neither was the coefficient
of the cumulative average effect in the five quarters following the reform date. The
results reported in column 1 of Table 4.6 suggest that the reform had a small
negative effect on the logarithm of early maternal mortality in the second, fourth
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Table 4.5: Effects of the Malpractice Reform on low birth-weight in
Ecuador
(1) (2) (3)
Low birth
weight
Low birth
weight
Low birth
weight
Effect in t 0.000425 -0.00225 -0.000810
(0.00202) (0.00224) (0.00240)
Effect in t+1 -0.000453 -0.00440∗∗ -0.00296
(0.00181) (0.00205) (0.00266)
Effect in t+2 0.00174 -0.00466 -0.00471
(0.00378) (0.00296) (0.00298)
Effect in t+3 0.00469 -0.00395∗ -0.00323
(0.00347) (0.00225) (0.00236)
Effect in t+4 0.00331 -0.00737∗∗∗ -0.00586∗∗
(0.00374) (0.00186) (0.00251)
Effect in t+5 0.000332 -0.0126∗∗∗ -0.0103∗∗∗
(0.00415) (0.00170) (0.00306)
P-value (leads) 0.118 0.149 0.230
Average effect (five lags) 0.00192 -0.00659 -0.00541
P-value (test Average effect=0) 0.507 0.0000473 0.00858
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No Yes Yes
Controls Yes No Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8894 9422 8894
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level shown in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The period of analysis
is four quarters before the reform and five quarters later. Column 1
reports the results of the difference-in-difference model in equation 4.1
using weights that reflect the number of births in the municipality as a
share of the total in the country. Column 2 adds a municipality specific
linear time trend to the model and column 3 adds some time variant
controls related to race, the share of women in different age groups and
the average gross value added per capita in the municipality.
and fifth quarter after the reform date, but none of the coefficients were statistically
significant. Furthermore, once linear time trends were added to the model, the sign
of the coefficients became positive but still not statistically significant.
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Table 4.6: Effects of the Malpractice Reform on early maternal mor-
tality in Ecuador
(1) (2) (3)
Maternal
mortality
Maternal
mortality
Maternal
mortality
Effect in t 0.00526 0.0106 0.0155
(0.0187) (0.0211) (0.0222)
Effect in t+1 0.0116 0.0145 0.0322
(0.0174) (0.0208) (0.0240)
Effect in t+2 -0.00316 0.00269 0.000708
(0.0177) (0.0189) (0.0184)
Effect in t+3 0.00326 0.00705 0.0167
(0.0149) (0.0130) (0.0147)
Effect in t+4 -0.00153 0.000299 0.0231
(0.0139) (0.0154) (0.0195)
Effect in t+5 -0.00879 -0.00548 0.0258
(0.0133) (0.00929) (0.0203)
P-value (leads) 0.293 0.443 0.352
Average effect (five lags) 0.000 0.004 0.020
P-value (test Average effect=0) 0.983 0.769 0.214
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No Yes Yes
Controls Yes No Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes
Observations 4183 4511 4183
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level
shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The pe-
riod of analysis is four quarters before the reform and five quarters
later. Column 1 reports the results of the difference-in-difference
model in equation 4.1 using weights that reflect the number of
early maternal deaths in the municipality as a share of the total
deaths among women of fertile age in the country. Column 2 adds
a municipality specific linear time trend to the model and column
3 adds some time variant controls related to race, the share of
women in different age groups and the average gross value added
per capita in the municipality.
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4.6.4 Heterogeneous effects
The c-section rate is expected to be higher among older mothers than among younger
mothers (Walker et al., 2016). In fact, the research in the area has found that the
risks of perinatal death, hypertensive disease, diabetes mellitus, among others, are
higher among women aged 35 years or older (Walker et al., 2016). Older women
also face a higher risk for preterm labor and low birth-weight infants (< 2500g)
(Reddy et al., 2006).
Taking this into consideration, Table 4.7 reports on the effects of the reform for three
different age groups. None of the models include municipality time trends so that
they are comparable to the preferred specifications discussed in the results section.
In terms of the c-section rate, the effects found among mothers aged 15 to 34 years
were very similar to those reported in Table 4.4 for the complete sample. However,
the reform did not have a significant effect on mothers aged 35 to 44 years. It seems
that doctors reduced the use of c-sections only among younger women, but kept
the c-section rate unchanged among older mothers. This finding is in line with the
theory that argues that doctors tend to have less discretion over riskier pregnancies.
Regarding the effects on the share of low-birth-weight babies, it is possible to see
that the reform caused a statistically significant reduction in the share of low-birth-
weight babies only among mothers aged 25 to 34 years, while for the other age
groups the effect remained not statistically significant. Finally, regarding the effects
on maternal mortality, the results by age groups were not different from the results
for the complete sample in the sense that the effects remained insignificant across
all the age groups, however, it is possible to see that the reform had a positive effect
on maternal mortality among the younger group and a negative effect among the
older group.
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Table 4.7: Effects of the Malpractice Reform on the c-section rate among mothers aged 15 to 34 years and 35 to 44 years
Mothers Aged 15-24 years Mothers Aged 25-34 years Mothers Aged 35-44 years
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
C-section
Low birth
weight
Maternal
mortality C-section
Low birth
weight
Maternal
mortality C-section
Low birth
weight
Maternal
mortality
Effect in t -0.000579 0.000329 0.0496 -0.00383 0.000390 -0.00933 0.00765 0.00217 -0.00759
(0.00471) (0.00236) (0.0374) (0.00329) (0.00273) (0.0381) (0.00628) (0.00608) (0.0141)
Effect in t+1 0.00235 0.00322 0.0442 0.00493 -0.00443** 0.00344 0.00314 -0.00151 -0.00262
(0.00464) (0.00232) (0.0315) (0.00430) (0.00224) (0.0306) (0.00692) (0.00539) (0.0234)
Effect in t+2 -0.0119* 0.00307 0.0357 -0.0134** 0.00189 -0.0128 0.000633 -8.74e-05 -0.0246
(0.00695) (0.00387) (0.0489) (0.00646) (0.00351) (0.0323) (0.00646) (0.00820) (0.0231)
Effect in t+3 -0.0171** 0.00528 0.0287 -0.0110* 0.00539 0.0154 0.00197 0.00616 -0.0260
(0.00730) (0.00355) (0.0382) (0.00603) (0.00453) (0.0285) (0.00657) (0.00823) (0.0183)
Effect in t+4 -0.0150** 0.00182 0.0233 -0.0131* 0.00585 0.00151 0.00312 0.00997 -0.0185
(0.00741) (0.00437) (0.0340) (0.00684) (0.00411) (0.0347) (0.00586) (0.00840) (0.0263)
Effect in t+5 -0.0159** -0.00189 0.0309 -0.0124* 0.00338 -0.0113 0.00984 0.00408 -0.0315**
(0.00716) (0.00405) (0.0452) (0.00648) (0.00492) (0.0337) (0.00658) (0.00902) (0.0146)
P-value (leads) 0.816 0.249 0.720 0.470 0.548 0.208 0.0310 0.750 0.667
Average effect (five lags) -0.0110 0.00200 0.0330 -0.00900 0.00200 -0.00100 0.00400 0.00400 -0.0210
P-value (test Average effect=0) 0.0450 0.409 0.289 0.0700 0.445 0.975 0.381 0.580 0.232
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No No No No No No Yes No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8728 8628 1998 8476 8359 2074 6396 6228 2509
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is mothers
aged 15 to 44 years old. The period of analysis is four quarters before the reform and five quarters later. I report the results of my preferred
specification for each of the outcomes of interest. Controls include the proportion of black and indigenous population (the omitted category is
mestizo), the share of women in different age groups and the average gross value added per capita in the municipality.
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4.7 Robustness checks
In this section, I test the robustness of the results to changes in the window around
the reform date. More specifically, I check if the results hold when I expand the
period of analysis to include eight quarters before the reform and five quarters later.
I also investigate whether the results found so far change if I select Peru instead of
Colombia as control group.
4.7.1 Sensitivity to changes in the window around the reform date
As a robustness check, I estimate the model in equation 4.1 considering the period
between eight quarters before the reform and five quarters later. Table 4.8 reports
the results of my preferred specification for each of the outcomes of interest. The
joint F-test in Column 1 shows that eight quarters before the reform, the c-section
rate in Ecuador followed a parallel trend with respect to Colombia’s rate. In general,
the results in Table 4.8 are similar to the ones presented in Table 4.4 and show a
statistically significant reduction of 0.9% on the logarithm of the c-section rate in
Ecuadorian municipalities in the five quarters that followed the passing of the new
Penal Code (in average). The results reported in columns 2 and 3 about the impacts
on the share of low birth-weight babies and maternal mortality are also in line with
the results reported in Tables 4.5 and 4.6, respectively.
4.7.2 Using Peru as control group
In this section, I compare the results thatwere discussed in section 4.6with the results
of an alternative specification that uses Peru as the control group for Ecuador. I
got access to Vital Statistics data for Peru through a special petition to the National
Statistics Office, however, microdata on death certificates was not readily available.
Hence, the analysis in this section focuses on the effects of the reform on the c-section
rate and on the share of low-birth-weight babies at the municipality level.
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Table 4.8: Effects of the Malpractice Reform. Period of analysis eight
quarters before the reform and five quarters later
(1) (2) (3)
C-section
Low birth
weight
Maternal
mortality
Effect in t -0.000954 -0.000311 0.00793
(0.00349) (0.00194) (0.0195)
Effect in t+1 0.00349 -0.00227 0.00989
(0.00363) (0.00185) (0.0191)
Effect in t+2 -0.0126** -0.00181 -0.00256
(0.00640) (0.00264) (0.0177)
Effect in t+3 -0.0137** 0.000532 0.000688
(0.00629) (0.00217) (0.0124)
Effect in t+4 -0.0132** -0.00205 -0.00775
(0.00642) (0.00240) (0.0144)
Effect in t+5 -0.0100 -0.00390* -0.0155
(0.00699) (0.00227) (0.00991)
P-value (leads) 0.101 0.0830 0.375
Average effect (five lags) -0.00900 -0.00200 -0.00300
P-value (test Average effect=0) 0.0880 0.268 0.807
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No Yes Yes
Controls Yes No No
Weights Yes Yes Yes
Observations 12621 13165 6344
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level shown
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The period of
analysis is eight quarters before the reform and five quarters later.
Column 1 reports the results from the model in equation 4.1 while
the specifications in columns 2 and 3 include municipality specific
linear time trends. Controls include the proportion of black and
indigenous population (the omitted category is mestizo), the share
of women in different age groups and the average gross value added
per capita in the municipality.
Columns 1 and 4 show the results reported in section 4.6 for comparison purposes
while columns 2 and 5 show the results of the specification in equation 4.1 using
Peru as the control group. The results found when Peru was used as the control
group for Ecuador are in line with the results found so far (shown in column 1).
Column 2 reports a negative effect of the reform on the c-section rate that starts
in the reform quarter and turns statistically significant in the second quarter after
the reform. The reduction in c-sections was slightly higher in the fourth and fifth
quarter possibly because Peru experienced a slight increase in the c-section rate by
the end of 2015 as evidenced in the results presented in column 3 that compares
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Colombia and Peru.18
The p-value of the joint F-test of the leads in the model reported in column 3
shows that Colombia and Peru followed similar trends in the c-section rate before
the reform. This was expected considering that both countries followed parallel
trends with respect to the c-section rate of Ecuador. Since none of these countries
experienced a reform, I expected that they followed parallel trends in the c-section
rate also after the third quarter of 2014. However, Peru experienced a slight increase
in the c-section rate in the two last quarters of 2015. This can be due to the
implementation of “PlanBienvenidos a laVida" thatwas launched inApril 2015 after
the passing of the Resolution 997-2014/MINSA.19 The aim of “Plan Bienvenidos a
la Vida" was to provide mothers with a newborn kit, counseling regarding newborn
care and to register babies in the Health Insurance System (SIS). More importantly,
the program targets mothers in the first and second poverty quintiles who gave birth
at a health facility. Since giving birth at a health facility increases the likelihood of
having a c-section, this may explain the rise in c-sections in Peru observed in the
last quarters of 2015.
Columns 4 to 6 show the results for the share of low birth-weight babies. The three
countries followed parallel trends before the reform as shown by the p-value of the
F-test of the leads in the models (p-value=0.118, 0.475, 0.563, respectively). In line
with the results obtained when Colombia was the control group (shown in column
4), when Peru was used as control group, Ecuador also experienced a decrease in
the share of low birth-weight babies on the first quarter after the malpractice reform
(as shown in column 5), even though the difference was not statistically significant.
18The rise in the c-section rate of Peru is likely to make the difference between Ecuador’s and
Peru’s c-section rates larger, making also the reduction in the c-section rate of Ecuador look larger.
19For more details see https://es.slideshare.net/FresiaIsmelda/plan-bienvenidos-a-la-vida
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Table 4.9: Results using Perú as control group
C-section rate Low birth-weight
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ecuador vs
Colombia
Ecuador vs
Perú
Perú vs
Colombia
Ecuador vs
Colombia
Ecuador vs
Perú
Perú vs
Colombia
Effect in t -0.00142 -0.00612 0.00513 0.000425 -0.00172 0.00134
(0.00365) (0.00372) (0.00316) (0.00202) (0.00200) (0.00122)
Effect in t+1 -0.00153 -0.00204 0.00575 -0.000453 -0.00266 0.00199
(0.00368) (0.00419) (0.00436) (0.00181) (0.00183) (0.00142)
Effect in t+2 -0.0109** -0.0131*** 0.00537 0.00174 0.000821 0.000959
(0.00445) (0.00494) (0.00454) (0.00378) (0.00271) (0.00140)
Effect in t+3 -0.0136*** -0.0153*** 0.00579 0.00469 0.00226 0.00236
(0.00467) (0.00453) (0.00421) (0.00347) (0.00215) (0.00168)
Effect in t+4 -0.0114** -0.0219*** 0.0126** 0.00331 0.000614 0.00243
(0.00543) (0.00512) (0.00530) (0.00374) (0.00241) (0.00152)
Effect in t+5 -0.0129** -0.0274*** 0.0176*** 0.000332 -0.00243 0.00240
(0.00568) (0.00545) (0.00556) (0.00415) (0.00286) (0.00158)
P-value (leads) 0.972 0.503 0.146 0.118 0.475 0.563
Average effect (five lags) -0.0101 -0.0160 0.00942 0.00192 -0.000279 0.00203
P-value (Average effect) 0.0122 3.23e-05 0.0276 0.507 0.878 0.0879
Municip. and quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municip. linear time trend No No No No No No
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Weights Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9487 6867 12540 8894 6811 12525
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at municipality level shown in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1. The sample is mothers aged 15 to 44 years old. The period of analysis is four quarters before
the reform and five quarters later. I report the results of the specification in equation 4.1 for each of the
outcomes of interest. For the specifications where Peru is used as control group, the control variables
included in the models are the share of women in the different age groups at the municipality level, since
race composition variables were not available neither measures of value added per capita at the district
level.
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4.8 Conclusions
Health systems that provide health coverage at no cost for the greatest part of the
population, necessarily face high health care costs because neither patients nor
doctors internalize the costs of health services. Malpractice laws may reduce these
costs but can also encourage defensive medicine so, the final result is an empirical
question. Costs may drop if, in response to increased malpractice pressure, doctors
reduce the use of invasive and expensive procedures in low-risk patients who do not
need them. However, costs may increase if in response to the reform doctors begin to
performmore preventive exams that do not have a positive effect on health outcomes,
in other words, costs may increase if the reform induces defensive medicine.
This paper shows that policies that increase themalpractice pressure faced by doctors
and health care providers can be effective in reducing the overprovision of elective
procedures. In line with previous literature, I show that doctors respond to an
increase in malpractice pressure by reducing the c-section rate. The observed
reduction in the number of c-sections did not affect the health outcomes of mothers
or newborns, instead, the share of low birth-weight babies decreased as expected
(driven by the reduction in c-sections). Furthermore, early maternal mortality
remained at the same pre-reform rates.
During the five quarters following the reform, doctors reduced the c-section rate
by 1.1% among women aged 15 to 24 years, and by 0.9% among women aged
25 to 34 years. The c-section rate remained unaffected for women aged 35 to 44
years, possibly because these women have more risky pregnancies and doctors are
expected to have less discretion over high-risk births (Currie and MacLeod, 2008).
These results are consistent with excessive procedure use among women aged 15
to 34 years before the reform, meaning that doctors were performing too many
unnecessary procedures. The theory predicts that when the marginal procedures
are unnecessary, the probability of a medical error leading to liability is higher with
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surgery than without surgery (Currie and MacLeod, 2008) which explains why the
malpractice reform led to a decrease in procedure use in Ecuador.
Given that the reduction in c-sections did not affect the health outcomes of mothers
or newborns, we can conclude that the difference between the pre-reform and post-
reform c-section levels correspond to socially wasteful procedures. Back of the
envelope calculations allow estimating the aggregate savings caused by the reform.
Considering that the number of registered newborns in Ecuador in the second quarter
of 2014 (the reference period in all the analyses) was 63,671 and that the average
cost of a c-section in 2014 in the public sector was 892.64 US dollars,20 reducing
the c-section rate in average by 1% in the five quarters following the reform implies
aggregate savings in the order of 1,420,882.04 US dollars (0.5 x 0.01 x 63,671 x
892.64 x 5).
A better assessment of the overall benefits of increased malpractice pressure would
also factor in the costs related to defensive medicine by estimating the costs of
low-benefit treatments triggered by fear of prosecution. Further checks should use
doctor-level data to check whether doctors decided to leave the least profitable
sector (possibly the public sector) in response to the malpractice reform, leading to
specialization within sectors.
20According to the information provided by the National Director of Articulation of the Public
and Complementary Health System in document MSP-DNARPCS-2017-0295-O.
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C h a p t e r 5
CONCLUSIONS
Market-driven economic growth is likely to be the main driver of poverty reduction
in most countries, however, markets alone rarely ensure efficient and equitable out-
comes. Public policy plays a central role in providing the institutional foundations
within which markets operate, in providing public goods, and in correcting market
failures (Fiszbein et al., 2009). In the recent years, the focus of social protection sys-
tems in Latin America has been on social assistance programs like non-contributory
pensions and cash transfer programs (Barrientos, 2011). The success of these pro-
grams has made countries aware of the need to put in place complementary actions
to achieve a greater impact. Some of them include expanding access to public
services and exploring reforms to social assistance programs focused on improving
the targeting of beneficiaries as well as the timing and size of the benefits (Fiszbein
et al., 2009).
The objective of this thesis has been to analyze the effectiveness of government
interventions in the form of cash transfers to the poor and health care regulations.
Considering the high costs involved in maintaining cash transfer programs in the
long-run, this thesis contributes with new evidence about the persistence of effects
in the long-run. This thesis also analyzes the role of government regulation in the
health care sector, a topic that has not been sufficiently explored in the developing
world. It provides first-hand evidence on the effects of labor market regulations on
hospital quality in a developing country context and adds to the literature that looks
at possible solutions to mitigate the problem of rising health care costs in developing
countries.
Another important contribution of this thesis is the method proposed in Chapter 2
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to evaluate the persistence of the effects of cash transfers in the long-run, which is
relevant to other Latin American countries and more broadly to other developing
countries that have programs with similar characteristics to BDH, in particular,
programs that use Social Registry data and a poverty index to select beneficiaries.
The interventions studied in this thesis took place at different points in time in the
same country. Hence, each identification strategy was chosen carefully to prevent
the effects of a certain policy from contaminating the effects of another policy.
For instance, the labor reform that began in 2009 and increased the number of
doctor-hours in public hospitals may have had a positive effect on the health status
of BDH beneficiary children, which in turn, may have boosted their education
outcomes during the second phase of expansion of the BDH. However, given that
soon after its implementation in 2003, it became clear that BDHwas an unconditional
transfer, I expect that children in treatment and control households would benefit
from improved health attention in the same way. Hence, any difference in education
and labor market outcomes should reflect only the effects of BDH.
Furthermore, I do not expect that the labor reform that affected health professionals
at public health facilities would contaminate the effects of the malpractice reform on
the c-section rate, maternal mortality, and birth-weight. First, because an increase in
staffing levels would imply higher procedure use instead of the observed reduction
in the c-section rate. Second, given that mortality is inversely related to staffing
levels, the labor reform would reinforce a reduction on maternal mortality, yet the
results were not statistically significant probably because very few hospitals (18%
of the total) adopted the labor reform in 2014. Furthermore, there was enough time
between the two reforms so that any change in the outcomes due to the first reform
would be clearly distinguishable from the changes caused by the second reform,
precisely around the implementation dates. To dispel any remaining doubts, as a
robustness check, I estimated the models excluding hospitals that adopted the labor
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reform after 2013 and confirmed that the results were robust to the exclusion of
those hospitals (not shown).
5.0.1 Summary of the Findings
The findings in Chapter 2, suggest that BDH became inefficient in raising chil-
dren’s schooling after several years targeting the same children. Most of the gains
in enrollment and schooling were achieved in the short-run among children that
began treatment when they were about to start elementary school, high school or
Baccalaureate. However, an extended exposure to BDH was not enough to keep
raising children’s education.
The lack of differential effects on education and labor market outcomes among
children that were treated during the two phases versus those treated during just the
first phase is not explained by an attenuation of BDH effects for all the age groups
in phase two. In fact, the analysis of the short-term effects at the end of phase two
showed positive and important effects in years of education at juncture ages. This
contradicts the hypotheses that educational gratuity or lack of monitoring of the
conditions attenuated the effects of BDH during phase two among all age groups. A
more plausible reason for the lack of differential effects is that once children reach
the education level they have planned to achieve, or alternatively, once they reach
a certain age when the opportunity cost of schooling becomes sufficiently high, an
unconditional transfer does not provide enough incentive to keep them at school.
The only group that experienced positive differential effects in years of education
after being exposed during the two phases of the program were children aged 0
when BDH began in 2003. Children who began treatment at an older age did not
experience similar gains despite being treatedwith similar intensity possibly because
once cognitive gaps appear, the process cannot be reversed with CTs. It is likely that
older children were already lagging behind perhaps with low grades and attendance
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problems, which explains why BDH did not have positive effects on their education.
These results are in line with the notion that human capital investment exhibits
both self-productivity and complementarity and explains why late investments that
attempt to compensate for the lack of adequate early investments can be very costly
and ineffective (Cunha, Heckman, Lochner, et al., 2006; Carneiro et al., 2002;
Cunha, Heckman, and Schennach, 2010; Heckman, 2000).
Regarding labor market outcomes in the short-run, results were not conclusive about
whether the negative effect on the likelihood of having a job among treated 17-year-
olds at the end of phase two was caused by a concurrent raise in enrollment for this
age group. Moreover, being exposed to BDH for two phases versus just one did not
give treated children an advantage in the labor market by the end of phase two. The
reason could be that children exposed during the two phases of the program did not
achieve more years of education after all.
Chapter 3 contributes to the literature that looks at the effects of changes in staffing
levels on hospital quality and patient outcomes, by analyzing for the first time a
reform that progressively made all health professionals working part-time switch to
full-time contracts. The reform was successful in reducing in-hospital mortality,
especially within the first 48 hours of admission. This is important because the
literature on the distribution of time to death shows thatmost deaths in the emergency
department, occur within the first 24 to 48 hours (Fisher and Gardner, 2012; Herlitz
et al., 2010; Karoshi andKeith, 2009; Latense, 2009; Sircar et al., 2007; Demetriades
et al., 2004).
Since a second objective of the reform was to guarantee continuous attention in
emergencies and hospitalization, more emphasis was placed on increasing the avail-
ability of physicians in the emergency and surgery departments, which explains
that the biggest drop in mortality was observed in the sample of admissions to the
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emergency department and in the indicator of mortality within the first 48 hours of
admission.
Chapter 4, provides evidence that policies that increase the malpractice pressure
facing doctors can be effective in reducing the overprovision of elective procedures,
which would, in turn, reduce aggregate health care costs. Cost reduction is desirable
if a reduction in procedure use does not affect patient’s health meaning that doctors
reduce the use of invasive and expensive procedures in low-risk patients who do not
need them but not on high-risk patients that require them. The results show that this
was the case in Ecuador. Doctors reduced the c-section rate among women aged
15 to 34 years but not among women aged 35 to 44 years who are expected to have
riskier pregnancies.
Furthermore, the reduction in c-sections did not affect the health outcomes of
mothers or newborns, so it is possible to conclude that the difference between
the pre-reform and post-reform c-section levels correspond to socially wasteful
procedures. Consequently, the reform caused important savings to the government
and consumers and bigger savings would have been expected had we considered
more types of elective procedures.
Limitations
This thesis has some limitations. In Chapter 2, limitations are related to attrition in
the panel of individuals in the Registro Social. Even though most of the individuals
reported a valid ID in the second and third waves, the sample in the three-wave
panel was bounded by the number of individuals that reported a valid ID in the first
wave. If children that experienced higher gains in the outcomes of interest are the
ones that I am not able to follow in the panel, the results would underestimate the
true effects of the program.
I took several steps to correct for this. First, I constructed sample weights so that
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the panel’s totals on key characteristics1 match the totals of the corresponding wave
of the Registro Social. Second, to validate the results obtained with the data of
Registro Social, I used administrative data from the ENES exam for the years 2013
and 2014 to estimate the impact of different lengths of exposure to BDH on the
likelihood of taking the exam, which is a good proxy for high school graduation, and
found similar results to the ones obtained using the three-waves panel of Registro
Social.
In Chapter 3, the main limitation for the study of the effects of the labor reform
on in-hospital mortality has to do with the lack of information about the official
implementation schedule. As an alternative, I adopted a data-driven approach based
on the assumption that treatment started in the first year a reduction in the number of
part-time contracts above 35% was observed. This drop in part-time contracts had
to occur within the adoption period determined by the resolutions of the Ministry
of Labor for the different groups of public hospitals.
I plan to use the dates in the official implementation schedule as soon as I get
access to it, but I do not expect to see significant changes in the results of the
study, considering that I got access to the resolutions of the Ministry of Labor that
guided in a more general way the order of adoption in the different groups of public
hospitals. Every hospital had to obey the dates established in those resolutions, so
I can be confident that any big drop in the number of part-time contracts within
the adoption period set by the resolutions has to signal the implementation of the
reform. Moreover, since the time unit for the event studies in Chapter 3 is the year,
there is no need to have the exact adoption date for each hospital, just the year.
In Chapter 4, one limitation is that the Ecuadorian National Statistics Office began
collecting information on the type of birth (c-section or vaginal delivery) in 2011.
1These variables include gender, education level, highest grade completed, the number of years
of education, birth year, employment, province, county and type of house
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Because of this, the c-section rate for Ecuador has an artificially steep slope until
mid-2012 when more mothers started reporting that information. I had to restrict
the sample for the main analysis to births that occurred four quarters before the
third quarter of 2014 (reform date) and five quarters after that date. However,
as a robustness check, I expanded the period of analysis to include eight quarters
before the reform and five quarters later. The fact that I do not have a longer series
does not affect my identification strategy though, because there are enough quarters
before and after the reform to conduct the parallel trends analysis and to evaluate
the impacts of the malpractice reform.
Policy Implications and Recommendations
The results from Chapter 2 stress the need for a redesign of BDH. BDH became
an unconditional transfer in the first place partly due to the lack of individual-level
information that could be accessed in a centralized and simple way to monitor the
conditions. However, since 2007, there is a Master File of Educational Institutions
which collects data of students from public and private institutions at the beginning
and at the end of the school year. Additionally, since 2014, the Ministry of Health
collects information at the patient-level about medical visits at outpatient health
centers. With this information, in theory, it would be possible to effectively monitor
compliance with BDH’s conditions.
Given that age at treatment matters and considering that BDH was effective in
the short-run raising schooling among children that were close to begin elementary
school aswell as the end of basic education. To ensuremore children remain at school
long enough to approach the end of high school, the government should make the
transfer conditional on grade progression. By making BDH a conditional transfer,
every additional year in school is rewarded, not only the last years of basic education
and baccalaureate that have a higher return in the labor market. Furthermore, the
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size of the transfer should increase for older children to compensate for the wages
they could get in the labor market if they choose to work.
To help treated children enter the labor market, first BDH should become effective
in raising the years of education of children that remain in the program for long
periods of time. However, even this might not be enough considering my results
showing that BDH had important short-term effects in years of education and still
did not help young adults to enter the labor market. It may be that these young
adults lack the skills to find and keep a job. One way to remedy early skill deficits
is to make compensatory investments, which may be an expensive option. A more
efficient solution could be to offer guidance to motivate them to pursue tasks that
do not require the skills that deprived early environments do not produce. Finally,
the government could also create a program similar to the General Educational
Development (GED) program in the US that allows high school dropouts to get a
high school degree, whichwould improve their chances in their labormarket (Cunha,
Heckman, Lochner, et al., 2006).
The results from Chapter 3 show that a reform that increases the number of doctor-
hours at hospitals with the intention of guaranteeing continuous attention at the
emergency and surgical departments can be effective in reducing in-hospital mortal-
ity, in particular within the first 48 hours of admission. However, is responsibility of
the government to consider all the implications of a reform of this kind, for instance,
the existence of any negative spillover effects to the private sector, since it is likely
that doctors had to leave their secondary jobs in the private sector to meet the reg-
ulations in the public sector or simply because one sector becomes more profitable
than the other once part-time and on-call contracts are banned (Cheng et al., 2018).
Moreover, doctors working long hours can suffer from fatigue and this could also
affect their performance (Landrigan et al., 2004; Collewet and Sauermann, 2017;
Pencavel, 2014).
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Finally, the results in Chapter 4 show that countries with high health care costs could
implement malpractice reforms to tackle the overprovision of elective procedures.
Two sufficient conditions have been identified in the literature for the efficient pro-
vision of credence goods like health care services, namely liability and verifiability
(Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2017). In practice liability is easier to enforce than verifi-
ability from a policy perspective. It follows that malpractice and tort reforms have
been proposed and welcomed by patients in many countries. Another way of reduc-
ing the problem of over-provision and overcharging is to choose an appropriate price
structure (Kerschbamer and Sutter, 2017). However, in the public sector services
are subsidized, leaving marginal cost pricing as an instrument to ensure efficient
outcomes only in private markets. Hence, another alternative to regulate the public
provision of health services is to develop tailor-made malpractice legislation that
corrects the problems stemming from asymmetric information without encouraging
the practice of defensive medicine. This could involve tougher liability laws on
health providers and less stringent malpractice laws for doctors.
More generally, a persistent issue throughout the thesis has to do with data quality.
Good data are the first step towards increasing transparency and accountability.
In fact, some administrative data like civil registration and vital statistics are by
themselves a crucial tool to fight poverty and inequality and should receive special
attention. For example, there is evidence that argues that children who do not hold
a birth certificate are three percent less likely to be enrolled in school in Bolivia and
18 percent less likely to be enrolled in Brazil (Peters, 2016).
Currently, in Ecuador, vital statistics and death certificates are processed by the
Civil Registry, from birth and death forms that are distributed by the National
Statistics Office (INEC, 2018). This creates delays in the publication of micro-data
and explains why in a specific year the microdata that is published by the National
Statistics Office contains children that were born in other years but registered in the
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current year. By contrast, in Colombia, individuals have access to a web application
that allows them to register births and deaths in real time. Other countries in the
region have implemented similar systems. In Uruguay, for example, around 35
percent of death certificates are electronic (Peters, 2016).2
Regarding healthcare data, patient discharge data in Ecuador do not record informa-
tion about patients after they leave the hospital. Hence, it is not possible to construct
several risk-adjusted mortality rates and 30 days mortality indicators. These data do
not distinguish between urgent admissions and emergency admissions either. The
latter is information that hospitals have or could generate, but to the moment, the
National Statistics Office – the institution that processes the information of all hos-
pitals in the country – does not request this information from hospitals. Regarding
data on hospital re-admissions, it would be best that the National Statistics Office
generate these data by matching inpatient records over time using patients IDs, so
that is possible to identify re-admissions even if the patient is admitted to a different
hospital.
Finally, a common problem in Latin American countries is that no major efforts
have been made to homogenize the information recorded in household surveys,
vital statistics, hospital resources, and hospital activity data. Furthermore, very
little information is available to the public, which makes it difficult to carry out
investigations. Additionally, these countries should make greater efforts to generate
longitudinal databases, which allow following the observation units over time.
Future research
Related to Chapter 2, future research could use the panel that links the three waves
of social registry data and merge it with individual-level administrative data that the
Ministry of Public Health collects from children below age five who attend regular
2However, an important aspect to consider is the trade-off between the goal of full digitization
and the more important goal of complete coverage (Peters, 2016).
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health checkups. These data contain the date of birth of the children, anthropometric
measurements including weight, height and hemoglobin levels, as well as the ID of
the mother or the child when available. Since the government began collecting these
data in 2014, it is possible to estimate the short-term effects of BDH among children
that were exposed only during the second phase of the program. Furthermore, one
can use the original assignment to treatment in 2003 to study the long-term effects of
BDH, by comparing the health outcomes of children whowere close to the eligibility
threshold set in 2003 ten years later.
Using the information on other outcomes that are available in the social registry
panel, future research could look at the effects of a long exposure to BDH on the
labor supply of women and how it evolved across time, as well as the effects of
BDH on the marriage and divorce rates among beneficiary women. Other topics
to be explored include the effects of Credito de Desarrollo Humano, a program
that provides small nonrefundable loans to BDH recipients, on the likelihood of
becoming self-employed and on consumption of durable goods.
To study the long-term effects of BDH on the likelihood of starting a new business,
in theory, it is possible to match the three waves of social registry data to the datasets
collected by the Superintendence of Companies using the names of the individuals.
The latter contains information about the firms where individuals participate as
shareholders and financial statements of the firms. Many of these firms are small
and medium enterprises, and some of them were registered but do not generate
profits. Hence, it is possible to analyze the effect of BDH and Credito de Desarrollo
Humano in business creation and possibly in their growth.
Regarding Chapter 3, I have requested individual-level data that allows identify-
ing the health professionals who switched to full-time contracts as well as their
transitions to the public or private sector. These data would allow me to study
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the cost-effectiveness of the reform since I would be able to distinguish the health
professionals who switched to full-time contracts from the new full-time employees
hired in a year, which is not possible using hospital resources data alone, since the
latter report the total number of full-time contracts per hospital in a year. Further-
more, I would be able to observe the wage increase of doctors that were affected by
the reform.
These data would also allow me to study the spillover effects of the labor reform on
private hospitals’ performance. If it is true that specialists respond to changes in
earnings by reallocating working hours to the sector with relatively higher wages,
while leaving total working hours unchanged as recent evidence suggest (Cheng
et al., 2018), the reform should have an effect on mortality at private hospitals, even
though the direction of the effect is not completely clear because it ultimately depends
on the number and characteristics of the doctors that decide to leave or remain in
the private sector. Given that dual practice is widespread in many developed and
developing countries and considering that it can have important implications for
health care cost and quality (Cheng et al., 2018), this is a very relevant topic which
has received little attention in the literature (McPake et al., 2016).3
Finally, linked to the analysis in Chapter 4, future research could study whether
doctors facing increased malpractice pressure began to administer treatments with
no apparent medical benefits by fear of prosecution – a practice known as defensive
medicine – (Kessler and McClellan, 1996; Paik et al., 2017; Baldwin et al., 1995).
This would provide amore complete assessment of the effectiveness of liability rules
on aggregate health care costs reduction. I recently got access to administrative data
for Ecuador that contains information that allows me to explore doctors’ treatment
patterns over time since 2013. These data contain the ID of the doctor and patients as
3Dual practice is defined as a situation where a doctor combines clinical practice in the public
and private sector.
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well as the diagnosis and treatment that each patient receives every time she registers
a visit to an ambulatory health facility of the Ministry of Public Health. With these
data, it would be possible to construct estimates of doctor productivity based on
the number of patients treated in a year and identify changes in productivity and
prescription patterns around the reform date using a model that controls for doctor
and time fixed effects.
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A p p e n d i x A
PROBABILISTIC RECORD LINKAGE FOR SOCIAL
REGISTRIES
Abstract
With the increasing use and availability of ‘big’ data, linking data from multi-
ple sources is becoming more common in academic research. In the absence of
individual identifiers, probabilistic record linkage is an important tool to match in-
dividuals across data sets. Understanding probabilistic record linkage is essential
for conducting robust longitudinal studies and assessing any potential biases due to
differential linkage that comes from higher linkage rates across different subgroups
of the population. In this paper, I contrast the performance of probabilistic record
linkage versus phonetic encoding when generating a longitudinal data set that links
several waves of Social Registry data recorded in Spanish.1, In general, the results
favor the use of probabilistic record linkage with a bi-gram string comparator over
the alternative. Results improve considerably after the introduction of an algorithm
that allows tracking individuals that left or joined the household on the next waves.
Finally, I check for differential link rates and propose the use of sample-balancing
or raking to correct for it.
1This paper was conceived as an independent paper but at this stage, it has been included as
an appendix. Its objective is to document the procedure used to generate the database that I use in
Chapter 2.
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A.1 Introduction and literature review
With the increasing use and availability of ‘big’ data and administrative data linking
information frommultiple sources is becomingmore andmore common in academic
research. Record linkage is the process of bringing together information from mul-
tiple sources using a common identifier or several common variables as match keys.
It has other applications including building longitudinal profiles, de-duplication of
individual records within a single database of records and case re-identification in
capture-recapture studies (Sayers et al., 2015). I study record linkage in the con-
text of linking data from multiple sources. There are two types of record linkage
methods: (i) deterministic and (ii) probabilistic. In deterministic record linkage,
records are matched if all match keys agree or unmatched if at least one disagree. On
the other hand, probabilistic record linkage involves the estimation of a similarity
score and leaves the researcher to decide the minimum similarity score needed for
a matched pair to be considered a valid match (Sayers et al., 2015). With a unique
numeric identifier, deterministic record linkage becomes a trivial task but, when the
identifier is a string variable like names, the task becomes a bit more cumbersome
and probabilistic record linkage is recommended.
The literature on probabilistic record linkage goes back to Fellegi and Sunter (1969)
who developed the formal theory of probabilistic record linkage. Christen (2012)
provides a more updated review of the methods related to record linkage for string
variables. The two main approaches for string matching are phonetic encoding
and pattern matching. Many techniques have been developed for both approaches
and several techniques combine the two with the aim to improve the matching
quality. Phonetic encoding techniques convert a name string into a code according
to how a name is pronounced. Unfortunately, this process is language dependent
and most techniques have been designed to work with anglicized names. The
most commonly used phonetic encoding algorithms are Soundex, Phonex, Phonix,
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Double-Metaphone and Fuzzy Soundex. On the other hand, pattern matching
techniques are used in approximate string matching with several applications from
data linkage and duplicate deletion, information retrieval, correction of spelling
errors to bio- and health informatics. The most used algorithms for pattern matching
are Levenshtein or Edit distance, Damerau-Levenshtein distance, Bag distance,
Smith-Watherman distance, Longest common sub-string, Q-grams, Positional q-
grams, Skip-grams, Jaro and Jaro-Winkler algorithm (Christen, 2006).
Several measures have been proposed in the literature to assess the quality of alterna-
tive record linkage techniques and in general to evaluate the results of a data linkage
process. Sensitivity is often referred to as the ‘matching rate’ and is defined as the
proportion of true positives over the sum of the true positives and false negatives.
Specificity is also known as the ‘true negative rate’ and is computed as the ratio
of true negatives over the sum of true negatives and false positives. Finally, the
positive predictive value is known as the ‘precision rate’ and is defined as the ratio
of true positives divided by the sum of true positives and false positives (Harron,
Goldstein, et al., 2015).
In this paper, I contrast the results obtained when using pattern matching and pho-
netic encoding independently and together to improve the quality of the data linkage
of social registries recorded in Spanish. Social Registries are information systems
that support registration and determination of potential eligibility for social pro-
grams (Leite et al., 2017). I use Ecuadorian administrative data from Registro
Social (RS). The data in the RS is used to compute a poverty index called Selben
which uses a principal components analysis that assigns numerical values to cate-
gorical variables. The Selben index is a proxy means test that takes values from
0 to 100 and is used for the allocation of most of the social programs in Ecuador,
including cash transfers like Bono de Desarrollo Humano (BDH). To quantify the
differences in terms of sensitivity and positive predictive value achieved with each
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technique, I first use a training subsample of the data that includes individuals who
reported a valid ID in two consecutive waves of RS. The linkage is performed using
blocking by household ID, which means that the program will look at matches only
among the members of the same household in the following waves (Sadinle and
Fienberg, 2013).
In general, the results favor the use of probabilistic record linkage with a bi-gram
string comparator over the alternative which involves the use of phonetic encoding
to perform the merge. The former mechanism produces a higher rate of successful
linkages, but also a higher rate of false positive matches, with best results achieved
after a thorough clerical review of the linked pairs. However, using phonetic encod-
ing while conditioning the merge on the household identifier does not produce very
substandard results either and the time needed to complete the merge is much lower
compared to probabilistic record linkage using a bi-gram string comparator. Yet, the
latter is preferred because it produces comparatively more successful matches which
in turns reduces the sample bias that could arise by ignoring those extra matches
even when it involves a more lengthy process. With longitudinal administrative
data, one should always account for changes in household composition through time
to successfully track the highest number of individuals. I propose an algorithm
that allows me to track individuals that moved to other households or that joined
the original households on the next wave. I show that the results of the preferred
technique (probabilistic record linkage with a bi-gram string comparator) improves
considerably after the introduction of the algorithm.
The contributions of this paper are twofold. First, is one of the few papers that
document the best practices for conducting record linkage using longitudinal ad-
ministrative data recorded in Spanish. Second, this study addresses the issues related
to changes in household composition through time and is one of the few papers to
introduce an application that lies outside the medical field using administrative data
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on social benefits. The rest of the paper is as follows. Section A.2 describes the
data contained in the RS, Section A.3 presents an example that contrasts the perfor-
mance of probabilistic record linkage versus a merge using phonetic encoding on
a training subsample of the RS. Section A.4 builds upon the results of section A.3
and explains the process to build a panel that links the three waves of RS using the
preferred method, ie. probabilistic record linkage. Section A.5 presents some de-
scriptive statistics of the resulting 3-waves panel. Section A.6 checks for differential
link rates and propose a technique called sample-balancing or raking to correct for
it. Section A.7 concludes.
A.2 Data
The RS is considered as a census of the poor because by 2008 the total number
of households in Ecuador was estimated in 3 392 851 and the second wave of the
RS covers 2 393 377 of those households. Besides, the RS was conducted in 215
cantons of the 223 registered in the census of 2010(Ponce and Falconí, 2011). It
contains relevant information of BDH recipients and potential recipients, namely,
individual socio-economic information at the family and individual level, the ID
number of the members (when available) and the Selben score assigned to each
household.
To themoment, there are threewaves, the first wave covers 6,303,352 individuals and
was collected between 2001-2007, however, most of the information was collected
before 2003 2. The second wave covers 8,068,957 individuals and was collected
during 2007-2013 with most of the surveys completed in 2008. While the third wave
was mostly collected in 2014 but data collection started in 2013 covering a total of
6,930,701 individuals. The reason why the last wave contains around 1,1 million
2Ecuador’s population was 12,628,596 inhabitants by the year 2000, 14,447,600 in-
habitants by 2008 and 15,661,312 inhabitants by 2013 according to the World Bank data
(http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SP.POP.TOTL&country=ECU)
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fewer observations is that during the data collection period the last 287 counties
were excluded from the process.
A.3 Comparison of alternative techniques
There are severalways to quantify the rate of linkage errors including: (i) comparison
with a gold-standard sub-sample; (ii) sensitivity analysis; (iii) comparison of linked
and unlinked data; and (iv) identification of implausible matches (Harron, Wade,
et al., 2014). In this section, I use a training subsample of the data that includes
individuals who reported a valid ID in two consecutive waves of RS (waves 2 and 3).
With big administrative data sets like the RS, even this simplified example would
result in 3,885,056 x 3,885,056 potential links. Blocking or stratification is used to
split the database into smaller blocks or strata to restrict the number of comparisons
to a subspace. All the matching keys have been previously preprocessed and I use
blocking at the household level in all the cases, to improve the likelihood of success.
Table A.1 shows the performance of the two alternative record linkage techniques
under consideration in terms of sensitivity and positive predictive value. It also
shows the linkage rates achieved when the tracking algorithm is put in place. In gen-
eral, using probabilistic record linkage renders the highest number of true matches,
however, the results from the simple merge using phonetic encoding (Soundex) are
not very different, particularly considering that the command was written to perform
at its best in English. The biggest improvement in terms of sensitivity and positive
predictive value happens with the introduction of an algorithm that allows tracking
individuals that joined the household or moved to other households on the third
wave. The sensitivity of the linkage in all the cases increases by nearly 9% when the
algorithm is used, besides the positive predictive value improves slightly as well.
These results confirm that using probabilistic record linkage with a bi-gram string
comparator together with the tracking algorithm is the best strategy to achieve the
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Table A.1: Performance for the alternative record linkage techniques
Prob. rec. link. Simple merge A + tracking B + tracking
+ bi-gram + phonet. enc. algorithm algorithm
(A) (B) (C) (D)
True positives 3,500,654 3,473,139 3,848,617 3,835,092
False negatives 384,402 411,917 36,439 49,964
False positives 8,452 2 7,258 3
Sensitivity 0.901 0.894 0.991 0.987
Specificity - - - -
Pos. Pred. Val. 0.997 0.999 0.998 0.999
N 3,885,056 3,885,056 3,885,056 3,885,056
Notes: The table shows the sensitivity and positive predictive values for the alternative
record linkage techniques. The sample is 3,885,056 individuals with valid IDs that were
used to merge the second and third waves of RS. There are no results for specificity because
the sample contains only true positives.
highest match rates. Building on these results, the next section documents the steps
to link the three waves of RS and explains in more detail the tracking algorithm
that allows me to track individuals that moved to other households or that joined the
original households on the next wave.
A.4 Probabilistic record linkage
Building on the results of the previous section, this section documents the process
to build a balanced panel that links the three available waves of the RS. The process
uses probabilistic record linkage and takes into account the changes in household
composition as times goes by to successfully track the highest number of individuals.
The data linkage process involves three key steps: 1) preprocessing, 2) probabilistic
record linkage, and 3) clerical review of machine-generated matched pairs.
A.4.1 Preprocessing
Data preprocessing consists of two steps: 1) parsing a field into the relevant subcom-
ponents and 2) standardizing common character strings. Regarding the first step; in
Ecuador and many Latin American countries, people report two names and two last
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names, so, I split the names into four new variables. The second step is particularly
important when dealing with data recorded in Spanish, because of the common use
accents and special characters that are not present in other languages. These should
be replaced or dropped altogether to simplify the matching process that will use
commands that are meant for data recorded in English. Cleaning the names and last
names also involve removing all the common expressions that appear instead of the
names.
A.4.2 Probabilistic record linkage
For the record linkage step, I selected the 2 names and 2 last names asmatch keys and
used a common household ID as the blocking variable. This common household
ID needs a bit more discussion because the correct construction of this variable
determines the possibility to follow individuals who joined or left the original
households in the next wave. To build it, I merged the first and second wave of the
RS by individual ID and created a new variable by concatenating the household ID
that was assigned to the individual in each of the two waves. I assigned this new
household ID (hhold) to all the family members of the person with id. In that way, I
just had to use names and last names to track the individuals inside those households
(blocking). However, since individuals move to or from other households as times
goes by, there were many household identifiers (hhold) at the family level in both
waves, and I had to expand each wave creating duplicates and assigning to each one
a different common household ID so that the record linkage command would look
for the individuals in all their possible former households.
This can be explained with an example. Imagine that in wave 2 there is a household
with two adults and both share the second part of the common household ID (hhold)
but not the first part because they belonged to different households in wave 1. To
track the rest of their family members (that did not report id) in wave 1, I had to check
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in the two former households. This is a simple example of a couple that gets married
and possibly had children of their own before the marriage, but in the data there are
cases where up to seven members of a household moved to other households and
to track the dependent members, who did not have id, it was necessary to try all
possible combinations of individuals and households.
I used the Stata command <reclink2> to perform the probabilistic record linkage
and used the 2 names and 2 last names as matching keys. <reclink2> uses a bi-gram
score which is computed from the ratio of the number of common two consecutive
letters in the two strings and their average length minus one. The bigram score
used in reclink (Blasnik, 2010) is a modified version where a pair of strings with
up to four common prefix letters also gets extra credit (Wasi and Flaaen, 2015). An
important difference between reclink and <reclink2> is that the latter allows for
many to one matching, so I selected the ones with the higher match score.
To be sure of the results of the linking, I further compared the prefixes and suffixes of
the matched names and last names as well as the sound of the prefixes. An additional
restriction requiring that the difference between the age reported in wave1 andwave2
was not higher than 2 years was also included. The same procedure was used to
match individuals in waves2 and 3. To get the complete panel, I performed a simple
merge between the two linked datasets (waves 1-2 andwaves 2-3) using an individual
ID that I created since the beginning of the process for people in the second wave.
Finally, to link individuals that were ignored in the process because nobody in their
household had an id, I did a simple merge using the names, last names, gender, and
birth year.
A.4.3 Clerical review and differential link rates
To assess the quality of the linking, I divided the linked pairs into smaller groups
according to the similarity scores obtained from the probabilistic record linkage
209
Table A.2: Results of the clerical review process for the linkage of waves 1 and 2 of
RS
Score Not a match Maybe Very likely Definitely a match N
(A) (B) (C) (D)
0.60-0.699 32 5 - 463 500
0.70-0.799 10 8 1 481 500
0.80-0.899 8 - 2 490 500
0.90-0.999 - - - 1250 1250
1 - - - 500 500
Total 50 13 3 3184 3250
Notes: The table shows the results of the clerical review process for the matched pairs
obtained after probabilistic record linkage of waves 1 and 2 of RS. The process excludes the
matched pairs that were obtained from deterministic record linkage using individual IDs.
Table A.3: Results of the clerical review process for the linkage of waves 2 and 3 of
RS
Score Not a match Maybe Very likely Definitely a match N
(A) (B) (C) (D)
0.60-0.699 7 4 2 302 315
0.70-0.799 - - 1 314 315
0.80-0.899 - - - 315 315
0.90-0.999 - - - 800 800
1 - - - 500 500
Total 7 4 3 2231 2245
Notes: The table shows the results of the clerical review process for the matched pairs
obtained after probabilistic record linkage of waves 2 and 3 of RS. The process excludes the
matched pairs that were obtained from deterministic record linkage using individual IDs.
step. I used the acceptance sampling approach and followed the ANSI AQL tables
to choose the samples size and acceptance levels required to accept a group of
randomly selected matched links or reject it. The linked pairs were manually
checked using the Stata command <clrevmatch> (Wasi and Flaaen, 2015). Table
A.2 shows the results of the match of waves 1 and 2. The results for the sensitivity
measure surpasses 96% for all the groups, except for the first group which is the one
that contains the matches with the lowest similarity score. However, even for this
210
group sensitivity is around 92.6%. The linking is better between the second and
third wave as shown in Table A.3 because starting with the second wave the MCDS
put more emphasis on the collection and validation of peoples’ birth dates and also
more people reported IDs.
A.5 Results
I was able to build a balanced panel of 2 961 079 individuals across the three waves
of RS. Tables A.4, A.5 and A.6 analyze the results in more detail. In the first wave
of the RS, from a total of 6.3 million individuals 4,2 million (67%) belong to a
household where at least one member has an ID number and due to that can be
tracked into the second wave of the RS. Among those 4,2 million individuals 2 961
079 individuals have a valid match on the second and third wave of the RS, which
correspond to 67% of the individuals who are likely to be matched and 47% of the
total.
In terms of households, the link rate is higher and if we analyze the ratio between
the number of households actually matched to the number of households that could
potentially bematched it exceeds 100%. This is because some individuals leave their
original households to form new ones and consequently the number of households
that can be tracked through time increases if the individual who moves has an id.
In general, the link rates for individuals with ID in the three-waves panel exceed
67% in all the cases. However, there are at least other 1.26 million individuals that
can be tracked through waves 1 and 2 but not through waves 1, 2 and 3; and other
1,48 million individuals that can be tracked only through waves 2 and 3. The reason
is that in the first wave there are much fewer people reporting a valid ID so even
when there are more matches between waves 2 and 3 (4,5 million individuals), the
length of the panel is limited by the number of valid matches between waves 1 and
2.
211
Table A.4: Results for the first wave of the panel
Total
Likely
linked %
Actually
linked %
Actual/Likely
%
Households 1,583,617 1,022,164 65 1,068,188 67 105
Individuals 6,302,861 4,221,610 67 2,961,079 47 70
Table A.5: Results for the second wave of the panel
Total
Likely
linked %
Actually
linked %
Actual/Likely
%
Households 1,910,165 967,454 51 1,036,012 54 107
Individuals 8,068,957 4,447,300 55 2,961,079 37 67
Table A.6: Results for the third wave of the panel
Total
Likely
linked %
Actually
linked %
Actual/Likely
%
Households 1,758,401 984,356 56 1,179,668 67 120
Individuals 6,930,712 4,181,534 60 2,961,079 43 71
A.5.1 Some descriptive statistics
Before moving forward to the construction of weights, I present some descriptive
statistics and compare the sample means in each wave of the panel with the popula-
tion means in the Ecuadorian Census collected in 2010. This helps to make sense
of the groups of the population that are more likely to be under-represented in the
panel. It is important to remember that the first wave of the RS was collected be-
tween 2000 and 2007, which means that it covers most of the Ecuadorian population
but its information is not directly comparable with that of other surveys which are
collected on a yearly basis like for example the Ecuadorian Labor Force Survey,
ENEMDU. Let me illustrate this with an example. A person who was born in 1989
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is surveyed in the RS of 2003, she is 14 years and has achieved 9 years of schooling.
This person is directly comparable to an individual surveyed in ENEMDU of 2003
who was born in 1989 and reports 9 years of schooling. However, this is not the case
for an individual who was born in 1989 but was surveyed also in the first wave of
the RS but in 2007. By 2007 this person may have cumulated 13 years of schooling
or less if she had repeated a year or more.
Figures A.1 to A.3 show histograms describing the distribution of the population by
year of birth for each wave of the RS versus the ones obtained using the 2010 census.
For the sake of comparison, I focus on individuals born between 1900 and 2007, the
latter is the last year of data collection of the first wave of the RS and also the year
in which the youngest person in the panel could have been born. The RS covers a
good share of the population in the census, this is why sometimes the RS is called a
census of the poor. The left skewed curves are in line with the actual demographic
pyramid in Ecuador. The panel covers an important share of the population of each
wave, however, people born between 1985 and 1992 seem to be underrepresented
in the three cases. These are children ages 11 to 18 years in 2003 and 21 to 28 years
in 2013.
As I mentioned in more detail earlier, among the reasons why the panel is not
able to cover a higher proportion of the people in wave 1 is the lack of IDs in
some households who had to be left out of the probabilistic record linkage process.
Besides, during the data collection of wave 3, at least 287 counties were excluded
from the process. In the case of Ecuador, the conditions linked to the BDH could not
be monitored due to lack of administrative capacity so most of the people who leave
the program leave due to other reasons like migration, death or because they did
not update their data. More importantly, there were two changes to the eligibility
criteria, the first happened in 2009 when the second phase of the BDH program
started and a new Selben score was computed. People with a Selben score higher
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Figure A.1: Histogram of the distribution of the population by birth cohort in the
census 2010, RS (first wave) and panel
than the new minimum score left the program and consequently left the RS. The
second change was in 2013 when the government decided to reduce the pool of
beneficiaries by moving the cutoff for selection; once again, these people left the
RS. People that drop out for the latter reason can be identified in the administrative
payment records of the BDH, while attrition due to migration can be accounted for
by analyzing the variables in the RS related to the number of individuals who have
migrated in the family or remittances.
There are around 1,9 million individuals who were in the first wave but left the RS
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Figure A.2: Histogram of the distribution of the population by birth cohort in the
census 2010, RS (second wave) and panel
after that. In general, these people tend to be richer as indicated by a higher Selben
score when compared to the average score observed in the first wave. Also, it is
more likely that men leave the RS. These results may be explained by the increasing
efforts to refine targeting and coverage by the MCDS after the collection of the first
wave, that led to dropping from the database an important number of individuals
who were not poor enough.3 The same happens with the people who were on the
second wave of the RS but left the RS afterward. There are 2.6 million individuals
3The government performed several checks looking for people that appeared in the databases of
the Social Security Institute or worked in the public sector, among others.
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Figure A.3: Histogram of the distribution of the population by birth cohort in the
census 2010, RS (third wave) and panel
that appear on the second wave of the RS but could not be observed on the third
wave. These people are on average richer than the individuals who remain in the
social registry data.
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Table A.7: Number of individuals by age and gender in the first wave of the RS and
the corresponding panel wave
Year
Panel
Male
Panel
Female Total (A)
RS
Male
RS
Female Total (B)
A/B
%
1985 14628 23308 37936 65260 66675 131935 28.75
1986 15553 20728 36281 67802 66640 134442 26.99
1987 17910 20260 38170 70828 69469 140297 27.21
1988 20935 20722 41657 76315 73044 149359 27.89
1989 23579 22204 45783 79380 75987 155367 29.47
1990 26399 24480 50879 83736 79484 163220 31.17
1991 30019 27232 57251 83747 80090 163837 34.94
1992 33516 30450 63966 88036 84808 172844 37.01
1993 37498 34625 72123 89203 87496 176699 40.82
1994 40431 37223 77654 92431 89439 181870 42.7
1995 44339 40362 84701 92717 89797 182514 46.41
1996 50004 44875 94879 94212 90997 185209 51.23
1997 54982 49678 104660 105235 101684 206919 50.58
1998 51642 47657 99299 89668 86169 175837 56.47
1999 60312 56548 116860 103304 98731 202035 57.84
2000 59501 56423 115924 100393 96099 196492 59
2001 54030 51622 105652 93712 89701 183413 57.6
2002 28776 27674 56450 50996 48972 99968 56.47
2003 15625 15129 30754 27270 26183 53453 57.53
The panel covers over 40% of the children who were born between 1993 and 2003
in the first wave of the RS. The percentage is a bit lower for those born between
1985 and 1992. Almost the same happens with the second and third waves and this
makes sense since by construction the panel follows the same people who entered
the first wave in first place. Tables A.7 to A.9 show that the number of children born
in 1985 is the same for all the waves (37 936) and the same happens with children
born in the other years. However, the percentages with respect to the totals change
because there are differences in the age distribution and the total number of people
surveyed in each wave. For instance, the second wave is the one that surveyed the
most people among the three, almost 1,7 million more than the first wave and 1
million more than the third wave.
Figures A.4, A.5 and A.6 show the kernel density curves for the SELBEN score
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Table A.8: Number of individuals by age and gender in the second wave of the RS
and the corresponding panel wave
Year
Panel
Male
Panel
Female Total (A)
RS
Male
RS
Female Total (B)
A/B
%
1985 14550 23386 37936 58054 68856 126910 29.89
1986 15498 20783 36281 59288 67529 126817 28.61
1987 17905 20265 38170 60801 68521 129322 29.52
1988 20908 20749 41657 66635 72325 138960 29.98
1989 23528 22255 45783 68062 72887 140949 32.48
1990 26345 24534 50879 74493 75693 150186 33.88
1991 29950 27301 57251 82697 81725 164422 34.82
1992 33429 30537 63966 89164 86595 175759 36.39
1993 37458 34665 72123 94265 91579 185844 38.81
1994 40398 37256 77654 97403 93938 191341 40.58
1995 44231 40470 84701 99906 97089 196995 43
1996 49812 45067 94879 103120 99800 202920 46.76
1997 54797 49863 104660 105618 101938 207556 50.42
1998 51348 47951 99299 100748 97525 198273 50.08
1999 60175 56685 116860 114780 110857 225637 51.79
2000 59084 56840 115924 117213 113293 230506 50.29
2001 53504 52148 105652 113797 110907 224704 47.02
2002 28552 27898 56450 109407 106591 215998 26.13
2003 15428 15326 30754 110169 107205 217374 14.15
for each wave of the RS and the corresponding panel wave. In general, the curves
follow a normal distribution and almost overlap, especially for the first and third
wave. Is important to bear in mind that 30 variables were involved in the estimation
of the Selben index, among them, characteristics of the household head, features of
the house, access to services, assets, etc. This is the reason why it is considered a
good measure to characterize households. The fact that the distributions of both the
complete sample and the panel sample are very similar says that there is little sample
selection and that on average the missing children belong to all the socio-economic
backgrounds. Only in the second wave is quite clear that the panel contains slightly
poorer households.
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Table A.9: Number of individuals by age and gender in the third wave of the RS
and the corresponding panel wave
Year
Panel
Male
Panel
Female Total (A)
RS
Male
RS
Female Total (B)
A/B
%
1985 14534 23402 37936 44908 53929 98837 38.38
1986 15521 20760 36281 43984 52455 96439 37.62
1987 17931 20239 38170 45291 53144 98435 38.78
1988 20941 20716 41657 46946 54506 101452 41.06
1989 23540 22243 45783 47776 54025 101801 44.97
1990 26388 24491 50879 48652 53715 102367 49.7
1991 29983 27268 57251 50871 55088 105959 54.03
1992 33498 30468 63966 53904 56219 110123 58.09
1993 37517 34606 72123 58374 59304 117678 61.29
1994 40400 37254 77654 61592 60924 122516 63.38
1995 44313 40388 84701 65810 63893 129703 65.3
1996 49922 44957 94879 74033 69221 143254 66.23
1997 54878 49782 104660 78227 73116 151343 69.15
1998 51495 47804 99299 76113 71461 147574 67.29
1999 60269 56591 116860 88944 84489 173433 67.38
2000 59225 56699 115924 90572 86493 177065 65.47
2001 53655 51997 105652 88933 86150 175083 60.34
2002 28579 27871 56450 89746 86237 175983 32.08
2003 15493 15261 30754 84099 81955 166054 18.52
Figure A.4: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in the first wave of RS and
and the corresponding panel wave
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Figure A.5: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in the second wave of RS
and and the corresponding panel wave
Figure A.6: Kernel density graphs of the Selben score in the third wave of RS and
and the corresponding panel wave
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Table A.10: Number of years of education in the first wave of the RS and panel
sample
Year Panel RS Difference t-test
1985 7.06 7.50 -0.44 0.00
1986 6.92 7.20 -0.28 0.00
1987 6.61 6.80 -0.19 0.00
1988 6.14 6.32 -0.18 0.00
1989 5.56 5.74 -0.18 0.00
1990 4.86 5.02 -0.16 0.00
1991 4.04 4.24 -0.20 0.00
1992 3.24 3.42 -0.18 0.00
1993 2.45 2.63 -0.18 0.00
1994 1.73 1.89 -0.16 0.00
1995 1.20 1.30 -0.11 0.00
1996 0.85 0.92 -0.07 0.00
1997 0.40 0.47 -0.06 0.00
1998 0.14 0.16 -0.02 0.00
1999 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.00
2000 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
2001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40
Source: BDH Social Registry data.
Continuingwith the descriptive statistics, TablesA.10 toA.12 show the average years
of schooling by birth cohorts in each wave of the RS and its corresponding panel
subsample. The differences are always below or equal to 0.45 years for children born
between 1985 and 2003. The differences are in few cases not statistically significant
and tend to be mostly negative for the first and second wave which indicates that on
those waves the panel samples fail to identify and track some of the individuals with
more years of schooling. In the third wave, the opposite is true meaning that people
in the complete wave are on average less educated. This may be explained by the
fact that in 2013, the government decided to graduate from the program to some of
the beneficiaries with higher Selben scores.
All in all, the panel covers an important share of the population in each wave,
221
Table A.11: Number of years of education in the second wave of the RS and panel
sample
Year Panel RS Difference t-test
1985 8.30 8.74 -0.44 0.00
1986 8.62 8.95 -0.33 0.00
1987 8.90 9.05 -0.14 0.00
1988 9.03 9.13 -0.10 0.00
1989 9.15 9.19 -0.04 0.03
1990 9.07 9.10 -0.02 0.12
1991 8.80 8.86 -0.06 0.00
1992 8.48 8.53 -0.05 0.00
1993 8.13 8.19 -0.06 0.00
1994 7.65 7.69 -0.04 0.00
1995 7.03 7.07 -0.04 0.00
1996 6.38 6.41 -0.03 0.00
1997 5.59 5.64 -0.05 0.00
1998 4.70 4.76 -0.07 0.00
1999 3.78 3.86 -0.08 0.00
2000 2.90 2.99 -0.08 0.00
2001 2.05 2.12 -0.07 0.00
2002 1.23 1.25 -0.02 0.00
2003 0.42 0.45 -0.02 0.00
Source: BDH Social Registry data.
however, people born between 1983 and 1995 are under-represented. These are
children ages 8 to 20 years in 2003 and 19 to 31 years in 2013. Someone interested
in the evaluation of the short-term effects of BDHon schooling using the information
in the first and second waves of the panel would look at the effects on children ages
0 to 18 in 2003 who were born between 1985 and 2003. This group of interest
overlaps with the children with lower link rates in the three-wave panel (born 1983
and 1995), for this reason, is very important to reweigh the observations. However,
someone interested in the long-term effects of BDHwould look at children that were
exposed during the two phases of the program, namely, children between 0 and 18
years in 2008 who were also treated during the first phase. The group of interest
would then be children ages 10 to 23 in the third wave who were born between
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Table A.12: Number of years of education in the third wave of the RS and panel
sample
Year Panel RS Difference t-test
1985 8.78 8.79 -0.01 0.62
1986 9.22 9.06 0.16 0.00
1987 9.61 9.26 0.35 0.00
1988 9.89 9.48 0.41 0.00
1989 10.17 9.72 0.45 0.00
1990 10.30 9.88 0.41 0.00
1991 10.29 9.99 0.31 0.00
1992 10.30 10.09 0.21 0.00
1993 10.24 10.09 0.15 0.00
1994 10.20 10.08 0.12 0.00
1995 10.01 9.91 0.10 0.00
1996 9.66 9.57 0.09 0.00
1997 9.20 9.12 0.08 0.00
1998 8.82 8.75 0.07 0.00
1999 8.30 8.22 0.08 0.00
2000 7.58 7.50 0.08 0.00
2001 6.81 6.72 0.09 0.00
2002 6.01 5.85 0.16 0.00
2003 5.07 4.94 0.13 0.00
Source: BDH Social Registry data.
1991 and 2004, which includes less under-represented children. Consequently, the
long-term analysis would not be as much affected as the short term analysis by the
low link rates for children born between 1983 and 1995. Yet, the use of raking
weights would solve the problem for the age groups that are under-represented in
the panel.
There are significant differences between the panel distribution and the RS distri-
bution. This translates into statistically significant differences in terms of average
years of schooling by birth cohort and is expected to happen as well with other
variables that have not been presented here. In the following section, I explain
the process to construct weights for the panel. The intention is to compensate for
unequal probabilities of selection, non-coverage of some groups of the population,
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and non-response that lead to the observed departures between the panel and the
RS.
A.6 Differential link rates and sample-balancing
As an additional check for differential link rates, I estimate a regression where the
dependent variable is the binary variable that reflects the link status. A priori I
know that is likely that people who turn 18 or people who are old enough to leave
the household may be more difficult to find on subsequent waves of the RS despite
my efforts to follow them. Also, some young children do not have IDs and there are
some problems with the reported date of birth. However, after the clerical review
of the results I can be quite confident that even though not all children report an ID,
they are correctly matched based on names, last names, gender, and birth year.
Table A.13 shows that men have a lower linking probability than women and this
effect is stronger when we focus on the linkage of the second and third wave, which
suggests that more women started to be surveyed over time. Younger people with
primary and secondary education are more likely to be correctly matched compared
to people with higher levels of education, mostly because the latter are not the main
target of the survey and are more likely to be dropped out of the RS. One of the main
predictors of linkage is having an ID. The coefficient of this variable in the linkage
of the first and second wave almost doubles the size of the coefficient in the linkage
of the second and third waves. The reason may be that since more people report an
ID in the second and third waves, having an ID is no longer a determinant factor of
a good match, while in the match of the first and second waves, the lack of ID on
the first wave makes that most of the good matches are due to ID linkage.
These results suggest that despite the high rate of successfully matched cases, being
successfully linked is not random, new weights taking into account the linking bias
need to be constructed to get a representative sample of the Ecuadorian population.
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Table A.13: Probit regression to explain the link status between the first and second
wave and between the second and third wave
(1)
Link wave 1 - wave 2
Gender -0.0343∗∗∗
(-29.53)
Birth year 0.0158∗∗∗
(410.15)
Score -0.00789∗∗∗
(-128.88)
Has ID 1.175∗∗∗
(686.22)
Constant -30.60∗∗∗
(-395.48)
N 6302758
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
(2)
Link wave 2 - wave 3
Gender -0.0670∗∗∗
(-70.86)
Birth year 0.000290∗∗∗
(10.33)
Score -0.0221∗∗∗
(-648.42)
Has ID 0.357∗∗∗
(309.55)
Constant 0.408∗∗∗
(7.24)
N 8027317
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: The first wave of RS has 6,3 million individuals, among them, 4,6 million or 72.44%
could be followed in the wave 2. The second wave of RS has 8 million individuals, among
them, 5,4 million or 67.37 % could be followed in wave 3.
A.6.1 Construction of weights
To make the sample distribution conform to a known population distribution it is
necessary to adjust the sampling weights so that the marginal totals of the adjusted
weights on key characteristics match the corresponding population totals. This
process is known as raking or sample-balancing, and the key characteristics are
known as auxiliary variables. Typical auxiliary variables include gender, age, years
of schooling and geographic variables like province or county.
In sample-balancing is important to use as many auxiliary variables as possible.
The reason is that if you make the response representative with respect to as many
auxiliary variables as possible, it is likely that the response also becomes repre-
sentative with respect to the other survey variables. I included gender, education
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Figure A.7: Kernel density graphs of the distribution of birth year in the first wave
of RS versus the first wave of the panel
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level, highest year of education approved, number of years of education, birth year,
employment, province, county and type of house.
I construct sample weights so that the panel’s totals on key characteristics match the
totals of the corresponding wave of the Registro Social.4 I use the Stata command
<survwgt rake> (Winter, 2002). It creates sets of weights for replication-based
variance estimation techniques for survey data including balanced repeated repli-
cation and several versions of the survey jackknife. These replication methods
are alternates to the Taylor series linearization methods used by Stata’s svy-based
commands.
4These key characteristics include gender, education level, highest grade completed, the number
of years of education, birth year, employment, province, county and type of house
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Figure A.8: Kernel density graphs of the distribution of birth year in the second
wave of RS versus the second wave of the panel
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Figures A.7, A.8 and A.9 show that after correcting the sampling weights in the
panel data, I obtain overlapping density curves for the date of birth and almost exact
histograms for the variable years of education as shown in Figures A.10, A.11 and
A.12.
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Figure A.9: Kernel density graphs of the distribution of birth year in the third wave
of RS versus the third wave of the panel
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Figure A.10: Kernel density graphs of years of education in the first wave of RS
versus the first wave of the panel
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Figure A.11: Kernel density graphs of years of education in the second wave of RS
versus the second wave of the panel
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Figure A.12: Kernel density graphs of years of education in the third wave of RS
versus the third wave of the panel
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A.7 Conclusions
Latin American countries lag behind developed countries in terms of the availability
of longitudinal data sets and longitudinal studies – where a defined population is
interviewed over an extended period of time –. Considering that longitudinal data
collection and analysis are critical to social research, policy, and practice, as well as
a vital input for policy and program evaluation, governments must take actions to
revert this reality. These actions should start by redoubling efforts in the collection of
individual identifiers first through the improvement of the civil registration systems
and secondly by implementing data collection protocols that contemplate revisiting
people who do not report a valid ID until they do.
The reasons behind the lack of longitudinal studies and longitudinal datasets in the
region are not only linked to the lack of funding or deficiencies of the Civil Registra-
tion Systems and data collection processes. Several technical and operational issues,
as well as legal and ethical considerations, may hinder the use of datasets held by
multiple organizations and constrain the extent to which data can be linked in prac-
tice. These problems must be solved through the establishment of inter-institutional
agreements that settle the guidelines for the institutions to share information and
generate new sources of information that are maintained over time.
There is also a lack of research about methods to link big administrative data sets, in
particular, because the existing methods and software apply mostly to information
recorded in English. This paper contributes to fill this gap in the literature and
contrasts the performance of pattern matching and phonetic encoding to link several
waves of Social Registry data recorded in Spanish. In general, the results of speci-
ficity and positive predictive values favor the use of probabilistic record linkage with
a bi-gram string comparator over the alternative which involves the use of phonetic
encoding to perform the merge. Probabilistic record linkage produces a higher rate
of successful linkages, but also a higher rate of false positive matches, with best
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results achieved after a thorough clerical review of the linked pairs.
Other methods like machine learning can be implemented in the future to possibly
improve the number of matched records. However, <reclink2> (Wasi and Flaaen,
2015) has proved to be a quite reliable tool and several public institutions use it to
link surveys nowadays. In the UK, for instance, several waves of the Small Business
Survey (SBS) are linked to the Inter-Departmental Business Register (IDBR) using
the Stata command <reclink2> (Prabhat et al., 2015).
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